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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Genealogy admits no a priori except an ancestor.'
I. INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN MUTUAL MISTAKE
This study gives a genealogy of precedent for the American contract doctrine
of mutual mistake of basic assumptions. It tracks the way in which precedents
came together to form the doctrine of mutual mistake and direct the application
of that doctrine in cases in which it is applied in the late twentieth century. The
first part of this study, the introduction, describes the doctrine's current
formulation, application, and rationale, and sets parameters to this study. The
second part traces the genealogy of mutual mistake. Conclusions follow. Inter
alia, this study determines that, though mutual mistake appears to take its form
from civil law, it retains within it and thus continues to enforce a portion of the
pre-classical common law contract doctrine of consideration.
A. Mutual Mistake Doctrine
Many law students learn about the American doctrine of mutual mistake by
studying the "cow case."2 Walker promised to sell Rose 2d of Aberlone, a cow,
to Sherwood.' Walker had purchased Rose as a breeder for $850; as a breeder
she was worth $750 to $1,000, he said.4 But Walker thought Rose's breeding
days had ended. He and Sherwood bartered for Rose as if she were only beef,
setting a price at about $78.' After the bargain was struck, Walker discovered
Rose was pregnant.' The court allowed Walker to keep the cow because Walker
I. Powhattan would not have guessed that two of his descendants, George Bush and Woodrow
Wilson, would become chief executives of a nation covering the continent. Gary Boyd Roberts,
Ancestors of American Presidents 266 (1989). Probably Pocahontas's role in presidential ancestry
comes as a surprise to many. Bush in fact shares common ancestry with 15 other United States
presidents; so did FDR. Id. at 262. Both Bush and FDR claim William Hutchinson, "noted religious
reformer, 'heretic,' and a founder of Rhode Island" as grandfather. 1d. at 239. Bush may be related
to as many as half of all Americans. Id. at xiii. Henry Squire, bom circa 1563, counts no fewer than
five presidents among his distant grandsons. Id. at 180. Ford and Nixon were related, id. at 243,
though that probably does not explain the pardon. (Ford and Nixon's common ancestry is through
Reverend Stephen Bachiler, of Hampton, N.H. Bachiler died about 1660. Id.) Nixon was also
related to Princess Diana, id. at 284, but so were John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Millard Fillmore,
Rutherford B. Hayes, Grover Cleveland, Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and FDR. Id. at 277-
85. Hnim ...1
2. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), limited to its facts in Lenawee County
Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Mich. 1982).
3. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 919-21.
4. Id. at 922.
5. Id. The price was "five and a half cents per pound, live weight fifty pounds shrinkage."
Id. at 920. Rose weighed 1420 pounds. Id. At that weight, less 50 pounds shrinkage, her price was
approximately $78.
6. Id. at 920.
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and Sherwood entered the contract believing that Rose was barren when she was
actually a breeder. They made a mutual mistake.
The Sherwood court required, as would courts today, that Walkerprove three
things in order to merit relief from his contract: (i) that a mistake of fact
occurred, (ii) that both parties to the contract made that mistake, and (iii) that the
mistake was serious enough to justify relief.' These elements are stated today
by courts in various ways. Some courts use the language proposed by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable
by the adversely affected party .... .
7. Henry Home, writing concerning Scottish equity jurisprudence in the 1700s, considered a
case directly converse to Sherwood:
A horse is purchased as a stallion for breed; but unknown to both [vendor and purchaser],
he happened to be gelt before the bargain. It may be doubted, whether such a bargain be
not effectual at common law, as the error is only in the quality of the horse; but
undoubtedly it may be set aside in equity, upon a principle mentioned more than once
above, That the vender certans de lucro captando, ought not to take advantage of the
purchaser's error, who is certans de damno vitando.
Henry Home of Kames, Principles of Equity 205 (Bell 4th ed. 1800). I tell students reciting
Sherwood "you can run but you can't 'hyde,"' to "take the bull by the horns" and "steer us right,"
"you've got this case corralled," "I've never 'herd' a better recitation," "you're obviously the cream
of the crop, here," "we just want the meat of the court's reasoning," "I'm going to milk this one for
all it's worth before we put this case out to pasture," "that will end the cheesy jokes," and "that was
udder nonsense." I get the class' attention by calling "hey." I suggest we take a poll to see whether
the case was rightly decided. That's the tail end, seriously.
8. See cases cited infra notes 9-21, 26-28.
9. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981). Section 152 also adds "... unless he
bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154." Id. For reasons discussed infra text
accompanying notes 74-79, I do not discuss assumption of risk in this study. The Restatement
(Second)'s statement of the rule has been widely followed. See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle
Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 525 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1172 (2d
Cir. 1989); Bumside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); United States v. Lewis, 964 F. Supp. 1513, 1521 (D. Kan. 1997); Louis Scherzer
Partners, LP v. FDIC, 885 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (D. Or. 1995); Ryan, Klimek, Ryan Partnership v.
Royal Ins. Co. of America, 728 F. Supp. 862, 870 (D.R.I. 1990); In re The Dow Co. "Sarabond"
Prods. Liability Litig., 660 F. Supp. 270, 275 (D. Colo. 1987); United States v. Southwestern Elec.
Coop., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 897, 899 (S.D. III. 1987); Shore Builders, Inc. v. Dogwood, Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 1004, 1011 (D. Del. 1985); In re Banister's Land Co., Inc., 57 B.R. 863, 865 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1985); In re Clark Entertainment Group, Inc., 183 B.R. 73, 78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995); Knieper
v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 128, 139 (Fed Cl. 1997); Morris v. United States, 33 Fed. CI. 733, 747
(Fed. Cl. 1995); Finley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 456 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Ala. 1984); Stormont v.
Astoria Ltd., 889 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Alaska 1995); Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. 1986);
Aig Hawaii Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395,399 (Haw. 1996); Maloney v. Sargisson, 465 N.E.2d
296,299 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); Gray v. First NH Banks, 640 A.2d 276, 279 (N.H. 1994); Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 560
A.2d 655, 659 (N.J. 1989); State v. Garley, 806 P.2d 32,35 (N.M. 1991) (dicta); Reilley v. Richards,
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Though generally courts agree that a "mistake of both parties," a "mutual"
or "common" mistake, is requisite,"0 they have disagreed how to phrase
the seriousness requirement. As alternatives to the second Restatement's
"basic assumption [having] material effect" formulation, courts require that
the mistaken fact be material," substantial,"2 fundamental," essential,'4
632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994); Fada v. Info. Sys. and Networks Corp., 649 N.E.2d 904, 908
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 691 P.2d 524, 538
(Wash. 1984).
10. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9 and infra notes 11-21, 26-28.
11. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 12 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1994);
Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992); U.S. Postal Scrv. v. Phelps
Dodge Refining Corp., 950 F. Supp. 504, 517 (E.D. N.Y. 1997); Matlock v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, 925 F. Supp. 468, 474 (E.D. Tex. 1996); R.J. Wildner Contr. Co. v. Ohio
Turnpike Comm'n, 913 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (N.D. Ohio 1996); In re Victory Markets Inc., 202 B.R.
668, 673 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1996); Merced County Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 284 Cal. Rptr.
680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App..1991); Dainty Rubbish Serv., Inc. v. Beacon Hill Ass'n, Inc., 630 A.2d 115,
119 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Eubanks v. CSX Transp., Inc., 478 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996);
Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 487 S.E.2d 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Shop'N
Save Warehouse Foods, Inc. v. Soffer, 918 S.W.2d 851, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Pharmacia Hepar,
Inc. v. City of Franklin, 676 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Hampton v. Surety Dev. Corp., 817
P.2d 1273, 1274 (Okla. 1991); Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 430 S.E.2d 676, 680 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1993); Knudsen v. Jensen, 521 N.W.2d 415, 418 (S.D. 1994); de Monet v. Pera, 877 S.W.2d
352, 356-57 (Tex. App. 1994); Great American Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 902
S.W.2d 488, 499-500 (Tex. App. 1993); see also generally, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(c) (1997)
(referring to "mutual mistake of a material fact sufficient to cause a contract to be ... set aside").
"Material" was the term used in the first Restatement. See Restatement of Contracts § 502 (1932).
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D. N.Y. 1996);
USPS, 950 F. Supp. at 516 ("substantial and fundamental"); The Indep. Order of Foresters v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc., 919 F. Supp. 149, 153 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Bailey v. Ewing, 671
P.2d 1099, 1102 (Idaho 1983) ("substantial and fundamental"); Carpenter v. Vreeman, 409 N.W.2d
258, 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("subject matter of the contract, or some substantial part thereof");
South v. Transportation Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 233, 235 (Mont. 1996); Weissman v. Bondy & Schloss,
660 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. App. Div, 1997); P.K. Dev., Inc. v. Elvem Dev. Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d
558, 559-60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); D'Agostina v. Harding, 629 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995); Loveday v. Cate, 854 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) ("substantial and fundamen-
tal"); deMonet, 877 S.W.2d at 357 ("subject matter of the contract and the substance thereof').
13. See, e.g., Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1997) ("fundamental
subject matter or terms"); Costello v. Sykes, 172 N.W. 907, 910 (Minn. 1919) (Hallam, J.,
dissenting); Copland v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); In re Marriage of
Murray, 852 P.2d 204, 205 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Knudsen, 521 N.W.2d at 418; Loveday, 854 S.W.2d
at 879 ("substantial and fundamental"); see also cases cited in the immediately preceding footnote
employing the terms "substantial and fundamental."
14. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 1996); Wilson v.
Massachusetis Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1548, 1551 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Rothman, 204
B.R. 143, 153 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 158 B.R. 343, 350 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1992) (reporting Ohio law); Hartford v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 870 P.2d 1202, 1207
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); In re Appraisal of Enstar Corp., 593 A.2d 543, 551 (Del. Ch. 1991) (finding
mistake "neither material nor essential"); Stewart v. Thrasher, 610 N.E.2d 799, 805 (I1. App. Ct.
1993); Jackson v. Blanchard, 601 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("material or essential");
Clayton X-ray Co. v. Evenson, 826 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Gocek v. Gocek, 612 A.2d
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vital, 5 the sine qua non or efficient cause of the contract,' 6 or going "to the
heart of the bargain" or transaction, 7 to the subject matter of the contract (as
opposed to something incidental), or to the "very nature of the purchase,"' 9
or that the mistake result in some hardship. 0 Some courts use more than one
of these terms.2 '
Courts and commentators have found this requirement of seriousness difficult
to understand and apply. Foulke said in 1911: "The law on this point is
1004, 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Vrabel v. Scholler, 85 A.2d 858, 860 (Pa. 1952) ("essence, the
sine qua non of the contract"); Knudsen, 521 N.W.2d at 418 ("It must go to the essence of the object
in view, and not be merely incidental."); Jennings v. Jennings, 409 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Va. Ct. App. 1991);
see also I Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and
America 157 (1836) ("In cases of mutual mistake, going to the essence of the contract, it is by no
means necessary, that there should be any presumptive fraud. On the contrary, Equity will often
relief, however innocent the parties may be.").
15. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 913 F.2d 1382, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing Idaho
law); McLaughlin v. Jung, 859 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988); Al Copeland Enterp. v. Schwab,
726 F. Supp. 254, 255 (E.D. Mo. 1989); In re Franklin County Visiting Nurses Ass'n, Ind., 73 B.R.
280, 282 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); Mar-Char Enterp. v. Charlie's The Lakes Restaurant, Inc., 451
So. 2d 930, 930 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1984); Hines v. Hines, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (Idaho 1997); Showalter,
Inc. v. Smith, 629 N.E.2d 272, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Dover Pool & Racquet Club, Inc. v.
Brooking, 322 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (Mass. 1975) (employing both basic assumption and vita!); Saline
County v. Thorp, 88 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Mo. 1935); South v. Transportation Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 233,
235 (Mont. 1996); Gramanz v. Gramanz, 930 P.2d 753, 758 (Nev. 1997); S.J. Groves & Sons & Co.
v. State, 273 S.E.2d 465,495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Globe Seed & Feed Co., 865
P.2d 451, 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah 1992); Downing v.
Stiles, 635 P.2d 808, 812 (Wyo. 1981).
16. See, e.g., Howell v. Waters, 347 S.E.2d 65, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Vrabel, 85 A.2d at
860 ("essence, the sine qua non of the contract").
17. See. e.g., Harbor Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Bituminous Coal
Operators' Ass'n, Inc. v. Connors, 867 F.2d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Onsite/Molokai Ltd.
Partnership v. GE, 838 F. Supp. 1390, 1396 (D. Haw. 1992); Palumbo v. Ewing, 540 F. Supp. 388,
393 (D. Del. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. National Tea Co., 323 N.E.2d 521, 528 (I1. App. Ct. 1975);
Childers v. Alexander, 571 P.2d 591, 594 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977); Davey v. Brownson, 478 P.2d
258, 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) ("heart of the subject matter of the transaction").
18. See, e.g., Homer v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1984); Sheng v. Starkey
Laboratories, Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083(8th Cir. 1997) ("fundamental subject matter or terms");
Texas Dep't of Housing & Community Affairs v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 68 F.3d 922, 931 (5th Cir.
1995); Harding v. Willie, 458 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) ("material... in respect to
the subject-matter"); Reilley v. Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994) ("material to the subject
matter"); Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 599 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. App. 1980); Rancourt
v. Berba, 678 A.2d 886, 887 (Vt. 1996) ("material fact affecting the subject matter").
19. See. e.g., Beasley v. Mcdin, 479 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. CL App. 1992).
20. See John Bums Constr. Co. v. Interlake, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (11). App. Ct. 1982)
(requiring the mistake to be "of such grave consequence that enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable").
21. See, e.g., Monet v. PERA, 877 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. App. 1994), which required in quite
non-technical fashion that the mistaken fact "involve[] the subject matter of the contract and the
substance thereof," be material and not relate "merely to a collateral matter," and be "essential to an
understanding of the consequences of the agreement." See also, e.g., cases cited supra note 12
employing terms "substantial and fundamental."
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probably as yet undeveloped, and we have not collected enough cases to enable
us to make any definite statement as to the principle involved."22  More
recently, commentators have called the element troublesome23 and imprecise. 4
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (and Professor Farnsworth's hornbook)
opts to give examples of the requirement's application rather than any definition
or guiding principle.25
However, a review of the case law establishes some consistent patterns of
application. Courts employ American mutual mistake to resolve a gamut of
cases which might appear unrelated at first glance. Mutual mistake applies to
warrant relief (or in other words, a factual assumption is found to be basic,
essential, etc.) most often when the mistake results in present impossibility or
26 27impracticability of performance, present frustration, or a gross undercutting
of the equivalence of the parties' exchange."8 Though not previously explicated
22. Roland R. Foulke, Mistake in the Formation and Performance of a Contract, II Colum.
L. Rev. 197, 299, 222-23 (1911).
23. Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. Legal
Stud. 309, 322 (1993).
24. Frona M. Powell, Mistake of Fact in the Sale of Real Property, 40 Drake L. Rev. 91, 92
(1991).
25. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 & cmts. (1981); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
§ 9.3 (2d ed. 1990).
26. See, e.g., Draper Mach. Works, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 815 P.2d 770,
778 (Wash. 1991); Rancourt v. Verba, 678 A.2d 886, 887 (Vt. 1996); see also, e.g., Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§ 152 cmt. b ("The term 'basic assumption' has the same meaning here as
it does in Chapter 11 in connection with impracticability .... ), 261, 262, 263, 266(1) (1981).
27. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 12 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994); U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 504, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)("The mistake must
be so fundamental that it defeats the object of the contract."); R.J. Wildner Contracting Co. v. Ohio
Turnpike Comm'n, 913 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Stormont v. Astoria Ltd., 889 P.2d
1059 (Alaska 1995); Copland v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) ("The
mistake must be material and fundamental so as to defeat the object of the contract."); Reilley v.
Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1994); Hampton v. Surety Dev. Corp., 817 P.2d 1273 (Okla. 1991);
In re Marriage of Murray, 852 P.2d 204, 205 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("Mutual mistake is a ground for
rescission ... if the'mistake is so fundamental that it frustrates the purpose of the contract.");
Loveday v. Cate, 854 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); see also, e.g., Hartle v. United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 843, 846-47 (1991); Thieme v. Worst, 745 P.2d 1076, 1079-81 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Murr
v. Selag Corp., 747 P.2d 1302, 1305-07 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Winter v. Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d
786 (Minn. 1987); City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990);
A.T. Switzer Co. v. Midwestern Constr. Co. of Mo., 670 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Hillside Assocs. of Hollis, Inc. v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 605 A.2d 1026, 1030-31 (N.H. 1992);
Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply, 691 P.2d 524, 538 (Wash. 1984); see generally
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 152 cmt. b ("The term 'basic assumption' has the same
meaning here as it does in Chapter II in connection with ... frustration."), 265, 266(2) (1981).
28. See, e.g., In re Clark Entertainment Group, Inc., 183 B.R. 73, 78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995); In
re'Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 158 B.R. 343, 350-51 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); Bailey v. Ewing, 671 P.2d
1099 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); Showalter, Inc. v. Smith, 629 N.E.2d 272, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
("[Tlhe transaction may be avoided if because of the mistake a quite different exchange of values
occurs from the exchange of values contemplated by the parties."); Garb-Ko v. Lansing-Lewis Serv.,
Inc., 423 N.W.2d 355,357-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); South v. Transportation Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 233
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in such short form, these three categories explain most of the case law.29 I am
not the first to notice these strong patterns of application. They lurked about the
case reports throughout the nineteenth and this century. They were noted by
(Mont. 1996); D'Agostino v. Harding, 629 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Showalter,
Inc. v. Smith, 629 N.E.2d 272, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); see also Edward H. Rabin, A Proposed
Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 1273
(1967); see generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(1) (1981) (requiring that the mistake
have a "material effect on the agreed exchange").
29. Recently Professor Andrew Kull suggested that a "windfall principle," namely that courts
leave unallocated losses where they find them, "frequently resolve[s]" mutual mistake cases. Andrew
Kull, Mistake. Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L.J. 1,9-11
(1991). Kull agrees that mutual mistake overlaps with present frustration in application (see, e.g.,
id. at 2-3) but argues that courts do not adjust losses after finding mutual mistake. With due respect
for Professor Kull, I do not see the same results in the American cases. The so-called "windfall"
principle Kull suggests seems to apply whenever courts do not grant relief for mutual mistake. Given
lawyers' penchant for bringing these mutual mistake claims, this occurs often. Usually it occurs
because courts find, the parties have assumed the risk of a mistake, but it can also occur because the
lawyer is trying to expand mutual mistake beyond its traditional bounds of application. To see in
a refusal to grant relief a hidden principle of "windfall" is unwarranted. Until courts articulate such
a windfall principle in mutual mistake cases, seeing it there is merely to mistake concomitance for
causation.
Kull also opines that courts do not generally grant relief after performance has begun and that the
executory contract is more likely to be rescinded. Kull, supra, at 10-11. Rescission, the traditional
remedy for American mutual mistake, is not generally available when the parties can not be placed
in their original positions, however. This traditional rule of equity, rather than a windfall principle,
probably accounts for hesitancy to grant relief after execution, when it is far more difficult to account
for all of the costs of performance. However, despite this difficulty, courts often do not leave losses
where they find them but order restitution in mutual mistake cases. See. e.g., J.J.B. Hilliard v. Fox,
735 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Va. 1990); Link v. Dowdy, 816 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); French
Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Okla. 1991); Isaacs v. Bokor, 566 S.W.2d 532
(Tenn. 1978); Stryken v. Panell, 832 P.2d 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). The cases are numerous.
Indeed, considering that mistake was a traditional ground for relief in the action for money had and
received, I would be surprised were they not numerous. A more complete view of the case law thus
shows that the windfall principle's results are not even concomitant with those of mutual mistake.
Perhaps Kull's windfall principle applies to the mutual mistake or common mistake doctrine
employed in the United Kingdom, where mutual mistake did not form fully until after classical
contract law reached its zenith in the United Kingdom courts. Possibly mutual mistake did not truly
develop in the United Kingdom until Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd., App. Cas. 161 (A.L. 1932). By that
time, United Kingdom courts had also developed doctrines of supervening impossibility and
frustration, in which United Kingdom courts and parliament had recognized that a windfall rule
operated. See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863) (impossibility); Krell v.
Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903) (frustration); Kull, supra, at 34-35 and n.122. The windfall principle was
(and is) not part of generally recognized American mutual mistake, however. Here, mutual mistake's
much earlier genesis in equity and in the action for money had and received precluded its application
to protect one party unless the other could be placed back in its original position. See infra Part II.
Moreover, mutual mistake's close ties to restitution even encouraged courts to order money to change
hands, in order to balance losses between parties. Kull notes that in the end English law dropped
the windfall principle and in its place adopted the restitutionary remedy. Kull, supra, at 34-35.
Ironically, the remedy the English courts adopted recognizes that mistake is akin to a failure of
consideration warranting restitution, see id., a fact American courts realized and put to general use
in the early 1800s. See Part ll.D.2.
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McKeag (1905),3" Foulke (1911), 31 Palmer (1962),32 Rabin (in part)
(1967), 3' and the reporters to the second Restatement (1981). 3'
Some categories of cases have been thought difficult to group with those
listed here. For example, courts have given mutual mistake relief when a vendor
and purchaser contract for a certain number of acres of land but the tract
transferred does not contain that number." Courts traditionally grant relief in
30. Edwin C. McKeag, Mistake in Contract: A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence 77-84, 124
(Columbia Univ. Press 1905) (noting the relationship between mistake and impossibility and
concluding that "mistake is not the dominant factor" in these cases; noting also that American
mistake doctrine recognizes mistake-in-motive).
31. Foulke, supra note 22, at 221-23 (recognizing that impossibility of performance and
something like unjust enrichment underlie many of the cases).
32. George E. Palmer, Mistake and Unjust Enrichment 35-39 (Ohio State 1962) (recognizing
that mutual mistake doctrine has been mostly applied in cases of present impossibility, frustration,
and unjust enrichment).
33. Rabin, supra note 28, at 1288-91 (recognizing that a principle of "gross inequality of
exchange" explains many cases).
34. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes these three categories. Its definition of
mutual mistake requires that the mistake have a "material effect on the agreed exchange," for
instance, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(l) (1981), which takes in cases in which the
exchange of the parties is grossly undercut. However, reference to frustration and impossibility is
inartfully buried in the comments to § 152: "The term 'basic assumption' has the same meaning here
as it does in Chapter II in connection with impracticability (§§ 261,266(1)) and frustration (§§ 265,
266(2)). See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a)." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 cmt.
b (1981). As a result, few courts have seen the connection between mistake and frustration and
impossibility. Most courts employing the Restatement (Second)'s terminology for mistake simply
decide frustration and impossibility cases under the rubric of "basic assumption." See generally, e.g.,
many of the cases granting relief for mutual mistake listed in the preceding footnotes.
Professor Famsworth claims that the Restatement (Second)'s phrase "basic assumption," a word
referring to the "seriousness" requirement of mutual mistake, comes from the Uniform Commercial
Code section on impracticability. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615; see Famsworth, supra note
25, at § 9.3; see also John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 91.D.l (3d ed. 1990). Probably
this phrase floated about contract and commercial law for years in discussions. The earliest I have
seen it, however, is in Foulke's 1911 article on mutual mistake. It appears in the midst of Foulke's
attempt to explain mutual mistake cases in which he sees a tie to unjust enrichment. He says
presciently, "[l]t may be said that there is injustice when the parties have mutually made the same
assumption as the basis of the formation of the contract, and it subsequently turns out that the fact
is otherwise .... " Foulke, supra note 22, at 223. This usage is foreshadowed by William W. Story:
"Where there is a mutual mistake, as to a fact forming the basis of the contract, the contract will be
void ...... William W. Story, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, Not Under Seal 69 (Little.
Brown 1844).
35. See generally, e.g., Speedway Enter., Inc. v. Hartsell, 251 P.2d 641 (Ariz. 1952); Dixon
v. Morse, 463 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1970); Hagenbuch v. Chapin, 500 N.E.2d 987 (111. Ct. App. 1986);
Overly v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 181 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. 1962); Ewing v. Bissell, 777 P.2d
1320 (Nev. 1989); Little Stillwater Holding Corp. v. Cold Brook Sand & Gravel Corp., 573 N.Y.S.2d
382 (Cty. Ct. 1991); Seyden v. Frade, 494 P.2d 1281 (Nev. 1972); Mills v. Brown, 568 S.W.2d 100
(Tenn. 1978); Branton v. Jones, 281 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981); 1 Story, supra note 14, at 158;
Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages Recoverable from Vendor Where There Has Been
Mistake as to Amount of Land Conveyed, 94 A.L.R.3d 1091 (1979) (hereinafter Annotation, Damages
for Mistake in Acreage]; Annotation, Relief by Way of Rescission or Adjustment of Purchase Price
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such cases for mutual mistake when the price in the contract was set "per acre"
rather than "in gross" or for a lump sum.36 These cases are consistent with the
categories set forth above. When the vendor agrees to sell more than he has, he
is prevented by present impossibility of performance. Alternatively, the
exchange is grossly undercut as to the mistaken acres, for the purchaser pays for
them in exchange for nothing." When the lot sold actually contains more acres
than the purchaser agrees to buy, the parties' exchange is grossly undercut as to
the excess acreage, for the vendor transfers them in exchange for nothing."
Another prominent and more difficult use of mutual mistake doctrine is
proposed by parties seeking to set aside a prior settlement of a lawsuit."
Frequently an injured party will argue that when settling it had injuries or claims
of which neither party knew."' A number of courts grant relief in such cases
if certain injuries were unknown but not if merely the extent of known injuries
was mistaken." Other courts disallow relief from settlements for mere mutual
mistake.42 These cases fit well in either the frustration-of-purpose category or
the gross-undercutting-of-the-exchange category. Whether relief is granted
depends on the parties' and the courts' view as to the purpose of, or the
exchange contemplated by, the settlement agreement at issue.43
for Mutual Mistake as to Quantity of Land, Where the Sale is in Gross, I A.L.R.2d 9 (1948)
[hereinafter Annotation, Relief from Sale in Gross]; Annotation, Relief by Way of Rescission or
Adjustment of Purchase Price. for Mutual Mistake as to Quantity of Land. Where Contract of Sale
Fixes Compensation at a Specified Rate Per Acre or Other Area Unit, 153 A.L.R. 4 (1944)
[hereinafter Annotation, Relieffor Mistake ofAcres]; 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 58,
92, 107, 109 (1997).
36. See. e.g., Speedway Enter., 251 P.2d at 646; Dixon, 463 P.2d at 285; Hagenbuch, 500
N.E.2d at 989-91; Ewing, 777 P.2d at 1323; Seyden, 494 P.2d at 1282; Mills, 568 S.W.2d at 102;
Branton, 281 S.E.2d at 801. The parties assume the risk of incorrect acreage when the sale is made
in gross. Branton, 281 SE.2d at 801. This rule is well-established, though it is subject to certain
exceptions. See generally, e.g., Annotation, Damages for Mistake in Acreage, supra note 35;
Annotation, Relieffrom Sale in Gross, supra note 35; Annotation, Relieffor Mistake of Acres, supra
note 35.
37. See, e.g., Dixon, 463 P.2d at 286-87;Hagenbuch, 500N.E.2d at989-91; Ewing, 777 P.2d
at 1324.
38. See, e.g., McGeorge v. White, 174 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943).
39. See generally. e.g., Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to
Avoidance of Release of Personal Injury Claim on Ground of Mistake as to Nature and Extent of
Injuries, 13 A.L.R.4th 686, 691 (1982) (listing hundreds of cases) ("The great weight of authority
is that a release of claims for personal injuries may be avoided under appropriate circumstances on
grounds of mutual mistake of the parties at the time of signing the release as to the nature and extent
of injuries.").
40. Id.
41. Id. § 5.
42. Id. § 3[b].
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990) (calling for an. analysis of
the intention of the parties and the circumstances under which the agreement was reached); compare
id. with id. at 265-67 (Spears, J., joined by Cook and Hecht, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that the
proper function of the courts in these cases is to balance peaceful settlement of disputes with policies
favoring just compensation of accident victims).
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Mutual mistake is distinct from other mistake-related doctrines such as
misunderstanding,"' mistake in performance or payment,4 mistake in
transcription,46 and unilateral mistake. 7 The rationales and policies which
animate these other doctrines differ from those guiding mutual mistake, and these
doctrines generally apply to fact scenarios other than those covered by mutual
mistake. 8 Moreover, these doctrines have a different history than mutual
mistake. They therefore lie outside the scope of this article. The volume and
complexity of material covered here requires a narrower scope.
B. Rationale
Mutual mistake's ambiguous doctrine and broad, seemingly unconnected
applications have prompted a number of courts and commentators to theorize as
to mutual mistake's rationale. Most recently, American mutual mistake has been
deconstructed"9 and subjected to economic analysis.50 Economic analysis
•44. The doctrine of misunderstanding is exemplified by the case of the ships Peerless: Raffles
v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (1864). In that case, a buyer agreed to buy cotton arriving on the ship
Peerless, and the seller agreed to sell cotton arriving on the Peerless, but the parties were referring
to different ships, so no contract formed. In a case of misunderstanding, the parties agree to different
performances. That is the standard explanation of Raffles. See generally, e.g., Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 20, 201 (1981); Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 361
(6th ed. 1996); Famsworth, supra note 25, § 7.9; Palmer, supra note 32, at 9-13.
45. Palmer aptly illustrates mistake in performance with Simms v. Vick, 65 S.E. 621 (N.C.
1909). In Simms, the maker of a $175 note overpaid it by $67.50 because he forgot an earlier
payment. The court allowed him to recover the overpayment. See also, e.g., Palmer, supra note 32,
at 21-30.
46. Mistake in expression or mistake in integration occurs when the parties reach agreement,
but in the final, written expression of their agreement express it incorrectly. For this type of mistake,
courts generally reform a contract so that it reflects the parties' agreement. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 155 (1981); Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.5; Palmer, supra note 32, at 17-21.
Mistake in transcription is also often referred to in the case law confusingly as "mutual mistake."
See, e.g., Terry Matthews, Inc. v. C&L Contracting, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 1434 (W.D. Okla. 1997);
Wedin v. Wedin, 944 S.W.2d 847 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (Griffen, J., dissenting); City of Fargo v.
D.T.L. Properties, 564 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1997); In re Estate of Harford, 936 P.2d 48 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997).
47. The elements of unilateral mistake are generally written to be similar to those of mutual
mistake, except that only one party need be mistaken as to the assumption and some additional
hardship must be shown and/or the other party must have known or had reason to know of the
mistake. See generally, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981); Farnsworth, supra
note 25, § 9.4; Palmer, supra note 32, at 88-98.
48. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 32; Foulke, supra note 22; see also generally John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 9-26 to 9-36 (3d ed. 1987).
49. Kenneth L. Schneyer, The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual Mistake, 34 Amer. Bus.
L.J. 429 (1997).
50. Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 23, at 309; Janet K. Smith & Richard L. Smith, Contract
Law, Mutual Mistake, and Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. Legal Stud. 467
(1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1978); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 90-103 (3d ed. 1986).
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yields inconclusive results as to mutual mistake's efficiency: the doctrine can be
applied efficiently or not."' Some have suggested that relief for mutual mistake
must be available in contract law, even though sometimes applied inefficiently
overall, to lower the potential risks of transacting or at least to bolster the
perception that courts will sanction the reasonable actions of contracting
parties."
Holmes thought that a contract induced by mutual mistake contained a
contradiction in terms. 3 In Holmes' view, Walker sold Sherwood "Rose the
mere beef cow," but Rose was not a mere beef cow, so the term "Rose" conflicted
with "mere beef cow." 4 Such a contract is "void," Holmes said, "because two
of its essential terms are repugnant, and their union is insensible."" By this
explanation, Holmes reduced a contract induced by mutual mistake to an
agreement to absurdity. Because an absurdity, by definition, means nothing
coherently, the parties have objectively agreed to nothing and no contract forms.
Mutual mistake is, therefore, a failure of the parties objectively to assefit.56
Perhaps Holmes' reasoning influenced later courts to state that a contract
induced by mutual mistake failed to show a "meeting of the minds." Cases citing
a "meeting of the minds" rationale abound." "Meeting of the minds" commonly
51. Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 23, at 339.
52. Students have suggested these rationales in my contracts classes.
53. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 242-45 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed:, 1963).
54. See id. at 243.
55. Id.
56. Holmes reduced many complicated contract questions to failure of objective assent.
Holmes' most infamous reduction involves Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng Rep. 375
(Ex. 1864), the case of the two ships Peerless. Seller and buyer contracted for the sale of cotton on
board "the Peerless," when that ship arrived in port. At least two Peerlesses existed, however, and
the seller meant one and the buyer the other. The court declined to enforce the contract without
giving a ratio decidendi. Id. Holmes thought that the parties had disagreed objectively, by agreeing
for objectively different ships. Later commentators have seen Raffles as a case of subjective, not
objective, disagreement, because the parties did appear objectively to agree. Professor Eisenberg
criticizes Holmes: "Holmes had it backward: the result in Peerless is correct because the parties
meant different things, not because they said different things." Fuller & Eisenberg, suprp note 44,
at 361. Holmes believed that the meaning of a proper name was the object to which it corresponded,
however, not what the speaker intended to mean by it. Holmes, supra note 53, at 242 245 n.7.
Under such a theory of meaning, the parties said different things. Holmes concedes tlat such a
theory of meaning can result in confusion, as in Raffles. Id.
57. See, e.g., Independent Order ofForesters v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc., 919 F. Supp.
149, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The purpose behind -a claim of mutual mistake is to rescind an
agreement between the parties that does not reflect a 'meeting of the minds."'); Sabine Coip. v. Ong
Wester, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 11 57, 1189 (W.D. Okla. 1989); In re Barrister's Land Co., Inc., 57 B.R.
863. 866-67 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985); Badgley v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 508, 512:(Fed. Cl.
1994); Marengo Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank of Woodstock, 527 N.E.2d 121,.124
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Wilkin v. Ist Source Bank, 548 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Harding
v. Willie, 458 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); Bouchard v. Blunt, 579 A.2d 261,.263 (Me.
1990); LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 496 N.E.2d 827, 830-31 (Mass. 1986); Jeselsohn v. Park Trust
Co., 135 N.E. 315, 317 (Mass. 1922); Melia v. Riina, 612 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (N.Y..App. Div. 1994);
Hampton v. Surety Dev. Corp., 817 P.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Okla. 1991); Madill Bank & Trust Co. v.
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refers to the parties' subjective agreement," though courts today sometimes
understand the term objectively, as Holmes would urge. 9 Perhaps Holmes'
influence remains strong here, for this explanation for mutual mistake is probably
more objectionable than any other60 and some account must be made for its
Herrmann, 738 P.2d 567, 572-73 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987); Knudsen v. Jensen, 521 N.W.2d 415, 418
(S.D. 1994) (noting that the mistake "must be so fundamental in character that because of it the
minds of the parties did not meet").
58. Murray, supra note 34, § 30; E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts,
76 Yale U. 939, 943-44 (1967). That is also the traditional meaning. In the nineteenth century,
when subjective assent was often considered necessary to contract formation, subjective "meeting of
the minds" was spoken of occasionally as if objective assent were irrelevant. See, e.g., Dickinson
v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876); Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T.R. 653, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790).
59. See Murray, supra note 34, § 30.
60. The meeting of the minds rationale is objectionable for several reasons. First, failure of
contracting parties' minds to meet, in the sense meant by Holmes, means that no contract formed.
Holmes appears to concede as much. Holmes, supra note 53, at 242-43. But courts almost
uniformly hold that mutual mistake renders a contract voidable, not void. See Kline v. Cisneros, 76
F.3d 1236, 1239 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Lloyd v. FDIC, 812 F. Supp. 293, 298 (D.R.I. 1993); Feaster
v. First Fed. Says. Bank of Kansas, 723 F. Supp. 1413, 1416 (D. Kan. 1989) ("[U]nder the doctrine
of mutual mistake the contract would be voidable, not void."); Tilbury v. Osmundson, 352 P.2d 102,
104 (Colo. 1960); Sargent v. Coolidge, 399 A.2d 1333, 1345 (Me. 1979); Maloy v. Smith, 341 P.2d
912, 915 (Okla. 1959) ("A deed procured through ... mutual mistake is not void but voidable.");
Kipp v. Agee, 457 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 1969) ("(M]utual mistake renders a contract merely voidable
and not void."); see also Stormont v. Astoria Ltd., 889 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Alaska 1995); Rekis v.
Lake Minnewaska Mountain Houses, Inc., 573 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). Thus,
either such contracts can form without mutual assent, as Holmes used "assent," or mutual mistake
does riot cause a failure of the parties' minds to meet objectively. Further, if the "minds met" notion
refers to subjective agreement, it is (or should be) irrelevant. In most cases, the subjective assent of
at least one party to an agreement is not strictly necessary under current contract law (at least the
other party must assent to a contract, or no one will enforce the agreement). See, e.g., Embry v.
Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84
S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954); Famsworth, supra note 25, §§ 3.6, 3.7.
Second, unless one holds to the objective correspondence theory of meaning espoused by Holmes,
see supra note 56, the parties' minds actually do meet in the formation of a contract induced by
mutual mistake. The parties make the same mistake, or the doctrine does not apply. Third, that
rationale confuses mutual mistake with misunderstanding, i.e., the case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2
H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864) (the case of the two ships Peerless). In Raffles the
parties minds truly did not meet subjectively, and that failure prevented contract formation. Possibly
the "minds not met" rationale made its way into mutual mistake cases when judges who did not
understand the difference between the two doctrines conflated them. Fourth, the rationale is
historically irrelevant. Mutual mistake doctrine was more or less fully formed by 1823. See infra
text accompanying notes 287-319. No mention of "meeting of the minds" occurs in mistake law
prior to or concurrent with that time. Finally, Holmes' rationale would render the mutuality of the
mistake irrelevant.
Holmes is at least in good company. Samuel Pufendorf spoke of error similarly in 1673:
When an error has arisen in regard to the very thing which was the object of the
agreement, the latter is vitiated, not so much on account of the error, as because the terms
of the agreement were not satisfied. For in agreements the object in regard to which they




popularity. Professor Hamburger ties mutual mistake to the civil law notion of
consensus in contracts, which required understanding of the circumstances
surrounding the contract, 6' but meeting of the minds fails to include this facet of
consensus.
Other courts reason that in a mutual mistake case the parties agree both
subjectively and objectively; these courts hold that a mutual mistake does not
cause a failure of minds to meet.62 These courts are more likely to cite a broad,
equitable rationale, such as unconscionability,63 or unjust enrichment,' or even
unfairness or injustice.65 Clearly courts are searching for an all-encompassing
rationale.
2 Samuel von Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem, Libri Duo IX.12 #
51 (Frank G. Moore trans., Oxford 1927) (1673). Pufendorfdoes not discuss mutual mistakes, but,
then, under this rationale they are irrelevant.
61. Philip A. Hamburger, The Development of the Nineteenth-Century Consensus Theory of
Contract, 7 Law & Hist. Rev. 241 (1989). According to Professor Hamburger, consensus included
for civilians a sufficient understanding of the circumstances to preclude mutual mistake. Id. at 283.
62. See, e.g., M.R. ex rel. D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 184, 192 (D.N.J.
1993) ("Mutual mistake presumes that the parties have had a meeting of the minds but that at the
time of contract both assumed the same misconception as to a basic assumption."); Hartford v.
Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 870 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
63. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 12 F.3d 472, 479-80 (5th Cir.
1994); Fulghum v. Kelly, 340 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Ga. 1986); Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 160
S.E.2d 659, 660 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Keller v. State Farm Ins. Co., 536 N.E.2d 194, 200 (111. App.
Ct. 1989).
64. See, e.g., Reggio v. Warren, 93 N.E. 805, 807 (Mass. 1911); Moritz v. Horsman, 9N.W.2d
868, 871 (Mich. 1943); see also, e.g., Murray, supra note 34, § 91.D.2. Professor George Palmer,
prominent author regarding the law of restitution, was chief promoter of the notion that mutual
mistake is best explained by unjust enrichment. See Palmer, supra note 32, at 38. Palmer said, "It
is the idea which brings most of the cases together." Id. By unjust enrichment Palmer meant,
however, "lack of economic equivalence, attributable to the mistake." Id. Perhaps Professor
Palmer's tying mutual mistake to this'narrow definition of unjust enrichment prompted Professor
Rabin's attempt to define basic assumption to include inequality of exchange such that the parties'
bargain is undercut. Rabin, supra note 28, at 1273 n.6 (calling Professor Palmer's monograph
extremely helpful). Palmer's definition is considerably more narrow than "unjust enrichment"
normally carries. Compare Palmer's "lack of economic equivalence, attributable to mistake," with
Harper v. McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 782, 784 (S.C. 1981), which employed a more traditional notion: "A
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to
the other .... [Tihe question is: Did he, to the detriment of someone else, obtain something of
value to which he was not entitled." Palmer admits that unjust enrichment is not "always essential
to relief." Palmer, supra note 32, at 38. In fact, in nearly every place Palmer cites the unjust
enrichment rationale as a factor, he also notes that the parties' general expectations of reality must
be protected. Id. at 38, 47 ("Enforcement in the name of protecting justified contract expectations
seems also to defeat such expectations. With the addition of a substantial enrichment of the
purchaser, the seller's claim for restitution is hard to resist.").
65. See. e.g., United States v. Lewis, 964 F. Supp. 1513, 1521 (D. Kan. 1997); Harbaugh v.
Hausman, 569 N.E.2d 523, 529 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties,
Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 136, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("justice and fairness"); D'Antoni v. Goff, 383
N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("justice and faimes"); Ray D. Lowder, Inc. v. North
Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 217 S.E.2d 682, 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) ("fairness").
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Commentators have been only a little more helpful. Most commentators
have only stated broadly that the presence of a mutual mistake undercuts the
policies for enforcement of a contract. Professor Palmer's book Mistake and
Unjust Enrichment, for instance, notes tersely: "When mistake in assumptions
occurs, the context that shaped the making of the agreement is seen to be false,
and if the discrepancy is radical the policies favoring enforcement of contract
lose much of their force."66 Professor Steven Burton's recitation is likewise
terse: "There are times when a mistake seems to undermine the authority of a
contract as a joint commitment stemming from the parties' autonomous
undertakings and enforceable because of their will or because socially benefi-
cial.' 67 And Professor Schneyer, focusing on contract's function of allowing
us to plan and make more orderly certain areas of our lives, concludes that we
need mutual mistake doctrine for protection because such attempts at order are
"meaningless if there is truly radical uncertainty about everything."68
The plethora of rationales offered indicates that no one knows the "true
rationale" for mutual mistake or that one does not exist. Some commentators
decry this lack of rationale.69 Others are content to report cases and decline to
try to explain mutual mistake's widely varying applications.7 Even so, no one
has suggested doing away with mutual mistake. Most agree the doctrine is
salutary, even though they cannot explain precisely why we have it.
66. Palmer, supra note 32, at 36; see also id. at 38 ("The reasons that justify enforcement of
contract are much diluted. Eventually they face a serious challenge.").
67. Steven J. Burton, Principles of Contract Law 220 (1995).
68. Schneyer, supra note 49, at 452. Professor Schneyer's discussion of the general purposes
of contract reflects concerns about contract as a set of social conventions that allow us to order
certain areas of our lives. See id. at 448-52. Home put the matter this way in the 1700s: "The
moral sense would be little concordant with the fallibility of our nature, did it leave me bound ......
Home, supra note 7, at 201.
Professor Frona Powell suggests that mutual mistake removes the justification for reliance on a
promise. Powell, supra note 24, at 117-18. Professor Edward Rabin likewise advises that mistake
law should "prevent one from profiting from a grossly disparate exchange resulting from the mistake
of another" as well as "protect an innocent non-mistaken party from harm flowing from a mistaken
party's attempt to rescind a contract honestly and fairly made." Rabin, supra note 28, at 1300.
69. Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 23, at 309-14; Foulke, supra note 22, at 222-23 ("The law
on this point is probably as yet undeveloped, and we have not collected enough cases to enable us
to make any definite statement as to the principle involved.").
70. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 & cmts. (1981) (comment a,
"Rationale," briefly explains (or merely repeats) some of the terms of § 152 but omits a rationale for
the rule); Restatement of Contracts § 502 & cmts. (1932) (same); Farnsworth, supra note 25, §§ 9.1-
9.3; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 48, § 9-26; 13 Walter H.E. Jaeger & Samuel Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts ch. 46 (3d ed. 1970) (listing most imaginably relevant cases but
grouping them as to the kind of transaction involved rather than according to the principles applied);
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts chs, 27-29 (2d ed. 1970) (same as Jaeger and Williston);
Foulke, supra note 22, at 197, 299 (noting the inconsistencies in the use of the doctrine and declining
to give a general explanation).
(Vol. 58
VAL D. RICKS
C. Purposes of this Study
This study gives a genealogical account of the development of American
mutual mistake. History explains its broad applications. History also prompts
further study of mutual mistake's rationale-or rationales (I think it unlikely that
a doctrine with such an ancient lineage and varied application over so many
centuries has now one singular reason for its existence). The willingness of
many to comment on mutual mistake without giving a rationale for it is as
interesting as the various attempts to rationalize it. Nietzsche claimed that the
desire to explain moral actions arose only when "aristocratic value judgments
declined."7  Perhaps we share such "aristocratic value judgments" With our
distant legal ancestors and therefore need no explanation for mutual mistake.
Indeed, one sees in this study a continuity between the decisions of Roman and
later civil courts, English law, and American jurisprudence. Though manifest in
different legal form, their concerns are sometimes also our concerns. But first
I must make some disclaimers.
D. Parameters of this Study
Some parameters on the scope of this study are necessary. First, time and
attention limit its focus. It does not trace mutual mistake much after it reached
its present formulation and application around 1840. Of course, other develop-
ments have occurred since that time, most notably the Restatements. These
developments were mostly formal, however, with respect to the elementary
doctrine of mutual mistake set forth above. They recognized the case law as it
stood and tried to report it, sometimes using new words to express the
seriousness element, for instance, but they did not change its substance much.
This study reports only the doctrine's genesis, which occurred long before the
Restatements and, with respect to the doctrine's application, even before or near
the beginning of the rise of classical contract law in America.
Second, the study focuses only on mutual mistake, not other kinds of
mistake such as unilateral mistake, mistake in transcription, or misunderstand-
ing.72 Third, this study does not try to explain non-American mutual mistake.
The American doctrine has English, Roman, and French ancestors. American
mutual mistake developed in America, however. English mutual mistake law
developed later and has since been influenced by developments peculiar to the
United Kingdom's largely monolithic court structure.73 Non-American mistake
71. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay I, section 2 (Walter Kaufman ed.
& trans., 1969).
72. These doctrines are distinguished from mutual mistake supra notes 44-48.
73. The English doctrine is also called "common mistake." Chitty on Contracts §§ 5-001 to
5-021 (27th ed. 1994); John Cartwright, Solle v. Butcher and the Doctrine of Mistake in Contract,
103 L.Q. Rev. 594 (1987). Current English mutual mistake law has been greatly influenced by the
decision of Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd., App. Cas. 161 (H.L. 1932), a House of Lords decision, and
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law appears in this study only insofar as it appears relevant to the development
of American mutual mistake.
Fourth, this study makes no attempt to explain assumption of risk, a
principle the second Restatement purports to make a part of mutual mistake
law.7'4 Assumption of risk doctrines have always been corollary to relief for
mistake." Several reasons exist for not discussing them here: (a) Risk analysis
is logically separate from mutual mistake; courts often analyze risk assumption
independently of mutual mistake doctrine.76 (b) Risk analysis gives a reason
subsequent decisions by lower tribunals. See, e.g., Chitty on Contracts, supra. Discussion of Bell
and its progeny present a different mode of analysis than that on which this study proceeds. In
England the legal system was made largely monolithic by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. A
single case such as Bell therefore has far-reaching effects. In America the federal legal system
prevents any contracts decision from having like effects. Thus, this study can, at most, discuss
American mutual mistake only in terms of general principles.
74. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 152, 154 (1981).
75. Maxims requiring risk analysis have been employed as corollaries to various mistake
doctrines since relief for mistake was first possible in America or England. Joseph Story's extremely
detailed explanation of mistake cases in 1836 lists numerous such maxims:
It is not, however, sufficient in all cases to give the party relief, that the fact is material;
but it must be such, as he could not by reasonable diligence get knowledge of, when he
was put upon inquiry. For, if by such reasonable diligence he could have obtained
knowledge of the fact, Equity will not relieve him; since that would be to encourage
culpable negligence.
I Story, supra note 14, § 146, at 159.
... where the means of information are open to both parties; and where each is presumed
to exercise his own skill, diligence, and judgment in regard to all extrinsic evidence. In
such cases Equity will not relieve.
Id. § 149, at 161.
In like manner, where the fact is equally unknown to both parties; or where each has
equal and adequate means of information; or where the fact is doubtful from its own
nature; in every such case, if the parties have acted with entire good faith, a Court of
Equity will not interpose.
Id. § 150, at 163. John Fonblanque, in annotating Henry Ballow's earlier 1737 equity treatise, noted
that "equity will not interpose, if the fact was, from its nature, doubtful, or, at the time of the
agreement, equally unknown to both parties ...." Henry Ballow, A Treatise of Equity 106 n.t
(Garland reprt. 1979) (John Fonblanque, rev., ed., ann., 1793) [hereinafter Fonblanque's Equity].
Fonblanque does not distinguish between mutual and unilateral mistake. Id. Powell, likewise,
writing in 1790, wrote similarly regarding assumption of risk principles, and declared them to govern
both cases involving mutual and unilateral mistakes. 2 John J. Powell, Essay upon the Law of
Contracts and Agreements 196-200 (Garland 1978) (1790).
76. Many cases employ risk analysis alternatively to analysis of mutual mistake, holding that
an assumption of risk renders analysis of mutual mistake unnecessary. See, e.g., Harbor Ins. Co. v.
Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 501-03 (D.C. Cir. 1995); P.K. Decv., Inc. v. Elvem Decv. Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d
558, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Copland v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995). On the other hand, sometimes courts confuse risk analysis with analysis of whether a fact was
serious or important enough that mistaking it warrants relief. See, e.g., U.J. Wildner Contracting Co.
v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 913 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that a mistake is




for denying mutual mistake, not granting it: Only if the adversely affected party
has not assumed the risk can relief be granted." This study focuses primarily
on how courts have given relief for mutual mistake. A logically separate factor
making relief inappropriate is only marginally relevant. Inasmuch as it appears
relevant, it appears briefly below.78 (c) Assumption of risk analysis is' not
unique to mutual mistake but is common to both unilateral and mutual
mistake."9 (d) Whether a party has assumed a risk is a fact-intensive question,
generally. 0 Thus, historical instances of risk assumption often bear less
precedential relevance to later cases.
On a related note, this study sees mistake-of-law cases in which relief was
granted as identical to cases of mistake of fact. Some courts have refused to
relieve for mistake of law,"t but some have granted relief: "[I]gnorantia juris
non excusat"' 2 did not prevent equitable relief, for example, in Bingham v.
Bingham (1748), 1 Lansdown v. Lansdown (1732),14 or Gartner v. Eikill
(1982). 5 Joseph Story attempted, not altogether'successfully, to reconcile cases
addressing mistakes of law."' In the end, Story concluded that courts' refusal
to grant relief for mistake of law resulted largely from judicial allocation of risk:
The law is available to all, and parties make legal conclusions at their peril.8 7
77. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981) ("[T]he contract is voidable by
the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in §
154 ...."); Restatement of Contracts § 502 cmt. c & f(l 932) (cmt. f: "Where the parties know that
there is doubt in regard to a certain matter and contract on that assumption, the contract is not
rendered voidable because one is disappointed in the hope that the facts accord with his wishes. The
risk of the existence of the doubtful fact is then assumed as one of the elements of the bargain.").
78. See infra text accompanying note 427.
79. The Restatement (Second) recognizes this fact by tacking risk analysis under § 154 to both
mutual and unilateral mistake. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 152 & 153 (1981); see also
generally, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 25, §§ 9.2-9.3.
80. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(c) (1981).
81. See, e.g., Heath v. A.B. Dick Co., 253 F.2d 30, 35 (7th Cir. 1958); Hartle v. United States,
22 CI. Ct. 843, 849 (1991); Murphy v. Torstick, 309 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958); In re
Estate of Hysinger, 785 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13
(Utah 1982); see also Marriott Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Capitol Funds, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 423, 428 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1974); Damstra v. Starr, 585 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. App. 1979).
82. See, e.g., Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 472, 102 Eng. Rep. 448,450 (K.B. 1802) (refusing
to grant relief); Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey 623, 649 (S.C. 1831) (counsels' arguments here are
a veritable "whose who" of English mistake of law cases).
83. I Ves. Sen. 126, 78 Eng. Rep. 934 (Ch. 1748).
84. Mosely 364, 25 Eng. Rep. 441 (Ch. 1730).
85. 319 N.W.2d 397, 399-400 (Minn. 1982); see also Gayle Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Federal Say. &
Loan Ins. Corp., 910 F:2d 574, 582 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting California law); Tidwell v. Tidwell,
505 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). Farnsworth calls it the modem trend. Farnsworth,
supra note 25, § 9.2.
86. 1 Story, supra note 14, §§ 110-40 (covering 35 pages).
87. See id. § 126, at 142 n.I (noting there is "much ... force" in the reasoning of Chancellor
Kent that "[e]very man is to be charged, at his peril, with a knowledge of the law" and stating that
failure to know the law is "culpable negligence" and further citing the maxim that the "law aids the
vigilant, and not those, who slumber over their rights").
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I see the cases similarly. This study therefore assumes that when courts have
granted relief for mistake of law, they have merely (a) refused to impose the risk
of legal mistake on the party seeking relief, and (b) treated the mistake of law
the same as a mistake of fact. Cases granting relief for mistake of law are
therefore the same analytically as mistake-of-fact cases in which the court does
not impose the risk of the mistake on the party seeking relief.
Finally, this study in no way attempts to give the last word on the history
and meaning of mutual mistake. Sources are limited; the sources relied on here
certainly do not give the full account; and undoubtedly I have overlooked
questions that could be asked. Perhaps more importantly, the questions asked
and answered here tell as much about the author as about the law, but I believe
that to be unavoidable."
II. ON THE GENEALOGY OF MUTUAL MISTAKE
Mutual mistake doctrines are ancient.s9 This study concludes that Ameri-
can mutual mistake developed in the early 1800s and was well-formulated in
88. After the noon bell booms out its twelve beats in my ear, it has often been said of me,
"[he] suddenly starts up and asks himself: 'what really was that which just struck?.' Nietzsche,
supra note 71, at Preface, I. Invariably I miscount the bells. Likewise most of us:
sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, "what really
was that which we have just experienced?" and moreover: "who are we really?" and,
afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life,
our being-and alas! miscount them.
Id.
89. The Roman law contained a doctrine of mutual mistake. See infra notes 90-106 and
accompanying text. Some known Anglo-Saxon procedure suggests a mistake doctrine of some sort.
A plaintiff would swear to the court:
In the name of Almighty God, thou didst engage to me sound and clean that which thou
soldest to me, and full security against after claim, on the witness of N. who then was
with us two.
J. Laurence Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, in Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law 183, 195
(1905). The defendant would then swear, if he could:
In the name of Almighty God, I know not in the thing about which thou suest, foulness
or fraud, or infirmity, or blemish, up to that day's-tide that I sold it to thee; but it was
both sound and clean, without any kind of fraud.
Id. at 196. Interpreters of this translation of a now-dead language can not be too careful. Any
inferences drawn from it are suspect. But if, as the plaintiff implies, infirmity exists in an item, and
if knowledge about the infirmity is relevant and fraud does not exist, then the defendant must have
been mistaken. That the defendant-seller's ability to make the oath discharged him (see id.) suggests
that mistake was not grounds for relief from a promise under Anglo-Saxon law. Assuming the
plaintiff would not have bought had he known of the mistake, any such mistake would have been
mutual.
Theoretical reasons for mutual mistake's existence in most legal systems suggest themselves:
Legal systems often proscribe an effect for the volitional act of two or more people. Given that we
err, even in important beliefs, it follows that such legal systems must address whether volition
mistakenly exercised changes the legal effect. Our law and its predecessors have typically attached
some legal significance to our volitionally entering into certain kinds of relationships or transactions.
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American courts by at least 1840. By then it had the same elements and roughly
the same application that it has today. American courts adopted into it doctrines,
ideas, and fragments of texts developed over centuries in first Roman and other
civil law, and then English law. I discuss first Roman and other civil law, then
English common law, English chancery, and finally American law.
A. Roman Law
The Roman digests"o give at least two clear instances of mutual mistake:
Ulpian: ... Now what are we to say when both parties are in error
over both the material and its quality? Suppose that I think that I am
selling and you think that you are buying gold, when it is, in fact,
copper, or again, that co-heirs sell to one of their number, for a
substantial price, a bracelet said to be gold which proves to be largely
copper? It is settled law that the sale holds good because there is some
gold in it. Even if a thing be of gold alloy, though I think it solid gold,
the sale is good. But if copper be sold as gold, there is no contract. 9'
Julian: ... You sold me a table plated with silver, with the
understanding that it was solid, neither of us being aware that it was
Ergo, our law must address the effect of mistake. Roman, civil, English, and American jurisprudence
all have done so.
90. Discussion of Roman law in this paper is necessarily truncated. The Roman law dealt with
several other forms of mistake outside the scope of this paper, including misunderstanding and
unilateral mistake. 2 The Digest of Justinian XVIII.I.9 (Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, and Alan
Watson, eds., Univ. of Penn. Press 1985) [hereinafter Mommsen's Digest) (misunderstanding:
"Hence, if I thought that I was buying the Comelian farm and you that you were selling the
Sempronian, the sale is void because we were not agreed upon the thing sold. The same is true if
I intended to sell Stichus and you thought that I was selling you Pamphilus, the slave himself not
being there."); id. at XVIII.I.l I (unilateral mistake: "[l]f I sell you a woman and you think that you
are buying a male slave, the error over sex makes the sale void."). Moreover, Roman law talked of
other kinds of mistake not often raised in American courts in the twentieth century, including error
as to the person with whom one was contracting or as to the nature of the transaction. Andrew
Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law 245-46 (Blackstone 1994); R.W. Lee, The Elements of Roman
Law §§ 53741 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 1956).
91. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.14. Scott gives the following alternative
translation:
But what shall we say where both parties are mistaken as to both the substances and the
nature of the object of the sale; as, for instance, where I think I am selling gold, and you
think that you are purchasing gold, when, in fact, the metal is brass; or where, for
example, two co-heirs sell a bracelet which is said to be of gold, at a high price to another
co-heir, and it is discovered that it is, for the most part, copper? It is held that this is a
sale, even though I think it to be gold, the sale will be valid, but where copper is sold for
gold the sale will not be valid.
5 S.P. Scott, The Civil Law, The Digest XVIII.l.14 (The Central Trust Co. 1973). Scott's translation
does not preserve as clearly the distinction between material and quality.
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not. The sale is void, and the money paid on account of it can be
recovered.92
These passages include at least two of the three elements of American mutual
mistake: (i) a mistake, and (ii) that is common to both parties to a transaction.
What kind of mistake warranted relief? The passage from Ulpian implies that
a "material" difference (an error "in materia") will qualify. To Americans,
material commonly means "relevant" or "important." Material in this passage
from Ulpian is distinguished from quality or "in ... qualitate," however.
Material in this sense probably means the stuff of which an object is composed,
its matter. Quality, as opposed to matter, may mean something like "that about
an object which is not essential to its being the material that it is." In another
passage, Ulpian equates material with substance and the Greek word for essence:
The next question is whether there is a good sale when there is no
mistake over the identity of the thing but there is over its substance ["in
substantia"]: Suppose that vinegar is sold as wine, copper as gold or
lead, or something else similar to silver as silver. Marcellus, in the
sixth book of his Digest, writes that there is a sale because there is
agreement on the thing despite the mistake over its substance. I would
agree in the case of the wine, because the [essence] is much the same,
that is, if the wine has gone sour; if it be not sour wine, however, but
was vinegar from the beginning such as brewed vinegar, then it emerges
that one thing has been sold for another. But in the other cases, I think
that there is no sale by reason of the error over the material ["in
materia"]. 93
92. 5 Scott, supra note 91, at XVIII.I.41.1. Mommsen, Krueger, and Watson give the
following alternative translation:
You unwittingly sold me, who did not know the facts, a silver-covered table as solid
silver; the purchase is of no effect and a condictio will lie to recover the money paid.
2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.41.1.
93. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.9.2. Scott gives the following alternative
translation:
Hence, the question arises, where no mistake is made as to the object itself, but there
is one as to the substance of which it is composed; as, for instance, if vinegar is sold for
wine, copper for gold, or lead for silver or something else which resembles silver, whether
there is a purchase and sale.
Marcellus says, in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that, in this case, there is a purchase
and sale, because the object was agreed upon, although there was an error with reference
to the matter of which it was composed. I am of the same opinion, so far as the wine and
vinegar are concerned; for, as they are very nearly the same thing, that is to say, the same
substance, provided the wine becomes sour, but if it did not become sour but was so in
the beginning, that is, if it contained vinegar, it will be held that one thing has been sold
for another. In the other instances, however, I think the sale was null, whenever a
mistake was made with reference to the substance of which the articles were composed.
5 Scott, supra note 91, at XVIII.l.9(2). The translation given in the text is preferred because it
preserves most closely the Latin terms. Interestingly, Scott translates substance as "the matter of
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This important passage confirms that an error in substantia or in materia might
void a contract, while an error of some other kind (such as in ... qualitate?)94
will not. However, which errors were in substantia, of the essence, was, difficult
to tell. Mistaking copper for gold, or vinegar for wine, was in substantia.
95
Mistaking gold alloy for solid gold was not.96 But is mistaking white wine for
red in substantia? What if we mistake 14-carat gold for 24-carat gold? A
pregnant breeder cow for a barren beef cow?9 A lot zoned agricultural for one
zoned commercial?" Modem Roman law commentators continue to puzzle
over what counted as the substance of a thing and what did not."
Puzzlement over what in substantia might have meant, besides causing
confusion as to what Roman law actually required, raises theoretical questions
about the rationale for Roman mutual mistake. Did the in materia or in
substantia element require that the mistake be important, or material to the
transaction, as does the word material in American law? Or did the Romans
attribute some metaphysical significance to an error in material or substance that
made a contract founded on one void by natural law?
which it was composed." He translates materia as "the substance of which the articles were
composed."
94. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.9, 10, & 14.
95. Id.
96. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.10 & 14 (Ulpian: "It is settled law that
the sale holds because there is some gold in it. Even if a thing be of gold alloy, though I think it
solid gold, the sale is good.") (Paul said: "It would be different if the thing was gold, although a
quality inferior to that supposed by the purchaser. In that case, the sale is good.").
97. This, of course, is the central difficulty of Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887),'
in which the court frames the discussion in roughly these terms also. See id. at 923-24, 924-27
(Sherwood, J., dissenting).
98. This was the mistake made in Golem v. Fahey, 13 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Cal. Dist. Ct. Abp. 1961).
The court he!d that the mistake warranted rescission, though the issue was mooted by the long-term
tenant's failure to rescind formally. 1d. at 63-65; see also Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397 (Minn.
1982), in which the court also held that a zoning ordinance mistake warranted rescission of the sale
of a lot. Id. at 400.
99. See discussions in Borkowski, supra note 90, at 245-46; W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of
Roman Law from August to Justinian 414-16 (Cambridge 1921); W.W. Buckland, Elementary
Principles of the Roman Private Law § 127 (Cambridge 1912); W.W. Buckland & Arnold D.
McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 196-97 (Cambridge 1965); W.A. Hunter, A Systdmatic and
Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order of a Code 581-84 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc.,
reprint 1992) (1885); Lee, supra note 90, §§ 537-44;. John George Phillimore, Private Law Among
the Romans from the Pandects 313-15 & 314 nA (McMillan & Co. 1863); James Mackintosh, Roman
Law in Modem Practice 181-85 (Rothman 1995) (1934) ("This is the case [of mistake] that gave the
most trouble" noting that Savigny tried to show that the difference was actually between "quality"
and "essence" as determined in the particular trade at issue). For an interesting discussion of
substance as opposed to accident as those words appear in Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 9.19 (1887).
see Robert L. Birmingham, A Rose by Any Other Word: Mutual Mistake in Sherwood v. Walker,
21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 197 (1987). Even if the in substantia doctrine identified aspects of a good
considered essential by those persons who usually traffic in it, no reason exists to restrict the
doctrine's application to transactions in regularly traded goods between those who regularly trade.
The doctrine would remain ambiguous when applied outside those parameters.
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In some cases of clear impossibility of performance, Roman law appeared
to adopt the natural law rationale. Roman law held void certain contracts for
impossible performances-namely those in which the object of sale had ceased
to exist."' One might think that parties would not contract to sell and buy a
non-existent item unless they mistakenly thought the object existed. One would
think, moreover, that such an object had changed its material or substance, from
existent to non-existent substance. Paulus in fact talks of one such contract as
if it were void for mistake (in possibly a third mutual mistake case from the
Digests):
I bought a house, both the vendor and I being unaware that it had been
burned down. Nerva, Sabinus, and Cassius say that even though the site
remains, there is no sale and the price, if paid, can be recovered by
condictio.'0 '
Here the focus is that the parties were unaware the house had burned down.
Gaius comes to the same result via natural law, however:
If we stipulate for something to be given to us, which is of such a
nature that this cannot be done, it is evident that such a stipulation is
void by natural law; as, for example, if an agreement is entered into for
the delivery of a freeman, or for that of a slave who is dead, or for a
house which has been burned, and this is done between parties who did
not know that the man in question was [ ] free, or that the slave was
dead, or that the house had been destroyed by fire.... A stipulation
is also void if a person contracts for property which belongs to himself,
not knowing that this is the case.'
100. "Even though there is agreement on a thing, if the thing ceases to exist before the sale, the
contract is void." 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.l.l5. Scott translates:
Even though the parties may agree upon the article which is the object of the sale, still,
if, in accordance with the course of nature, it ceases to exist before the sale is concluded,
the purchase will be void.
5 Scott, supra note 91, at XVIII.I.15.
101. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.I.57. Scott translates the same passage:
I purchased a house, both the vendor and myself being ignorant at the time when the sale
was made that it had been burned. Nerva, Sabinus, and Cassius say that nothing was
sold, even though the site remained, and that the money which had been paid could be
recovered by suit.
5 Scott, supra note 91, at XVIII.LS7.
Paulus' references to the parties' knowledge allows him to relate mistake law to fraud:
Where both purchaser and vendor knew that the house had been entirely, or partially
destroyed by fire, the transaction is of no effect, on account of fraud being set off on both
sides, and a contract which depends upon good faith cannot stand where both parties are
guilty of deceit.
Id. at XVIi1.1.57(3).




This passage places natural law prior to contracting parties' knowledge or
volition. If natural law actually held this position in Roman law, then Paulus'
reliance on (and Gauis' mention of) the parties' ignorance of the burned house
is irrelevant. Natural law would prohibit a legal obligation to sell or buy a
burned house prior, at least logically, to the civil law's taking account of the
parties' mistaken beliefs.'0 3 Possibly Romans relied on one rationale at one
time in their history and another rationale at another time. Mistake (and assent)
rationales come fairly late in Roman contract jurisprudence.0 4 Without further
light, Roman law remains ambiguous as to its ground for decision in these cases.
The presence of a natural law ground for deciding the burned house case
suggests a metaphysical explanation for material and substance in the other
mutual mistake instances noted above. If an item sold is different in substance
from the item named in the contract, then the item named in the contract does
not exist. If it does not exist, then a contract for it would be contrary to natural
law and therefore void. Interpreted this way, the parties' mistake warrants relief
not because it undermines consent to the contract but because it creates a contract
contrary to natural law. The Roman use of material and substance in the mutual
mistake cases leaves open this possible interpretation.
Though the theory of the Roman cases is uncertain, Roman law left mutual
mistake another lasting heritage: the fact patterns themselves. For instance, the
hypothetical in which one precious metal is sold as another appears often in later
literature.0 5 The fact pattern possibly cited most in American law involves
Gauis' dead slave, although in American discussion the slave becomes a
horse.
0 6
B. Other Civil Law
I have arbitrarily limited discussion of post-Roman civil law to that which
appears to have had the greatest effect on American jurisprudence. Civilians
103. See also 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.1.6 (Pomponius: "Regardless of
the purchaser's state of knowledge, purchase of'one's own property is void; but if he bought in
ignorance, he can recover the price he paid, because he was under no obligation.").
104. Assent theory of contracts and mistake law were formulated rather late in Roman law as
descriptions of classes of cases not previously generalized to such a degree. Buckland & McNair,
supra note 99, at 196-97; see also id. at 203-04 (discussing cases of impossibility under Roman law).
105. See, e.g., Wieler v. Schilizzi, 17C.B. 619, 624,139 Eng. Rep. 1219, 1221 (C.P. 1856) ("If
a man buys an article as gold, which everyone knows requires a certain amount of alloy, he cannot
be said to get gold if he gets an article so depreciated in quality as to consist of gold only to the
extent of one carat."); Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El. & BI. 849, 853-55, 118 Eng. Rep. 985, 987 (K.B.
1853) ("The case is precisely as if a bar was sold as gold, but was in' fact brass, the vendor being
innocent. In such a case the purchaser may recover."); Home, supra note 7, at 204-05 (As to errors
of quality, Home writes, "Or, I purchase a watch, the case of which I take to be gold, though only
silver gilt. Equity will not relieve me from the bargain .... "); I Robert J. Pothier, A Treatise on
the Law of Obligations I I (William D. Evans ed. & trans., R.H. Small 2d American ed. 1826).
106. See infra notes 206, 394, 430 and accompanying text.
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have been discussing error since the Romans described the cases noted above.
Grotius °7 and Pufendorf0 both wrote passages on error later cited in Ameri-
ca. Other than the Roman law itself, however, by far the most prominent among
civilian sources influencing early American and contemporary English authorities
is Pothier. Robert Joseph Pothier published his Treatise on the Law of
Obligations or Contracts in French in 1761.09 The work had a lasting
107. Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres appeared first in 1625. It gives natural
law and civil bases for the law governing nations. As to mutual mistake, Grotius reasoned from both
natural law and consent relating mistake to frustration of purpose:
1. The treatment of agreements based on a misapprehension is perplexing enough. It
is, in fact, customary to distinguish between errors which affect the substance of the
matter and those which do not ....
The majority of these distinctions come from the Roman law, not only the old civil law,
but also the edicts and decision of the praetors; and some of them are not entirely true or
accurate.
2. Now a method of ascertaining the truth according to nature is furnished to us by the
fact that as regards the force and effect of laws nearly every one agrees that, if [the
application of] a law rests upon the presumption of a certain fact which does not actually
obtain, then that law does not apply; for the whole foundation for the [application of the]
law is overthrown when the truth of the (alleged] fact fails .....
In like manner, then, we shall say that, if a promise has been based on a certain
presumption of fact which does not so obtain, by the law of nature it has no force. For
the promisor did not consent to the promise except under a certain condition which, in
fact, did not exist.
2 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, II.XI.VI (Francis W. Kelsey, trans., Oxford 1925).
Grotius was cited by Joseph Story. I Story, supra note 14, at 158 n.1 ("Grotius has made some
sensible remarks upon the subject of error in contracts.").
108. Samuel von Pufendorf published De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Libri Octo in 1672.
Pufendorf, like Grotius, rested his conclusions about error in contracts on lack of consent and natural
law. He concludes:
And so in contracts, an error about a thing or some quality of it, in view of which a man
was induced to enter the agreement, renders the agreement void. For it is supposed that
the man consented not absolutely but because of the supposition of the presence of that
thing or quality, on which as a condition he based his consent; and when the thing or
quality is not to be found, the agreement also is understood to be void.
II Samuel von Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Libri Octo 1.111.12 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather, trans., Oxford 1934) (translated from the edition of 1688). Pufendorf gives as an example
the Roman case of a soldier's father, on believing falsely that his son was dead, altered his will to
give the soldier's inheritance to another. After the father died, the soldier returned home and sued
for his inheritance. Pufendorf would hold the father's altered will void for lack of consent. Id. at
lIlIlI..VI (so would Grotius, see Grotius, supra note 107, at I].XI.VI.2; these facts were considered
anciently by Cicero). Pufendorf reasons, alternately: "[lt is possible to make a simpler reply on the
basis of natural law, to wit: The father's will was based upon the belief that his son was dead, and
since this is clearly false, the purpose of the father is null ...." Pufendorf, supra, at 111.111.6.
Pufendorf published an abridgment of De Jure Naturae et Gentium one year later, in 1673, called
De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem. It also contains a short statement of the effects
of error. See Pufendorf, supra note 60, at L.IX.12. Pufendorf is cited by the United States Supreme
Court at Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) 63, 71 (1837) (citing De Jure Naturae et Gentium for
the proposition that mutual mistake nullifies consent).
109. I Pothier, supra note 105, at 11. The first American edition of Pothier was published in
[Vol. 58
VAL D. RICKS
influence on the common law in England and America. At one time a British
commentator opined that Pothier's contract doctrine was "law at Westminster as
well as Orleans."" 0  Pothier's discussion of mutual mistake was likewise
influential, though terse. In fact, he merely cites the Digests, interpreting them
to rest solely on failure of consent rather than natural law:
Error annuls the agreement, not only when it affects the identity of the
subject, but also when it affects that quality of the subject, which the
parties have principally in contemplation, and which makes the substance
of it. Therefore if, with the intention of buying from you a pair of silver
candlesticks, I buy a pair that are only plated, though you have no
intention of deceiving me, being in equal error yourself, the agreement
will be void, because my error destroys my consent; for my intention was
to buy a pair of silver candlesticks. Those which you offer to sale [sic]
being plated, it cannot be said that they are what I intended to buy. This
is decided by Julian in a similar case, 1. 41. § 1ff. d.. and Ulpian, 1. 14,
where he says, Si aes pro auro veneat non valet."'
Later civilians largely followed Pothier's lead. Dean Roscoe Pound's 1914
comparative law textbook lists various Roman digest sections relating to mistake
and their modem civil code counterparts."' The codes and various civil law
commentators Pound cites generally agree with Pothier on mistake law, and
continue prominently to retain Roman law's distinction between essence/sub-
stance and quality/accident."' The distinction appears lately in Louisiana civil
law also." 4
1806.
110. Sir W. Jones, Essay on the Law of Bailments 29 (2d ed. 1804). Pothier had great influence
in America, also. R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American
Jurisprudence, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1649, 1654,1659 (1992) ("Indeed, in the American reports, Mansfield
and Pothier seem sometimes almost to have vied for the attention of American Lawyers, the former
emerging only slightly ahead of the latter in general repute.").
Ill. I Pothier, supra note 105, at i. The Latin Pothier quotes is translated in Mommsen,
Krueger, and Watson to read, "But if copper be sold as gold, there is no contract." 2 Mommsen's
Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.1.14.
112. Roscoe Pound, Readings in Roman Law and the Civil Law and Modem Code as
Development Thereof 34-44 (Harvard 1914).
113. Id. at 3943; see also John Makdisi, An Objective Approach to Contractual Mistake in
Islamic Law, 3 B.U. Int'l LJ. 325, 329 (1985) ("French law adopted the Roman concept of
actionable mistake but expanded the concept of error as to quality."). Home distinguishes errors in
substantialibus from errors in quality in Scottish equity. Home, supra note 7, at 204-05 (as to errors
of quality, Home writes, "The other kind is where the error is in the qualities of a subject, not in the
subject itself, a purchase, for example, of a horse, understood to be an Arabian of true blood, but
discovered after to be a mere Plebeian. The bargain is effectual at common law ...." and "I
purchase, for example, a telescope, believing it to be mounted with silver, though the mounting is
only a mixed metal. Or, I purchase a watch, the case of which I take to be gold, though only silver
gilt. Equity will not relieve me of the bargain .... ; as to errors of substance, see supra note 7).
114. See, e.g., Cutright v. Wilson, 410 So. 2d 1274, 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (Culpepper,
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C. English Common Law
1. Earliest Attitudes
a. Rejection
Conventional wisdom holds that early English common law did not
recognize mutual mistake."' A.W.B. Simpson reports that early assumpsit
entirely lacked a mistake defense."'  And indeed, English doctrine as it exists
J., concurring) (citing Pothier's section regarding error, including the language cited in this study
supra text accompanying note 109); see also George L. Bilbe, Mistaken Assumptions and
Misunderstanding of Contracting Parties-Louisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence, 44 La. L. Rev.
885 (1984); Timothy Hoff, Error in the Formation of Contracts in Louisiana: A Comparative
Analysis, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 329 (1979) (discussing various kinds of civil law error).
115. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the
Action of Assumpit 535 (Oxford 1975) ("The idea that mistake could form an independent ground
for invalidity belongs to the nineteenth century, when the theory of consensus ad idem, the meeting
of the minds, held sway."); Schncyer, supra note 49, at 431. Professor Atiyah describes Kennedy
v. The Panama Royal Mail Co., 2 L.R. 580 (Q.B. 1867), as the first "serious attempt... to lay down
a general principle as to the effect of mistake in contracts." Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of
Freedom of Contract 436 (1979).
116. Simpson, supra note 115, at 535. Professors Berman and Reid have recently described
succinctly the writ system of procedure in which the English common law developed and the genesis
of the writ of assumpsit:
In establishing, in 1178, the Court of Common Pleas as the first permanent professional
English royal court, Henry II had limited its civil jurisdiction to the types of complaints
for which the chancellor would issue a writ. At first, these were chiefly complaints that
alleged certain types of "trespasses" (as they came to be called) against the rights of
possession of land and chattels, as well as against the bodily security of the person. Later,
the chancellor also granted writs of "debt" for the payment of money that the plaintiff
claimed belonged to him, writs of "detinue" to recover damages for the wrongful
detention of the plaintiff's chattels, writs of "replevin" for the retum of chattels pledged
for an obligation that had been fulfilled, writs of "covenant" for breach of a sealed
instrument containing a promise, and various others. By the year 1300 there were dozens
of different types of such "forms of action" commenced by a royal writ issued to local
royal officials (sheriffs), ordering them to have the defendant before the judges of
Common Pleas or King's Bench to answer the charges stated in the writ. In the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, very few new types of writs were issued,
although one of them, "trespass-on-the-case," was of great importance, because it gave
a legal remedy for certain types of harm to persons or property caused "indirectly" and
also for certain types of harm caused by failure to perform an act that the defendant had
specially undertaken to perform (" special assumpsit"). In the 1530s and 1540s, a new
form of trespass-on-the-case called indebitatus assumpsit gave a remedy for breach of
certain types of obligations for which there was no express undertaking but one could be
implied because the defendant was "indebted," as when the defendant had received
something of value from the plaintiff and, in the absence of an agreement on the price,
would not pay for the benefit he obtained.
Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale
to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437, 451-52 (1996).
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today-in form somewhat like the American doctrine-apparentlydid not surface
in the English common law opinions until the latter part of the nineteenth
century." 7  Chandelor v. Lopus (1603)," 8 once a leading case establishing
caveat emptor doctrine, is indicative of the early common law's attitudes toward
mistake, at least with respect to the writ of assumpsit." 9
In Chandelor, a goldsmith sold Lopus a stone for £100 which the goldsmith
said was a bezar stone. 0 But the stone was not a bezar stone.' 2' Lopus'
complaint did not allege that the goldsmith warranted the stone's character or
that the goldsmith knew it was not a bezar, however. Lopus won at trial, but the
goldsmith appealed, claiming essentially that no relief could be granted if the
goldsmith could have been ignorant of the stone's true character. The court of
Exchequer-Chamber reversed, holding that Lopus could not sue without a
117. See infra text accompanying notes 225-238. Some indications exist that very early common
law granted relief for mutual mistake, at least for error of law. Consider the following from The
Mirror of Justices:
Contracts are avoided to the disadvantage of the party who would have gained by them,
by reason of vice .... Contracts are vicious ... (4) by reason of a false supposition.
(4) In the fourth case, as if false supposals be made in charters or other muniments.
Such is the case where a charter of feoffent is made but the donor remains seised; or
a charter of quitclaim is made to one is not seised; for no charter, sale or gift will hold
good permanently if the donor be not seised at the time of the contract in both rights, the
right of possession and the right of property. And as a charter which supposes a gift to
be made without a transmutation of seisin is void, so also is a quitclaim if the maker of
the charter be himself in the possession of the thing that is quitclaimed. And as in these
cases the charters are void, so also are the warranties and all that concerns such writings,
for they have no validity because of their false suppositions.
A' contract may make a false supposal as to homage done in fraud of the law, as if I
receive your homage in respect of any other service than the service which issues from
a hauberk fee [knight's fee].
The Mirror of Justices Book II, Ch. XXVII (Selden Society, William Joseph Whittaker, ed. 1895).
The Mirror was probably written about 1285-90, though the date is not certain. See id. at Frederic
William Maitland, Introduction, at xxiii-xxv. Doubts exist as to whether the Mirror reports the law
of its time correctly. See id. at xli-liv. Moreover, the Mirror's author appears to have been familiar
with Roman and canon law, and may have reported this instead of English court decisions. See id.
at xxxi-xxxv. In any event, the law of false suppositions, or any other hint of relief for mistake, does
not appear in the common law reports at a time relevant to the formation of American mutual
mistake, nor have I found any indication that early relief for mistake influenced American law.
118. Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1603).
119. See Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 109-10 n.x (note distinguishing English
common law from equity: "the general rule of the common law of England is caveat emptor").
120. A bezar stone or bezoar stone is "any of various concretions found in the alimentary organs
[of goats, for example] ... formerly believed to possess magical properties and used in the Orient
as a medicine or pigment." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Unabridged) 210 (1976).
121. Professor Atiyah suggests that the plaintiff in Chandelor may have been complaining that
the bezar stone did not have magical powers, not that it was not a bezar stone. Atiyah, supra note
115, at 179. This hypothesis would explain in part the court's reluctance to grant relief.
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warranty.' 22 Whether the goldsmith "knew it to be no bezar-stone, it is not
material."' Chandelor therefore implies that innocent mutual mistakes about
the subject matter of a sales contract do not warrant relief. The rule in
Chandelor was followed in many later cases. 4
b. Non-Existence of Subject Matter
Conventional wisdom leaves the tale half told, however. Sometimes relief
was granted at common law on what must have been mutual mistake facts
without reference to mistake. For instance, courts held void certain releases and
conveyances if the subject matter of the contract did not exist.' 2  Most likely
122. Merely affirming a representation or stating a fact about an item created no warranty under
the law at the time Chandelor was decided. See, e.g., Harvey v. Yonge, reported at Simpson, supra
note 115, at Appendix 16, wherein it was "held that an action does not lie at the suit of this B on
the naked assertion of S, and it was his folly that he [B] was willing to give this [money] to him [SI.
But it would be otherwise if S had warranted the term to be of such value, for the warranty is a
means of inducing confidence." To create a warranty, the seller therefore had to use specific
language such as "I warrant .... "
123. Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3, 3-4 (Ex. 1603).
124. See. e.g., Harvey v. Young, Yelv. 20, 80 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1602); Derry v. Peek, 14
App. Cas. 337, 356 (1889). The old common law sometimes took account of error in certain other
situations, however. St. Germain reported in 1519-20 "Certain cases and grounds where ignorance
of the deed excuseth in the laws of England, and where not":
If a man buy a horse in open market of him that in right had no property to him, not
knowing but that he hath right, he hath good title and right to the horse, and the ignorance
shall excuse him.
The italicized language is a chapter heading from Christopher St. Germain, Doctor and Student, Ch.
XLVII, at 256 (1787 ed.) (1519-20); Dialogue I published in 1530); see also William Noy, The
Principal Grounds and Maxims with an Analysis of the Laws of England 146 (Goodrich 3d American
ed. 1845). The horsebuyer became something like a buyer in the ordinary course. See U.C.C. § 2-
403. But the situation was different when land was at issue:
[lf a man buy lands whereunto another hath title, which the buyer knoweth not, that
ignorance excuseth not him in the law, no more than it doth of goods.
St. Germain, supra, Ch. XLVII, at 257; see id., Ch. XVI, at 151. The situation was also different
if the sale was not made in market overt:
Caveat emptor. If I sell another man's Horse, and he take him out of the Vendee's
possession; yet I shall have an action of debt for the money.
J. Phillipps, The Principles of Law Reduced to Practice 12 (1660).
125. See. e.g., Quick v. Ludborrow, 3 Bulst. 29, 30, 1 Roll R. 196 (13 Jac.), 81 Eng. Rep. 25
(K.B. c. 1616) (Dodderidge, Justice) ("[A] release doth not operate, but upon an estate, interest or
right, none of which is here in this case, and therefore his release is void."); Arthur v. Bokenham,
I I Mod. R. 148, 150-51 (3 Anne), 88 Eng. Rep. 957 ("[lIt is plain by the rules of the common law,
that is, such rules as are to govern conveyances and dispositions of estates, that the law did never
allow any person, by any conveyance at common law, to dispose of the lands he had not, or had no
right or interest in at the time of making and executing of such conveyance."); If John Joseph Powell
& Edward Wood, A Complete Body of Conveyancing, In Theory and Practice 64-65, 79-80, 338-39,
351 (Strahan & Woodfall 1791); 18 Vin. Abr. 299; John Cowell, The Institutes of the Laws of
England 172-73, 174 (Roycroft 1651) ("If a man promiseth to give a thing which is not in Rerum
natura, nor cannot be possibly, it is void, so if one promise that which is not any ones particularly,
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these were cases of mutual mistake. Serious parties, unless mistaken, would not
contract for a non-existent right. Indeed, we know from English chancery cases
that sometimes cases of this type resulted from mistake. 26 Some evidence
suggests that this line of English cases was based on natural law, just as were
some Roman resolutions of this fact pattern.'"
c. Account
The English common law also granted relief for mistake under the common
law action for account, long before Chandelor was decided. 28 Account was
burdened with technical requirements and procedures, however; it declined before
it could affect the development of American law.'
d. Money Had and Received
When the action of account declined, at least part of account's function
transferred to the action for money had and received, a form of indebitatus
assumpsit." ' Money had and received upon a mistake first appears in the law
reports in the later 1600s."' This action became prominent in the 1700s, as
as a thing sacred or publick." "A Covenant is made also invalid, by a condition which is naturally
impossible; as if the Covenant be to give me so much if I touch heaven with my finger .... ).
126. Several mistake cases involving title mistakes were brought in chancery. See, e.g.,
Hitchcock v. Giddings, 4 Price 135, 146 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ex. 1817); Bingham v. Bingham, I Ves.
Sen. 126, 27 Eng. Rep. 934 (1748) (Mr. Bingham's attempt to transfer to himself an estate he already
owned); Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 243, 23 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch. 1691). These cases are
discussed Infra notes 243-252 and accompanying text.
127. See. e.g., authorities cited supra note 125. For a later case, see Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El.
& BI. 849, 853-55, 118 Eng. Rep. 985 (Q.B. 1853) ("The case is precisely as if a bar was sold as
gold, but was in fact brass, the vendor being innocent. In such a case the purchaser may recover.").
128. To-iikins v. Bemet, I Salk. 22, 91 Eng. Rep. 21 (K.B. 1693); Hewer v. Bartholomew, Cro
Eliz. 614, 78 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1598); see also R.M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in
English Law (Cambridge 1936).
129. Commentators report various reasons for this decline. Barbour reports that the only remedy
for account was specific performance. W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English
Equity 16 (Octagon 1974) (1914). Moreover, no remedy was given for account until after two
hearings. Id. at 16 n.2. Jackson reports that account could be contested by wager of law. Jackson,
supra note 128, at 21 n.4. Also, until 1705 account could not be brought against executors. Id.
Jackson cites all these reasons as contributing to account's decline. Id. at 36. He also notes, though,
that the chancery court's inquisition-like evidentiary methods were far more likely to search out the
truth in an accounting than were the common law's rules of evidence. Id.
130. See generally Jackson, supra note 128; William A. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of
Quasi-Contracts 26-158 (1893); Peter B.H. Birks, English and Roman Learning in Moses v.
MacFerlan, 37 Current Legal Probs. 1, 22 (1984).
131. See Tomkins v. Bemet, Salk. 22, 91 Eng. Rep. 21, Skin. 411, 90 Eng. Rep. 182 (K.B.
1693) (Skinner reported as follows in dicta: "if a man pay money upon a policy of assurance,
supposing a loss, where there was not any loss, that in such case this shall be money received to the
use of the payer; [Holt, C.J.] admitted [this], because here the money was paid upon a mistake; the
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account was dying out. " In 1760, Lord Mansfield, in Moses v.
MacFerlan,'" described the money had and received doctrine as follows:
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not
in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much encouraged.
It lies only for money which ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to
refund .... [I]t lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consider-
ation which happens to fail ....
In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant,
upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural
justice and equity to refund the money.' 34
Some mutual mistakes were remedied before 1800 by means of the action
for money had and received, and possibly as early as 1693.135 Only after 1800
do these actions begin to mention "mutual mistake," however. 3 6 Even then
same law if it was upon a fraud in the receiver"); see also Jackson, supra note 128, at 58; Simpson,
supra note 115, at494-95; Atiyah, supra note 115, at 181-84; see also, e.g., Martin v. Sitwell, Holt,
K.B. 25, 90 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1691) (a failure of consideration case obviously involving a
mistake).
132, Atiyah, supra note 115, at 184.
133. Moses v. McFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
134. 2 Burr. 1005 at 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680-81 (K.B. 1760); see also Buller v. Harrison,
2 Cowp. 565, 568, 98 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244 (K.B. 1777) (Mansfield, C.J., adding that money
received by mistake ought to be returned "in point of equity and conscience"). Of course, Lord
Mansfield is wrong about it being one word-he spoke twenty-four. Relief for money had and
received by mistake was well-developed in the law by at least 1733. The court in Attorney General
v. Perry, 2 Comyns 481, 92 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1174 (K.B. 1733), reported that mistake could be:
under colour, and upon an apprehension, though a mistaken apprehension of having a
good authority to receive it, as where it is received by imposition, fraud or deceit in the
receiver (for there is always an imposition and deceit upon him that pays, where it is paid)
by colour of a void warrant or authority, although the receiver be innocent of it.
Id. at 491. Clearly a number of different kinds of mistake cases had been successful by this time.
Mistake law was not clearly explicated further in the early cases, however. Jackson, supra note 128,
at 59.
135. Sec, e.g., Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & S. 344, 105 Eng. Rep. 641 (K.B. 1815); Tomkins v.
Bernet, Salk. 22, 91 Eng. Rep. 21, Skin. 411, 90 Eng. Rep. 182 (1693) (indicating in dicta that
money had and received would lie in the case of an insurer's paying money to an insured when both
the insurer and insured mistakenly believed that a loss had occurred); Farrer v. Nightingal, 2 Esp.
639, 170 Eng. Rep. 481 (1798) (opinion of Lord Kenyon); Cripps v. Reade, 6 T.R. 606, 101 Eng.
Rep. 728 (K.B. 1796). In Cripps, Cripps paid money to Reade for a lease but was later ousted by
another with better right to the property. Lord Kenyon declared, "[H]ere ... . the [lease] ...
proceeded on a misapprehension by both parties that the defendant was the legal representative of
the lessee, though it turned out afterwards that he was not. As therefore the money was paid under
a mistake, I think that an action for money had and received will lie to recover it back ... ." Id.
at 729.
136. See, e.g., Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & S. 344, 105 Eng. Rep. 641 (K.B. 1815). The reasoning
in Cox, a case for money had and received, almost surely includes a reference to Pothier. Both Lord
Ellenborough and Lord Dampier (two of four judges) mention "mutual error," but Lord Ellen-
borough, whose opinion appears first in the reports, also refers to the parties' mistake as "equal
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they do not refer explicitly to mistake by the elements of American mutual
mistake we have discussed,13 7 though they generally grant relief on a showing
of a mistake and some seriousness or hardship. The presence of some or all of
these elements, ex aequo et bono, or in justice and conscience, required that
money had and received should be returned, but a distinct doctrine is not well-
formulated in these early cases. The money-had-and-receivedcases had a Roman
analogue, condictio,"' mentioned in Paul's "burnt house" case discussed
above.'39 Evidence of direct importation is not strong, however, though Roman
law influenced many English judges, particularly Mansfield. 4 Probably the
error," nearly the exact language used by Evans in his translation of Pothier. See supra text
accompanying note 109.
Powell's 1790 treatise on contract law discusses a kind of mutual mistake. He distinguishes
mistake brought about by fraud from the case of "an error or mistake respecting the thing or subject
bargained for, equally unknown to both parties." I Powell, supra note 75, at 140. But Powell
explains that no relief for mistake was given in this case:
if it plainly appear that there was no intention of fraud in either of the contracting parties,
and that the one had no more knowledge of the thing contracted about that the other;
there, if, in a doubtful point, one party mistake, it is so much the worse for him, but the
contract is valid notwithstanding; for the assent is complete and full to treat upon the
subject as it stands.
Id. at 142. Powell leaves open room for a case such as Bingham v. Bingham, I Ves. Sen. 126, 78
Eng. Rep. 934 (Ch. 1748), which probably involved a mutual mistake, see supra text accompanying
notes 243-247, but grounds such cases on failure of one party to assent, not on mutual mistake. I
Powell, supra note 75, at 147-51. Zephaniah Swift, writing in'Connecticut in 1796, agreed with
Powell. See 2 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 465 (1796)
(expressly rejecting equitable relief for mutual mistake; Swift is obviously quoting Powell).
137. See Cox v. Prentice, 3 M.& S. 344, 105 Eng. Rep. 641 (1815) (Ellenborough, CJ.,
declaring that "this is.a case of mutual innocence or equal error, which is not an unusual case for
money had and received ..... Our decision will not clash with the rule, caveat emptor; for here
both parties were under a mutual error, neither of them being to exercise nor exercising any judgment
upon the subject. I think this is a proper case for money had and received.") (Dampier, J.,: "It is
a case of mutual error.").
138. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.l .57; see also supra note 92; 4 Scott, supra
note 91, at VII.6.1; id. at XlI.6. Mackintosh records a translation of the Institutes of Justinian,
111.27.6.7, as follows:
A person to whom money, not owing, is paid by mistake is thereby laid under a quasi
contractual obligation; an obligation, indeed, which is so far from being contractual that,
in strictness, it may be said to arise from the extinction rather than from the formation of
a contract; for when a man pays over money intending thereby to discharge a debt, his
purpose clearly is to undo a bond already formed, not to create a fresh one; while the
person who takes the money comes under an obligation exactly as if he had received it
on loan, and therefore he is liable to a personal action (condictio).
Mackintosh, supra note 99, at 192-93.
139. See discussion of Roman cases listed supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
140. The earliest reported cases do not mention the Digests, nor have commentators generally
thought the action to have Roman origins. See generally sources cited supra note 135 (indicating
that English law of uses was money had and received's most direct ancestor), and Holmes v. Hall,
6 Mod. 161, 87 Eng. Rep. 918 (K.B. 1704); Berman & Reid, supra note 116, at 464-67. But see
I George Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery 633 n.c (Lea & Blanchard
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English court system between 1700 and 1820 handled most cases of mutual
mistake by means of the action for money had and received.
2. Money Had and Received, Mistake, and Consideration
Though Mansfield insisted that the action for money had and received was
"equitable" in nature," ' various legal historians have given a wholly legal
genesis for the action of money had and received. "2 Hazeltine attributed the
equitable notions found in money had and received solely to Lord Mansfield. 43
The mistake variant of money had and received also appears to be a legal, as
opposed to equitable, creation, at least as used in that action. " Both mistake
and failure of consideration cases in money had and received play a role in
American mutual mistake's history, however. In order to illustrate how, this
study must first explain what consideration historically meant as used in the
money had and received action.
The law courts may originally have borrowed the word consideration from
chancery or canon law.' 45 Moreover, what evidence exists indicates that the
chancery in the fifteenth century granted relief similar to that later available in
the common law action for money had and received.'46 But after the common
lawyers worked out a usage for consideration in the later 1500s, the chancery
generally followed it.'47 Accordingly, early precedents (in the 1600s) of failure
1846). Perhaps the emergence of mistake as a species of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received is best explained as lawyers' noticing that cases of failure of consideration oflen involved
mistake, as in Martin v. Sitwell, Holt, K.B. 25, 90 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1691). That theory also
explains the tendency of lawyers to refer to Martin as if it were a mistake case. See infra note 202.
Certainly an action for money had and received on a mistake was more palatable to lawyers familiar
with the Roman doctrine. Moreover, Mansfield's summary of money-had-and-received cases cites
condictio precedents explicitly. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680
(K.B. 1760); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV: The Nature of
Civilian Influence on Modern and Anglo-American Commercial Law, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 877, 955-56
(1987); Birks, supra note 130, at I. Birks shows that "Lord Mansfield's references to 'equity' are
to the Roman aequitas, not to the chancery jurisdiction." Birks, supra note 130, at 21.
141. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 680.
142. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 128; Simpson, supra note 115, at 303-14; Atiyah, supra note
I 15, at 181-84. Professor Birks argues that Mansfield meant by ex aequo et bono not doctrines of
English chancery, but the Roman aequitas, which meant "natural justice and equity" or "what is fair
when weighed ... by reason" or "reasonable." Birks, supra note 130, at 20-21.
143. Jackson, supra note 128, at xiv.
144. As to mistake, see Martin v. Sitwell, 1 Show. 156, 157, 89 Eng. Rep. 509-10, Holt 25, 90
Eng. Rep. 91!, 912 (K.B. 1691) (Holt, C.J.); Tomkins v. Bernet, Salk. 22, 91 Eng. Rep. 21, Skin.
411, 90 Eng. Rep. 182 (K.B. 1693).
145. See infra authorities cited notes 150-157; Simpson, supra note 115, at 316-488; Barbour,
supra note 129, at 66-168; R.H. Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 L.Q. Rev. 406 (1975).
146. See generally Barbour, supra note 129, at 123; Jackson, supra note 128, at 20-21.
147. Anonymous, Cary 5, 21 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ch. c. 1570-1602). This entire entry in Cary's reads,
"Upon nudum pactum there ought to be no more help in Chancery than there is at the common law,
neither against him that hath waged his law in debt, though peradventure falsely." Chancery did not
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of consideration in money had and received show no signs that chancery is the
source of the consideration concept.'4 Chancery appears not to have used
failure of consideration at all, not at least before 1800." 9
As used in money-had-and-received cases, particularly those of the
nineteenth century and prior, consideration should be understood in its old, broad
sense as a good reason for promising. The precise meaning of "consideration"
at common law has been debated by others at length.' 0 However, very early
follow this rule absolutely, however, as it occasionally broadened the meaning of consideration in
equity. See generally Roscoe Pound, Consideration in Equity, in Celebration Legal Essays (1919).
148. See Martin v. Sitwell, I Show. 156, 157,89 Eng. Rep. 509-10, Holt 25,90 Eng. Rep. 911,
912 (K.B. 1691) (Holt, C.) (in Holt's report, holding that "the money was received without any
consideration, and consequently ... received to the plaintiff's use"); see also Attorney General v.
Perry, 2 Comyns 481,490-94, 92 Eng. Reg. 1169, 1173-75 (K.B. 1733).
149. See generally, e.g., Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 361-74 & n.(g). Fonblanque
states that "as a covenant without a consideration is null, it is the same thing, if a cause of
consideration happen to cease." Though the chancery cases Fonblanque cites support that statement
roughly, they rest on broader grounds. Probably the most broad statement comes from Stent v.
Baillis, 2 P. Wins. 217, 24 Eng. Rep. 705 (K.B. 1724), in which the Master of the Rolls opined:
It is against natural justice, that any one should pay for a bargain which he cannot have;
there ought to be a quid pro quo, but in this case, the defendant has sold the plaintiff a
bubble or moonshine.
It is impossible that this bargain should ever be made good to the plaintiff .... and the
money cannot be said to be due in conscience, supposing the plaintiff to be incapable of
coming at what he contracted for, an in consideration whereof he was to pay his money.
2 P. Wins. at 219-20, 24 Eng. Rep. at 706. The court mentions consideration but clearly rests its
decision on something besides the lack of this legal element. Natural justice and conscience are
probably the best grounds for the decision, or impossibility or lack of a quid pro quo. Other cases
cited by Fonblanque likewise fail to show chancery's use of a doctrine of failure of consideration.
See. e.g., Hale v. Webb, 2 Brown C.C. 78, 29 Eng. Rep. 44 (Ch. 1786); Henley v. Axe, 2 Brown
C.C. 17, 29 Eng. Rep. 9 (1786); Mortimer v. Capper, I Brown C.C. 156, 28 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch.
1782); Steele v. Wright (1773), mentioned in Doe v. Sandham, I T.R. 705, 708 (1787); Brown v.
Quilter, Ambler 619, 27 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ch. 1764); Hanger v. Eyles, 21 Vin. Abr. 540 (declining
to aid in collection of a debt for which the debtor would receive no benefit; no mentioning of
consideration explicitly); Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wins. 307, 24 Eng. Rep. 1077 (Ch. 1734); Ex.
parte Manning, 2 P. Wins. 410, 24 Eng. Rep. 791 (Ch. 1727);,Hick v. Phillips, Prec. Ch. 575, 24
Eng. Rep. 258 (Ch. 1721) (mentioning the harsh and inequitable effects of the transaction); White
v. Nutts, I P. Wins. 61, 24 Eng. Rep. 294 (Ch. 1702); Cass v. Rudele, 2 Vern. 280. 23 Eng. Rep.
781 (Ch. 1692); Newton v. Rowse, I Vein 460, 23 Eng. Rep. 586 (Ch. 1687); Anonymous, 2 Chanc.
Cas. 19 (1679); Duckenfield v. Whichcott, 2 Chanc. C. 204, 22 Eng. Rep. 912 (Ch. 1674); Harding
v. Nelthrope, Nelson 118, 21 Eng. Rep. 804 (Ch. 1667-68); Carter v. Cummins (c. 1665), mentioned
in Harrison -#. Lord North, I Chanc. C. 83, 22 Eng. Rep. 706 (Ch. 1667). Notwithstanding that these
cases do not rest on failure of consideration, they do evince a broad concern with fairness in
transactions. In Brown v. Quilter, Ambler 620, 27 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ch. 1764), Lord Northington,
Chancellor, expressed his readiness to enjoin a landlord from collecting rent after the rental house
had burned down, notwithstanding that the common law had rejected such a result in Paradine v.
Jane, Aleyn 26, 73 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
150. See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 115 (historical discussion throughout); Simpson, supra note
115, at 316-488 (excellent historical discussion); Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 1.6; K. Sutton,




cases clearly reveal a broader concept than our twentieth century "bargain-based"
doctrine, broader even than the benefit/detriment doctrine the bargain concept
supposedly refined or replaced.'
One of the earliest explications of consideration in common law literature
is found in Christopher St. Germain's Doctor and Student, as published in 1530:
.. and of other promyses made to man vpon a certayne consyder-
acyon/ yf the promyse be not agaynst the lawe. As yf .A. promyse to
gyue .B. .xx.li. bycause he hathe made hym suche a house or hath lente
hym suche a thynge or suche other lyke/ I thynke hym bounde to kepe
hys promyse. But yf hys promyse be so naked that there is no maner
of consyderacyon why yt sholde be made/ than I thynke hym not
bounde to perfourme it/ for it is to suppose that there was som errour
in the makyng of the promyse. ..."'
The consideration outlined in St. Germain's text and often employed in the 1500s
has been variously described as a requirement for an "adequate motive,"'5 3
reason,'54 inducement,' 5 or cause" 6 for the promise given.'
When defined as good reason or appropriate circumstances for making a
promise, "consideration" could (and did) include payment of money,'
marriage, detriment, benefit,'5 9 a return promise, 6 ° natural love and affection
between immediate family members, s16 a prior debt, and possession of assets
151. Accord Atiyah, supra note 115, at 139-93; Simpson, supra note 115, at 316-26; 11 Thomas
Atkins Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability 64-66 (1906).
152. Christopher St. Germain, Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Ch. 24 (Selden Society
1974) (1530).
153. Simpson, supra note 115, at 322; Barbour, supra note 129, at 60.
154. St. Germain, supra note 152, at Dial. 11, ch. 24 (discussing consideration and causes as
"reasonable").
155. Barbour, supra note 129, at 60 ("motive or inducement ... sufficient to support a
promise").
156. See, e.g., Sharington v. Strotton, Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (1566). Doctor and
Student uses cause and consideration similarly or identically (which is difficult to tell). St. Germain,
supra note 152, at Dail. II, ch. 24.
157. Professor Simpson opined that "consideration" as used in the late 1500s had no synonym.
Simpson, supra note 115, at 331.
158. See, e.g., John Style's Case, published at Simpson, supra note 115, at Appendix of Cases,
No. 9, p. 630-31 ("The law is the same if I give certain money to one to make me a house by a day,
and he does not do this by the day-there this is a consideration whereby there for the nonfeasance
I shall have an action on my case").
159. See Mayor and Commonality of London v. Hunt, 3 Lev. 37,83 Eng. Rep. 565 (K.B. 1681),
held, for instance, that the benefit of a safe port was consideration sufficient to support a promise to
pay a customs charge imposed at the port. Id. at 565.
160. See, e.g., Strangborough & Wamers Case, 4 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1589).
161. See. e.g., various reports of Marsh v. Rainsford. In Marsh, a father sought to induce his
daughter's suitor to many the daughter, with a promise of 2001., but before the father and suitor
could agree on a day for payment, the suitor secretly married the daughter, after which the father
consented to the marriage and promised to pay 1001. The court gave the now son-in-law an action
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by executors and administrators.162  Consideration was central to recovery on
a promise, generally speaking. In fact, evidence exists that some jurists thought
on a writ of assumpsit, apparently on the ground that the father's love and affection for his daughter
were sufficient consideration. Marsh v. Rainsford, 2 Leon. I1I, 74 Eng. Rep. 400 (1587) ("Wrey,
Justice, Although the consideration be precedent, yet if it were made at the instance of the other
party, the action would have lien. But here the natural affection of the father to his daughter, is
sufficient matter of consideration."); Marsh v. Kavenford, Cro. Eliz. 59, 78 Eng. Rep. 319 (1587)
("Egerton and Foster argued, that this was no consideration; for it is past, and had no reference to
any act before: but if the marriage had been at the request of the defendant, and after the marriage
he promised, &c. this had been good. -Popham, Daniel, and Coke contra. For the father's natural
affection doth continue, and her advancement is sufficient cause of the promise."); Marsh v.
Rainsford, 2 Dyer 272b, 73 Eng. Rep. 608 (K.B. 1587) (reporting only the facts and the result);
Simpson, supra hote 115, at Appendix No. II, p. 633 (a much fuller report of the arguments of
counsel and judges, taken from a Harvard manuscript). In the Harvard manuscript the reporter
appears to have concluded: "And as I gather the better opinion of the justice was that if one marries
my daughter without my request, or without any communication had with me, or against my will,
nevertheless if after the marriage I say that in consideration of his having married my daughter, I
shall give him so much money, that on this he will have an action, for the natural affection is
sufficient." Id. at 636. Leonard, Croke, and the Harvard manuscript reporter all seem to have agreed
that natural affection between father and daughter constituted whole or part of the consideration in
this case. Other cases prove further that love and affection could function as consideration to make
a promise actionable in assumpsit. Church v. Church, reported in Hunt v. Wotton, Raymond 259,
83 Eng. Rep. 133 (31 Car. 2) (K.B. 1678) ("Where in assumpsit the plaintiff declared that whereas
the plaintiff had at his own charges buried the defendant's child, the defendant promised to pay him
his charges; and though there was no request laid, yet judgment was given for the plaintiff .... "),
and at Hunt v. Bate, 2 Dyer 272a, 272b n.(b), 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (K.B. 1568); Bret's Case, Cro. Eliz.
756, 78 Eng. Rep. 987 (K.B. 1600). In Bret's Case the court explained:
that natural affection of itself is not a sufficient consideration to ground an assumpsit; for
although it be sufficient to raise an use, yet it is not sufficient to ground an action,
without an express quid pro quo. But it is here good, because it is not only in
consideration of affection, but that her son should afterwards continue at his table, which
is good as well for the money due before, as for what should afterwards become due.
Id. Simpsot concludes from Bret's Case and Marsh that a past benefit combined with love and
affection was sufficient consideration to ground assumpsit. Simpson, supra note 115, at 436-37. At
least two American cases continue in a related vein, holding love and affection to be sufficient
consideration but holding that other kinds of consideration also existed in the case. See Dawley v.
Dawley's Estate, 152 P. 1171 (Colo. 1915) (enforcing a promise of a mother to pay money to her
adopted son, and holding that his adoption did not preclude the validity of love-and-affection
consideration); Arnold v. Park, 8 Bush 3 (Ky. 1871) (enforcing a release and stating, "[Alppellee was
the son of Geo. Park, and that of itself constituted a sufficient consideration"). At any rate, love and
affection continued to be a sufficient consideration in equity in cases of family settlements. See. e.g.,
Wycherley v. Wycherley, 2 Eden 175, 28 Eng. Rep. 864, 865 (Ch. 1763) (enforcing a memorandum
promising to execute a deed to secure £500 each to the defendant's sisters, the court stating it would
consider "the ease and comfort and security of families as a sufficient consideration"). Dutton v.
Poole, 2 Lev. 211, 83 Eng. Rep. 523, 1 Vent. 318, 332, 86 Eng. Rep. 205, 215 (K.B. 1677), which
gave third party beneficiary rights to a family member, also appears to give legal effect to love and
affection in contract law.
162. These categories are thoroughly discussed, with numerous citations, by Simpson, at
Simpson, supra note 115, at 412-45, 459-65. Consideration was defined slightly differently in
chancery than in law courts. See generally Pound, supra note 147.
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consideration more central than the promise itself"' . Only such prominence
accounts for such definitions as, "A consideration is a cause or meritorious
occasion, requiring a mutual recompense in fact or law."'" This prominence
also accounts, as Professor Atiyah notes, for the common law's proclivity for
implying promises, particularly in cases of prior debt, which were actionable
without a promise."s In such cases a consideration made relief in assumpsit
appropriate, but the promise was a fiction.
Courts were concerned with the substance of the consideration at this early
stage, not that promising took place in a certain form. St. Germain's Student of
the common law says: "[A] nude contracte is where a man maketh a bargayne
or a sale of his goodes or landes wythout any recompence appoynted for yt. '" 66
A bargain and sale can only lack consideration if bargaining and selling is not
itself consideration. But a bargain and sale most typically involved mutual
exchange, as Plowden later stated in 1566:
[A] bargain and sale is, when a recompense is given by both the parties,
as if a man bargains his land for money, here the land is recompense to
the one for the money, and the money is recompense to the other for
the land, and this is properly a bargain and sale.'67
As Plowden describes it, it is not the reciprocity of performances or promises
that gives consideration, but the recompense given for the promise. 6s It is true
that when a return promise was the alleged consideration, the plaintiff need not
have performed in order to recover from the defendant. 69 But such recovery
was justified on the ground that the defendant could later sue the plaintiff on the
163. See, e.g., Stone v. Withypoll, I Leon. 114, 74 Eng. Rep. 106; Cro. Eliz. 126, 78 Eng. Rep.
383, Owen 94, 74 Eng. Rep. 924; Latch, 82 Eng. Rep. 254 (K.B. 1588). Owen reports Coke's
winning argument: "The consideration is the ground of every action on the case ......
164. Calthorpe's Case, 2 Dyer 334b, 336b, 73 Eng. Rep. 758, 759 (K.B. 1574).
165. Atiyah, supra note 15, at 143-67. Atiyah argues that promises were sometimes thought
of merely as evidence of an obligation that arose out of the consideration. Id.
166. St. Germain, supra note 152, at Dial. II, ch. 24.
167. Sharington v. Strotton, I Plowden 298, 303, 5 Eng. Rep. 454, 461 (1566) (argument of
Plowden as counsel for the defendants).
168. See also John Rastell, Difficult and Obscure Wordes and Termes of the Lawes of this
Realme 47-48 (c. 1527, reprinted with English translation in 1579). Rastell defines Contract as:
a bargaine or couenaunt betweene two parties, where one thinge is gecuen for an other
which is called quid pro quo, as if I sell my horse for money, or if I make you a lease of
my manor of Dale in consideration of xx.li. that you giue me, these are good contracts
because there is one thig for an other, But if a man make promyse to mee that I shall
haue twentye shyllinges, and that hee wil be debtour to mee thereof, and after I aske the
the ww.s. and hee wil not deliuer it, yet I shal neuer haue any action to recouer this xx.s.
for that, that this'promise was no contracte but a bare promyse, and ex nudo practo [sic]
non oritur actio.
Id.
169. See Gower v. Capper, Cro. Eliz. 543, 78 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1596).
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plaintiff's promise.170  This recompense by action substituted where recom-
pense by performance might fail. Courts were concerned that some substantive
reason for the defendant's promise exist. This concern was most often expressed
in application of the doctrine of consideration. 17
Some early cases, which might appear to be exceptions, show good reasons
for promising apart from consideration itself. In Sturlyn v. Albany, 72 the court
said, "[F]or when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, however so small, this
is sufficient consideration to ground an action."' 73 But the consideration in that
case was that the promisee show the promisor a document embodying a legal
obligation that the promisor pay. Had the plaintiff neither done nor promised
anything, the plaintiff could still have sued by a writ of debt. In such a case the
substantive reason for the promise is satisfied and the formal action taken by the
plaintiff could suffice as consideration without lessening the court's satisfaction
that good reason for the promise existed.
Other cases, such as those involving an exchange of a small amount of
money for a more valuable promise or a chance at more money, 7 probably
show the beginnings of the formalistic bargain theory which eventually took the
place of more substantive concerns.' Sheppard indicates that in those kinds
170. See, e.g., Wichals v. Jones, Cro. Eliz. 703, 78 Eng. Rep. 938, 939 (K.B. 1599) ("for there
is a mutual promise, the one to the other; so that if the plaintiff doth not (perform], the defendant
may have his action against him; and so also the defendant shall be charged as to him; and a promise
against a promise is -a good consideration"). Manwood, J., argued that in the case of a promise
against a promise is not good unless the promisor whose promise is consideration had to perform or
actually does perform. Compare West v. Stowe], 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1577)
(Mounsen, J.: "here the consideration is sufficient, for here this counter promise is a reciprocal
promise"), with id. (Manwood, J.: "Such a reciprocal promise betwixt the parties themselves at the
match is sufficient; for there is consideration good enough to each, as the preparing of the bows and
arrows, the riding or coming to the place appointed to shoot, the labour in shooting, the travel in
going up and down between the marks; but for the bettors by, there is not any consideration, if the
bettor doth not give aim .... ").
17 1. But see also, e.g., St. Germain, supra note 152, at Dial. 11, ch. 24 ("Yf he to whome the
promyse ys made: haue a charge by reason of the promyse whyche he hathe also perfourmed: than
in that case he shall haue an accyon for that thyng that was promysed thoughe he that made the
promyse haue no worldelyprofyte byyt.") (emphasis added) (emphasizing also that detriment would
make a promise actionable).
172. Cro. Eliz. 67, 78 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1587).
173. Id. at 328.
174. See also, e.g., Rastell, supra note 168, at 47-48 ("but if any thinge were geuen for the
xx.shillinges though it were not but to the value of a peny, then it had ben a good contracte").
175. Plowden actually argued that a formalistic mechanism that forced deliberation could replace
consideration as reasons for promising, in Sharington v. Strotton, I Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454
(K.B. 1566):
[B]y the law ... there are two ways of making contracts ... for lands or chattles. The
one is, by words, which is the inferior method; the other is, by writing, which is the
superior. And because words are oftentimes spoken by men unadvisedly and without
deliberation, the law has provided that a contract by words shall not bind without
consideration. [Verbal agreements without consideration are unenforceable, and] the
reason is, because it is by words which pass from men lightly and inconsiderately, but
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of cases the jury probably gave "damages according to the loss," '  which
might well have been merely the small amount of money given or promised by
the plaintiff.
Powell's 1790 treatise on contract law 7' retains the older, reason-based
notion of consideration. But Powell shows signs of growing acceptance of
consideration as a formal mechanism forcing a party merely to deliberate before
promising, which mechanism disregarded the substantive reasons the party had
for promising. Thus, Powell reports: "A Consideration is the material cause of
a contract or agreement [the older doctrine]; or that, in expectation of which,
each party is induced to give his assent to what is stipulated reciprocally between
both parties [the newer doctrine]."' 8 Powell reports the old, reason-based law:
So if one buy of me an house, or other thing for money, and no
money be paid, nor earnest given, nor day set for payment, nor the
thing delivered; here no action lies for the money, or the thing sold, but
the owner may sell it to another if he will. 79
Without money already paid, a day set, or a thing delivered, no reason exists to
promise, so no reason exists to enforce the promise. Powell also notes that a
marriage will serve as consideration 8' as will prior, just debt's' or any "duty
before,"'" 2 past consideration given at the request of the promisor,"s and in
equity the establishment of family peace." 4 Mere bargaining will not serve:
"idle and insignificant considerations, are looked upon as none at all; for
whenever a person promises without a benefit arising ... or loss, it is considered
as a void promise."'85
But Powell's discussion of whether a mere writing can be consideration
indicates that the traditional, reason-based consideration theory is giving way to
where the agreement is by deed, there is more time for deliberation. For when a man
passes a thing by deed, first there is the determination of the mind to do it, and upon that
he causes it to be written, which is one part of deliberation, and afterwards he puts his
seal to it, ... [and so on]. So that there is great deliberation used in the making of deeds,
for which reason they are . . . adjudged to bind the party without examining upon what
cause of consideration they were made.
Id. at 308-09, 75 Eng. Rep. at 470. The court was never accepted by the Sharington court, however.
See id. at 309, 75 Eng. Rep. at 471.
176. William Sheppard, Action on the Case 18, 21 (1663)("... [F]or a penny is as much
obliging in a promise as 1001. But there it is probably the jury will give damage according to the
losse").
177. 1 Powell, supra note 75, at 330-69.
178. Id. at 330.
179. Id. at 331 (citing Sharington v. Strotton, I Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B. 1566)).
180. Id. at 350.
181. Id. at 351.
182. Id. at 350.
183. Id. at 351-52.
184. Id. at 362.
185. Id. at 355.
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a consent-based will theory of contract formation, which was more consistent
with and a precursor to our formal, bargain-based consideration. Lords Wilmot
and Mansfield had by 1765 already suggested in Pillans v. Van Mierop'" that
a writing could be consideration. Wilmot and Mansfield said the purpose of
consideration was to force deliberation, and a writing alone would suffice. 7
Though Powell thought a writing requirement alone would not force enough
deliberation,' s Powell agreed with Wilmot and Mansfield about consideration's
purpose." 9 Even though a sealed writing had always been enforced at common
law without consideration, Powell concluded that a sealed writing "import[s] in
itself a consideration, namely, the will of him who made it."'90 In the course
of his reasoning, Powell quoted Roman law at length, giving numerous examples
from Roman law in which an agreement is enforced because it shows the
deliberate "consent" of the parties reflected in a bargained-for exchange; Powell
opined that these exchanges suffice as consideration. 9'
Notwithstanding these indications of change, as of 1790 the older consider-
ation doctrine was still much in force. In the money-had-and-received cases
which gained prominence in that century, failure of consideration meant the
absence of the efficient causes or motives of the promise. This use of failure of
consideration retained some force into the twentieth century 92 and persists in
186. 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765). The King's Bench rejected this suggestion
in Rann v. Hughes, 7 T.R. 350, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 (K.B. 1778).
187. Pilans, 3 Burr. at 1669-73; 97 Eng. Rep. at 1038-40.
188. 1 Powell, supra note 75, at 355.
189. See id. at 330, 341-42.
190. Id. at 333. Powell here is quoting Plowden's argument from a portion of Sharington v.
Strotton, Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B. 1566). See supra note 175.
191. See I Powell, supra note 75, at 333-42. Powell writes:
A contract was the consent of two or more persons to something to be given or done. It
followed of course, that a promise accepted immediately became a contract; for, then,
there was the assent of two person to the thing promised.
Id. at 334. And later:
I give you this that you may give me that; which was where one gave money or goods
on a contract that he should be paid money or goods for them. Of this kind were all
loans ... and all sales of goods .... Orfacio utfacias, I do this for you, that you may
do that for me; this was where one agreed with another to do his work for him, if he
would do the work of the former in return; or where two persons agreed to marry
together, or to do any other positive act on both sides; or to forbear on one side in
consideration of something done on the other .... Or it might have been for mutual
forbearance on both sides ....
Id. at 335-36. Powell reports that all of these kinds of contracts were pacts with consideration in
Roman law-pacts with consideration, as opposed to naked pacts. Id. at 337-38.
192. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained failure of consideration in part:
That type of "failure of consideration" which is a defense is where the thing expected to
be received by one party and given by the other party, cannot be or has not been given
without fault of the party contracting to give it.
Cook v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 190 A. 99, 101 (N.J. 1936); see also Shirk v. Neible, 59 N.E.
281, 284 (Ind. 1901) ("An answer of failure of consideration implies that there was a consideration
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some of its original meaning today. Thus, some courts continue to scrutinize
contracts under a failure of consideration doctrine to ensure that good reason for
holding both parties to the bargain still exists, even though a bargaining process
has already occurred.
93
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, when American mutual mistake was
developing, courts employed this older understanding of consideration in the
action for money had and received, to determine when afailure of consideration
had occurred. In accord with this older understanding, a failure of consideration
occurred when the reasons for making the promise disappeared.
Failure of consideration, this meaning embedded in it, was closely related
to mutual mistake, for any time the parties mistakenly believed a fact the non-
existence of which would also result in a failure of consideration, relief was
warranted on either mistake or failure of consideration grounds. Jones v. Ryde
(1814)1 4 illustrates this point. In Jones, the defendant sold to the plaintiff a
negotiable instrument. Both assumed the instrument had not been altered from
its original. In fact, a forger had increased the amount of the instrument by
sufficient . . . but that it has subsequently failed, in whole or in part, without fault of the
defendant."). Consider also the following:
[Flailure of consideration implies that a consideration, originally existing and good, has
since become worthless or has ceased to exist or been extinguished, partially or entirely.
Douglass v. Douglass, 188 P.2d 221, 223 (Okla. 1947); see also, e.g., Benson v. Andrews, 292 P.2d
39, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Kelley, Glover & Vale, Inc. v. Heitman, 44 N.E.2d 981, 984 (Ind.
1942); Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, 157 So. 280, 281-82 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Henry v.
Reich, 72 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); Guss v. Nelson, 78 P. 170. 173 (Okla. 1904);
Shinn v. Stemler, 45 A.2d 242, 243 (Pa. 1946); In re Conrad's Estate, 3 A.2d 697, 699, 699 n.5 (Pa.
1938) (holding failure of consideration a defense to a sealed instrument); In re Killeen's Estate, 165
A. 34, 35 (Pa. 1932); Rauschenback v. McDaniel's Estate, I t S.E.2d 852, 854 (W.V. 1940). But
see Farrell v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 101 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936) ("Failure
of consideration is in fact simply a want of consideration."). Historically, failure of consideration
could also occur by breach of the other party after the first party's payment of money. See, e.g.,
Henry, 72 N.E. at 501 ("[I]t is the neglect, refusal and failure of one of the contracting parties to do,
perform, or furnish, after making and entering into the contract, the consideration in substance and
in fact agreed upon.").
193. The Fifth Circuit recently reported Texas law: "Failure of consideration occurs when,
because of some supervening cause after an agreement is reached, the promised performance fails."
In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 742 (5th Cir. 1990). Other cases report the law similarly. See
Henslee v. Boyd, 360 SW.2d 505, 507 (Ark. 1962); World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 728
P.2d 769, 773-74 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Womer Agency, Inc., v. Doyle, 459 N.E.2d 633, 635 (111.
App. Ct. 1984); Ryan v. Tinker, 744 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Ennis v. LcLaggan, 608
S.W.2d 557, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Fugelsang v. Fugelsang, 517 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987); Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1186 (Okla. 1993) ("The test is
whether the failure of performance defeats the object of the contract."); Bemal v. Garrison, 818
S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. App. 1991); General Ins. Co. of America v. Camicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502, 504-05 (Utah 1976). In some cases, the supervening or later nature of the failure is not part
of the formulation of the doctrine. See, e.g., Worner Agency, 459 N.E.2d at 635 ("Failure of
consideration ... necessarily admits the contract, but then refers to transactions in which
consideration was anticipated but did not materialize.").
194. 5 Taunt. 488, 128 Eng. Rep. 779 (C.P.D. 1814).
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10001. As a consequence, the plaintiff had paid 10001. too much for it and
sought recovery of that amount in an action for money had and received.1"
Gibbs, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, opined that the 10001. could be recovered
because it was paid by mistake. 9 ' Justice Heath, though agreeing with Gibbs
that the money was recoverable because paid under mistake, also noted, "If a
person gives a forged bank note, there is nothing for the money: it is no
payment."' 197 Justice Dallas combined mistake with failure of consideration
explicitly: "Upon the ground therefore that the money was in part paid by
mistake, upon a consideration that has failed, I am of opinion, that the Plaintiffs
are entitled to recover it back."' 98
Jones was typical of its time. 99 It seemed everyone who studied the
matter saw the overlap between mistake and failure of consideration. Blackstone
in 1783 discussed money had and received in such a way that failure of consider-
ation could be taken to include mistake.2" By 1893 William Keener argued
195. Id. at 488-89, 128 Eng. Rep. at 780.
196. Id. at 492-93, 128 Eng. Rep. at 781-82.
197. Id. at 494, 128 Eng. Rep. at 782.
198. Id. at 495, 128 Eng. Rep. at 782. Dallas, J., also speaks of the doctrines separately but as
if either were adequate grounds to grant relief in this case: "The case falls not only within the
general principle that where a man has paid more than the thing is eventually worth, and the
consideration fails, he may recover it back, but also comes within the express authority of Cripps v.
Reade [in which only mistake was mentioned]." Id.
199. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Willis, I Ch. App. 58,46 Eng. Rep. 906 (Ch. 1865) (Knight-Bruce,
L.J.: "There was substantially an absence of consideration and substantially a mistake .... ); Cocks
v. Masterman, 9 B. & C. 902, 109 Eng. Rep. 335 (KB. 1829) (counsel arguing that "[the money
in this case was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants without consideration, and under a mistake
as to the facts"); Bruce v. Bruce, 5 Taunt. 495, 128 Eng. Rep. 782 (C.P.D. 1814) (decided with
Jones); Staniforth v. Staggs, I Camp. 398 n.*, 564, 170 Eng. Rep. 998 n.*, 1059 (1808) (case argued
as mistake but held to be failure of consideration); Harvey v. Gibbons, 2 Lev. 161, 83 Eng. Rep. 499.
Harvey held that, because a servant could not legally release his master's debtor, the debtor's promise
given in exchange for a release by the servant was without consideration. It seems likely that the
parties to the Harvey contract would not have agreed had they known that the law prohibited the
servant's release from having legal effect, although it is possible that the debtor may have been
gambling to that effect. But see 4 Leon. 2, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (26 Eliz.) (The entire report reads, "A
man in consideration of 201. paid him, promiseth to assign to J.S. the lease of a stranger; it was
adjudged, that an action would lie upon such a promise, because the assumor might purchase the
house and then assign it."). A later American case handled an issue similar to that in Jones solely
as a failure of consideration. Terry v. Bissel, 26 Conn. 23 (Conn. 1857). For American cases
recognizing the relationship between mistake and failure of consideration, see Claflin v. Godfrey, 38
Mass (21 Pick) I (Mass. 1838); Champlin v. Laytin, 6 Paige 189 (1836); Bellas v. Hays, 5 Serg. &
Rawle 427, 440 (Pa. 1819) (Gibson, J.: "Mistake (is] perhaps not very different from want of
consideration."). American counsel argued both mistake and failure of consideration when both
appeared applicable. See, e.g., Mowatt v. Wright, I Wend. 355, 357-59 (N.Y. 1828) (arguments of
Troup and Raymond).
200. 111 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 162 (1783). Blackstone defined
money had and received as "when one has had and received money of another's, without any
valuable consideration given on the receiver's part." Id. Blackstone then says that this remedy "lies
for money paid by mistake." Id.
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at length, citing both English and American cases, that relief for money had and
received under a mistake could only occur if consideration failed.20" ' Street in
1906 and English lawyers before and after him cited failure of consideration
cases to support mistake analysis. 2  Foulke, in his 1911 discussion of
American mutual mistake, mentioned the relationship. 3 And as late as 1954
a British commentator argued that most common law mutual mistake cases were
grounded not on mistake but on failure of consideration. °4 This overlap in the
law continues today.2°
Failure of consideration cases thus overlapped with mutual mistake cases,
because reasons for promising can disappear because of a mistake. But failure
of consideration could also occur because performance is impossible from the
outset or because the purpose of a contract, the reason for making the promise,
is frustrated at the time the contract forms. Courts in money had and received
cases treated these fact patterns also as instances of failure of consideration or
mistake, or both.2 "6 Thus, in money had and received, mistake developed a
relationship with impossibility, frustration, and failure of consideration.
201. Keener, supra note 130, at 34-43.
202. Street, supra note 151, at 211 n.3. Both Street and Keener cite Martin v. Sitwell, Holt, K.B.
25, 90 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1691), as a mistake case. Street, supra note 151, at 211 n.3; Keener,
supra note 130, at 112. The parties in Martin may have been mistaken, but the court's opinion is
grounded solely on failure ofconsideration. Martin, 90 Eng. Rep. at 912. English lawyers also argued
Martin as a mistake case. Attorney General v. Perry, 2 Comyns 481, 492 (1733) (argument of the
attorney general). Strickland v. Turner, 7 Ex. 208, 86 R.R. 619 (1852), a failure of consideration case,
is cited for mistake in I Chitty on Contracts, supra note 73, § 5-011, and in Sir John Salmond & James
Williams, Principles of the Law of Contracts 223 (Sweet & Maxwell 1945).
203. Foulke, supra note 22, at 222 & n.87 (discussing Keener and other authorities).
204. C.J. Slade, The Myth of Mistake in the English Law of Contract, 70 L.Q. Rev. 385, 396-97
(1954).
205. See, e.g., Seitz v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 911 P.2d 605, 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
("Whether one characterizes these facts as a failure of consideration, a mutual mistake of material
fact, or [other] ... it is clear that petitioner is entitled to rescind this contract .... ); Cottonhill Inv.
Co. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Cape Girardeau, 887 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(reporting a trial court's determination that a mutual mistake caused a "substantially total failure of
consideration"). Reported cases in which mutual mistake is pleaded with failure of consideration as
a defense to a contract action are far too numerous to list, even if one restricts the search to cases
reported in the 1990s.
206. As to present frustration, see Cole v. Gower, 6 East 110, 102 Eng. Rep. 1229 (K.B. 1805)
(Ellenborough, C.J.); Staniforth v. Staggs, I Camp. 398 n.4, 564, 170 Eng. Rep. 998 n.*, 1059
(1808) (case of frustration of purpose argued as mistake but held to be failure of consideration);
Wilde v. Griffin, 5 Esp. 142, 170 Eng. Rep. 765 (1804); Wharton v. Hudson, 3 Rawle 390 (Pa.
1832); Rheel v. Hicks, 25 N.Y. 289 (1862) (a case in which money was paid to the government for
the support of an illegitimate child on the mistaken belief, shared by both parties, that a woman was
pregnant with an illegitimate child; she was not, it was later learned).; cf. Woodward v. Cowing, 13
Mass. 215 (1816) (dicta: the case was resolved against the plaintiff on assumption-of-risks grounds).
In England, cases of future frustration were denied. See, e.g., Gillan v. Simpkin, 4 Camp. 241, 171
Eng. Rep. 77 (1815); Jackson, supra note 128, at 86 & n.I. Gillan reported that relief for present
frustration was available in money had and received, however. Gillan, 4 Camp. at 242, 171 Eng.




When mutual mistake which rendered a contract voidable began to develop
in the English common law, it came slowly. Commentators often cite several
cases from the early to mid-I 800s as establishing such a doctrine, but cases from
this period do not generally mention mutual mistake, or even mistake.07
Contemporary writings of commentators on English common law confirm this
analysis. Comyn's early treatise on contracts 208 does not mention such a
mistake doctrine, nor does Chitty's reworking of Comyn's treatise published in
America in 1834.2" Reference to the doctrine occurs at least by 1807 in
equity, ° and dicta in an 1811 law case shows that at least some common
lawyers had thought about it.21' But cases actually resting on such doctrine
As to present impossibility handled as failure of consideration, see Farrer v. Nightingal, 2 Esp.
639, 170 Eng. Rep. 481 (1798), and American cases Murray v. Richards, I Wend. 58 (N.Y. 1828);
Merrit v. Clapp, 2 Cai. Cas. 117, 120 (N.Y. 1804) (holding a note failed as consideration when its
maker became insolvent); Keener, supra note 130, at 244; see also Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463,
467 (1857) (quantum meruit case); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197, 202 (1859) (quantum meruit);
Fenton v. Clark, II Vt 557 (1839) (quantum meruit). The Restatement classed impossibility as
failure of consideration as well. Section 399 of the first Restatement gives the following illustration
of failure of consideration:
A contracts to give B for $50, payable in one month, an option to buy for $10,000, A's
horse, Orion, at the end of a racing season lasting three weeks. In two weeks Orion dies.
B's contractual duty to pay $50 is discharged.
Restatement of Contracts § 399 illus. (1) (1932). This illustration is a variation of the dead horse
case from Roman law. See supra text accompanying notes 102, 106.
207. These cases typically rest on failure of consideration only, though probably they did involve
a mistake, namely the mistake that the consideration had not failed. E.g., Couturier v. Hastie, 5
H.L.C. 673, 101 R.R. 329 (1856), cited in Sir William R. Anson, Principles of the English Law of
Contract and of Agency in Its Relation to Contract 146 (Oxford 1952), and in Sir John Salmond &
James Williams, Principles of the Law of Contracts 220 (Sweet & Maxwell 1945). Chitty in I Chitty
on Contracts, supra note 73, § 5-0 11, recognizes Couturier's failure to mention mistake but cites it
anyway in the next paragraph to support a proposition concerning mistake, id. § 5-012] n.59. See
also, e.g., Strickland v. Turner, 7 Ex. 208, 86 R.R. 619 (1852), cited in I Chitty on Contracts, supra
note 73, § 5-011, and in Salmond & Williams, supra, at 223.
208. Samuel Comyn, A Treatise of the Law Relative to Contracts and Agreements Not Under
Seal (Riley 1809).
209. Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts, Not Under Seal (Francis J.
Troubat, ed., Grigg & Elliot 3d American ed. 1834).
210. Stapylton v. Scott, 13 Ves. Jun. 424, 33 Eng. Rep. 353 (Ch. 1807).
211. See Boughton v. Sandilands, 3 Taunt. 342, 368, 128 Eng. Rep. 136, 146 (C.P.D. 1811)
(Mansfield, C.J.: "No argument has been raised from the cases of contracts for the sale of goods,
for building houses, or the like. Such contracts, whether under seal or not under seal, if they proceed
on a clear mistake, on both sides, are void."); see also Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & S. 344, 105 Eng.
Rep. 641 (K.B. 1815) (a case in indebitatus assumpsit discussing the doctrine under the rubric of that
writ). A later case in equity, Robinson v. Dickenson, 3 Russ. 399, 38 Eng. Rep. 625 (Ch. 1828),
appears to question whether the dicta in Boughton actually represented the state of the law. Id. at
412-13, 38 Eng. Rep. at 631.
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must have been rare. However, the common law was moving toward recognition
of mutual mistake.
In Hitchcock v. Giddings (1817)12, the Court of Exchequer held that non-
existence of the subject matter of a contract at the time the contract of sale is
formed allows a court to refuse to enforce the contract. Though this holding in
itself appears to be little more than reiteration of former cases involving non-
existence of the subject matter of the contract, 2 1 Hitchcock foreshadowed our
mutual mistake doctrine in several ways.2 4 First, its facts are similar to many
modem cases to which mutual mistake doctrine is applied." 5 Second, it relied
on equitable precedent and notions of equity;"" courts today do the same."7
Third, Hitchcock granted in substance the modem equitable remedy for
mistake: The court refused to enforce the contract.2 " Later American courts
212. 4 Price 135, Daniell 1, 146 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ex. 1817).
213. See supra cases cited notes 125, 127.
214. Hitchcock was cited numerous times by American courts and commentators. See. e.g.,
Galloway v. Finley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 264, 277 (1838); Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) 63, 67
(1837); Smith Eng'g Co. v. Rice, 102 F.2d 492, 498 (9th Cir. 1938); United States v. Charles, 74
F. 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1896); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (D. Mass. 1869); Waples's Case, 16
Ct. Cl. 126 (1880); Bumside's Case, 3 CL Cl. 367 (1867); Hecht v. Batcheller, 17 N.E. 651, 652
(Mass. 1888); Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co., 25 A. 1070, 1073 (Pa. 1893); Ross v. Harding, 391
P.2d 526, 533 (Wash. 1964); Enrico v. Overson, 576 P.2d 75, 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); 1 Story,
supra note 14, at 157 n.3.
215. In Hitchcock, a seller sold a vested remainder in fee simple, expectant on an estate in fee
tail. Hitchcock, 4 Price at 135-36, 146 Eng. Rep. at 418. After signing the contract, the parties to
it learned that the tenant in fee tail had Suffered a recovery, so that the vested remainder had not
existed when the contract was executed. Id. at 136. See, e.g., Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190
(Va. Ct. App. 1966) (holding a lease void for mutual mistake because the lessor did not own the
property supposedly leased); Washington Sec. Co. v. State, 114 P.2d 965 (Wash. 1941) (resolving
a similar case on failure-of-consideration grounds); Robertson v. Robertson, 119 S.E. 140 (Va. 1923);
Wolfinger v. Thomas, 115 N.W. 100 (S.D. 1908); see also generally, e.g., cases of impossibility
cited supra note 26 and discussion concerning acreage cases supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text.
216. The court appears to have reasoned that if a Court of Equity would grant relief here for
mistake, and that result was consistent with common justice, then the Court of Exchequer would also
grant relief. Hitchcock, 4 Price at 139-41, 146 Eng. Rep. at 419-20. Chief Baron Richard's opinion
notes no fewer than five times what a court of equity would do in this case. Perhaps these references
are dicta. The court found fraud, which would warrant non-enforcement of the contract. But it
relied on equitable precedent to define fraud. Id. at 139 ("That is, without doubt, what we call a
fraud, in Courts of Equity."). For a case similar to Hitchcock in an American jurisdiction, see
Conner v. Henderson, 15 Mass. 319 (1818).
217. Cases noting mutual mistake's equitable character are far too numerous to list. See. e.g.,
UT Communications Credit Corp. v. Resort Dev., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 699, 707 '(Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
("Equity may grant relief against a. .. mutual mistake of both parties."); Brookside Memorials, Inc.
v. Barre City, No. 96429, 1997 WL 357862, 03 (Vt. June 14, 1997) ("Equity affords relief against
mutual mistake .... "); Diffendarfer v. Dicks, II N.E. 825, 828 (N.Y. 1887) ("[T]he jurisdiction of
chancery to rescind contracts for ... mutual mistake of material facts, is one of the best settled and
most beneficent powers of a court of equity.").
218. Hitchcock, 4 Price at 14142, 146 Eng. Rep. at 420.
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grant equitable rescission, which has the same result." 9 Granting relief from
enforcement differed from the normal common law method of dealing with
mistakes in indebitatus assumpsit, in which money had and received was repaid,
though indebitatus actions had been moving in this direction.2
In many ways, Hitchcock is an amalgam of prior lines of case law. In its
formal holding, Hitchcock clearly falls in the "non-existence of the subject
matter" line. As noted above, holdings of these types were fairly common, and
ancient with respect to certain kinds of contracts.2 ' On the other hand, in its
reasoning and language, it is an equity decision.222 Perhaps the court was
unduly influenced by counsel.2  Perhaps Hitchcock resulted from the odd
jurisdiction of the Exchequer, which sometimes sat in equity and sometimes in
law. Hitchcock was cited later by both law and equity commentators as
precedent.224 Hitchcock played a role later in the develtpment of American
mutual mistake law.
Beyond Hitchcock, further explicit English common law development
(relevant to American law) waits until 1867, for the case of Kennedy v. The
Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co. 22  Kennedy was a case
of innocent misrepresentation,2 6 but in such cases mutual mistake doctrine is
often applicable, 27 and the court discussed mutual mistake on the way to
219. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 504, 516
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Rescission is ... appropriate on ... ground of a mutual mistake .... );
Equitable Mortgage Corp. v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp., 791 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D. Miss. 1990)
("[T]he appropriate remedy is that of rescission."); Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assur.
Co., 640 N.E.2d 961, 966 (I1. App. Ct. 1994) ("Rescission is a proper remedy for ... mutual
mistake .. "); Schultz v. Hourihan, 656 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("A contract
is voidable under the equitable remedy of rescission if both parties entered into the contract under
a mutual mistake of fact .... ); McIntyre v. Zara, 394 S.E.2d 897, 900 (W.V. App. 1990) ("(T]he
circuit court should order rescission .... "). Of course, "rescission is not the exclusive remedy for
mutual mistake; a court may consider other equitable remedies in fashioning a just result." Thieme
v. Worst, 745 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
220. See, e.g., Farrer v. Nightingal, 2 Esp. 639, 170 Eng. Rep. 481 (1798), in which the plaintiff
sued in indebitatus assumpsit for return of £5 paid as a lease deposit. The court not only ordered
return of the £5 but declared that the plaintiff may "consider the contract at an end." Id. at 639-41,
170 Eng. Rep. at 481-82.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
222. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
223. See Hitchcock, 4 Price at 137, 170 Eng. Rep. at 419. Hitchcock was argued for the plaintiff
by a certain Fonblanque, perhaps the Fonblanque who annotated Ballow's treatise on equity.
224. 1 Story, supra note 14, at 157 n.3; Chitty on Contracts, supra note 73, § 5-011 n.51.
225. 2 L.R. 580 (Q.B. 1867). Professor Atiyah describes Kennedy as the first "serious attempt
•.. to lay down a general principle as to the effect of mistake in contracts." Atiyah, supra note 115,
at 436 (1979). That description fails to take account of American law.
226. In Kennedy, the plaintiff Lord Gilbert had bought stock in the defendant company on the
mistaken representation (which the company stated in the stock prospectus) that the company had a
contract to deliver mail to New Zealand. Kennedy, 2 L.R. at 582-84. On later finding the company
had no such contract, Lord Gilbert sought to have his money returned. d. at 580, 584.
227. Kennedy could have been tried as a mistake case because both the company and Kennedy
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refusing to grant relief.228 The Court's citation almost solely to Roman law is
particularly interesting:
The principle [at issue] is well illustrated in the civil law, as stated
in the Digest [XVIII.I.9-1l1]. There, . . . the framers of the digest
[state] thus: "Inde quaeritur, si in .ipso corpore non erretur, sed in
substantia error sit, ut, puta, si acetum pro vino veneat, aes pro auro, vel
plumbun pro argento vel quid aliud argento simile: an emptio et
venditio sit;" and the answers given by the great jurists quoted are to
the effect, that if there be misapprehension as to the substance of the
thing there is no contract; but if it be only a difference in some quality
or accident, even though the misapprehension may have been the
actuating motive to the purchaser, yet the contract remains binding.
Paulus says, "Si aes pro auro veneat, non valet, aliter atque se aurum
quidem fuerit, deterius autem quam emptor existemarit: tune enim
emptio valet." Ulpianus, in the eleventh law, puts an example as to the
sale of a slave very similar to that of the unsound horse in Street v.
Blay .... And, as we apprehend, the principle of our law is the same
as that of the civil law; and the difficulty in every case is to determine
whether the mistake or misapprehension is as to the substance of the
whole consideration, going, as it were, to the root of the matter, or only
to some point, even though a material point, an error as to which does
not affect the substance of the whole consideration. 29
After citing so prominently the Roman sources, Kennedy's reasoning afterwards
appears limited to misrepresentation. 30  Nevertheless, this passage from
Kennedy made an indelible impression on later mutual mistake law in Eng-
land." In the United States, the Michigan Supreme Court and others adopted
were in error as to the same fact. Id. at 580. Presumably the court would have reached the same
conclusion regarding mistake as it did representation, however, because both theories depend on the
analysis discussed in the case. Id. at 586-90.
228. See id. at 580. The court held that rescission from a contract induced by an honest, non-
fraudulent misrepresentation would only be granted when the misrepresentation prevented the subject
matter of the contract from being "in substance" that named in the contract. Id. at 588-90.
229. Kennedy, 2 L.R. at 587-88. Ulpian's statement translated reads: "The next question is
whether there is a good sale when there is no mistake over the identity of the thing but there is over
its substance: Suppose that vinegar is sold as wine, copper as gold or lead, or something else similar
to silver as silver." 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.i .9(2). Paul's statement may be
translated as follows: "It would be different if the thing was gold, although a quality inferior to that
supposed by the purchaser. In that case, the sale is good." Id. at 10. Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad.
456, 109 Eng. Rep. 1212 (K.B. 1831), was an assumpsit action arising upon the sale of a horse. The
court discussed failure of consideration but not mistake. See id. at 457-64, 109 Eng. Rep. at 1213-
15.d
230. Kennedy, 2 L.R. at 588-90. The court held that the company's representation was not "as
to the substance" of Kennedy's stock purchase. Id.
231. See, e.g., Bell v. Lever Bros., App. Cas. 161 (1932).
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Kennedy's Roman substance/essence v. accident/quality distinction into mutual
mistake law. 232 Reference to Roman law was the jurisprudential fashion of the
day for mutual mistake cases.2 33 Recently-reported common law cases resting
on that distinction are rare, however. 34
The language from Kennedy, besides proving a Roman parentage for some
states' versions of the seriousness element of mutual mistake, also shows a close
relationship between mutual mistake and the older consideration doctrine. The
Kennedy court was not content to require only a mistake as to the substance of
the object sold, or the agreement or transaction; that would have been the
Roman doctrine. Reference to that doctrine would allow us to speculate whether
the Kennedy court held to an importance or natural law theory of the seriousness
requirement in mutual mistake.
Kennedy's referenceto substance is not to the Roman in substantia, however.
Kennedy required a mistake as to the "substance of the whole consideration".23 5
Rome had no doctrine of consideration, nor did the civil law, so Kennedy's
requirement must be understood within the context of English common contract
law. Talk of "the whole consideration" makes little sense if consideration means
only a process or formal mechanism. I suggest consideration here refers to the
older, reason-based notion. If it does, Kennedy adopts the older consideration
232. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887), limited to its facts in
Lenavee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Mich. 1982) (rejecting the
substance/quality or accident distinction in favor of a basic/non-basic distinction); see also. e.g.,
Costello v. Sykes, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1919) (referring to Kennedy as a leading case); Hecht
v. Batcheller, 17 N.E. 651, 652 (Mass. 1888) (argument of Warren and Brandeis for the plaintiffs)
(citing also to Hitchcock v. Giddings).
233. Even mistake cases cited by Sherwood cited Roman authorities. See Gibson v. Pelkie, 37
Mich. 379 (1877) (citing to, inter alia, earlier English cases and to Pothier, supra note 105 and
accompanying text, which relied almost exclusively on Roman sources); Cutts v. Guild, 57 N.Y. 229
(1874) (citing Roman law and a number of English cases); Huthmacher v. Harris's Adm's, 38 Pa.
St. 491 (1861). The arguments of counsel in Huthmacher are especially interesting. Counsel for
both parties cited both American and English case law and civil law sources for various aspects of
their cases. With respect to mistake in particular, counsel for appellant said:
A tropical bird was sold recently in New Orleans, the owner finding in its craw some
valuable stones. Were these jewels sold with the bird?
38 Pa. -St. at 494. Counsel for respondent replied:
The citation of an ancient case touching this kind of contract, may be excused as an off-
set to the case[] of the tropical bird .... It is stated by Plutarch, in his life of Solon (Ist
Plutarch Lives 205) that ....
38 Pa. St. at 497. Did citation to the tropical bird case loosen the standards for argument? Because
it was a civil case or because it was cited loosely (and possibly inconclusively)?
234. See. e.g., Gartner v. Eikill, 319N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1982), which cites Sherwood. Gartner
does not rest on the distinction between substance and quality but instead cites the nearly equally
dubious distinction between value and "the very nature" of the subject matter of the contract. Id. at
399.




doctrine into mutual mistake analysis. Sherwood 6 recited this consideration
language as well as the Roman terms, 2" and the requirement that the mistake
affect the "substance of the consideration" is still found in some states' mutual
mistake law. 238  This was not the only time the older consideration doctrine
crept into mistake law, however. English equity showed signs of that much
earlier, and in America consideration was tied to mutual mistake from the
beginning.
D. English Equity
Were England's common law the only direct authority for our mutual
mistake, this history would be shorter. But mutual mistake had a more
complicated, more ancient history in English equity. In equity, however, the
doctrine is more obscure, at least in part because the early equity cases are
reported obscurely. 239  The doctrine of mutual mistake did not develop to its
current state in English equity. The Chancery granted relief for "mistake," or
"misunderstanding," without further explanation, and the doctrine became no
more specific than that. 4 Mistake was in fact a traditional head of English
chancery jurisdiction by the 1500S,241' but the chancery did not define various
236. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
237. See id. at 923.
238. See. e.g., In re Appraisal of Enstar Corp., 604 A.2d 404, 411 (Del. 1992); Iversen Const.
Corp. v. Palmyra-Macedon Central Sch. Dist., 539 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). Many
courts have stated such a requirement at one time or another. See, e.g., Hannay v. Steinman, 112
P. 1094, 1097 (Cal. 1911); Houghton v. Mendenhall, 52 N.W. 269, 270 (Minn. 1982); Rothschild
v. Frank, 16 Misc. 621 (N.Y. 1896).
239. See, e.g., Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vein. 242, 23 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch. 1691), which
Fonblanque reports as granting relief, Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 114 n."?", and which
Story correctly reports as denying relief, I Story, supra note 14, at 138-39 n.2. Reported cases in
English Chancery extend only back to the mid-I 500s, and between that date and 1660 their reporting
was both incomplete and haphazard. F.W. Maitland, Equity: A Court of Lectures 8 (John Brunyate,
ed., 2d ed. 1936); Barbour, supra note 129, at 66-168 (examining chancery petitions, occasionally
indorsed by the chancellor, before 1500). The Yearbooks occasionally mention a position taken by
the Chancery also.
240. See, e.g., Tothill 131,21 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ch.) (listing a variety of mistake cases from 1551 -
1632, most of which appear to involve scrivener's errors, and none of which appear to be mutual
mistake). But cf. Parke v. Peake, Choyce 116, 21 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1577) (scrivener's error
resolved without apparent reference to mistake). Possibly the doctrine had not developed in the civil
law either. Though the Romans distinguished mutual from unilateral mistake, and the cases
discussing misunderstanding are clearly distinguishable on their facts from other cases, the Romans
made no attempt to categorize mistake cases. Pothier discusses mistake in contract as if it were a
unitary doctrine. I Pothier, supra note 105, at 11-13.
241. See, e.g,, case authorities supra note 240; Henry Ballow, A Treatise of Equity (Nutt &
Goslih.g 1737). Ballow wrote:
Another Impediment of Assent is Ignorance and Error, either in Fact or Law; if it be the
Cause and Motive of the Agreement. And if the Mistake is discovered before any Step
is taken towards Performance, it is but just that he should have Liberty to retract; at least
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mistake doctrines. As a consequence, early chancery cases do not distinguish
mutual from unilateral mistake or misunderstanding (apparently granting relief
for all of these) or money paid by mistake, and barely distinguish mutual mistake
from fraud. 42
Some fact patterns in the early mistake cases appear to involve true mutual
mistakes, however; other kinds of mistake and fraud can be ruled out. For
instance, in Bingham v. Bingham,243 the plaintiff purchased an estate from the
defendant that the plaintiff had previously acquired by devise."' Why would
he do such a thing? He claimed the defendant told him the devise was void.2
4 5
If it was, then the defendant had prior right to the estate and could eject the
plaintiff. Plaintiff apparently purchased in order to avoid defendant's ejectment
suit. Later, when the plaintiff learned he had bought property he already owned,
he sued to get his money back. He won. The court held that "no fraud
appeared."' 4" That no fraud appeared indicates the defendant did not know the
upon satisfying the other of the Damage that he has sustained by losing the Bargain. But
if the Contract is either wholly or in Part performance, and no Compensation can be given
him, then is it absolutely binding, notwithstanding the Error. Yet this is not to be
understood where there proves to be an Error in the Thing or Subject, for which he
bargained. For then the Business is null in it self, by the general Laws of Contracting,
inasmuch as in all Bargains, the Matter, about which they are concerned, and all the
Qualities of it, good or bad, ought to be clearly understood; and without such a distinct
Knowledge, the Parties cannot be supposed to yield a full Consent.
Id. at 10.
242. Fonblanque's Equity treatise incorporates the same confusion. See, e.g., Fonblanque's
Equity, supra note 75, at 116-22 & nn.t-x. Fonblanque writes about mistake and error generally:
"Another impediment of assent is ignorance and error, either in fact or in law .... [And] where
there proves to be an error in the thing or subject for which (a person] bargained; ... then the
business is null in itself, by the general rules of contracting .... In support for this proposition,
Mr. Fonblanque cites various cases sometimes involving, inter alia, misunderstanding in the Raffles
v. Wichelhaus sense, e.g., Graham v. Hendren, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 185 (1816), and supra notes 56 and
60 (discussing Raffles v. Wichelhaus), money paid by mistake, The President, Directors, etc., of the
Union Bank v. The President, Directors, etc. of the Bank of the United States, 3 Mass. 74 (1807),
and suspiciously fraudlike facts, Cocking v. Pratt, I Ves. Sr. 400, 78 Eng. Rep. 1105 (Ch. 1749) (see
also Cocking v. Pratt, Supp. Ves. Sr. 176, which reports the allegations found in the bill in equity).
Mistake in assumption appears to be the ground for many of these decisions, however. See Cocking,
I Ves. Sr. at 400-01; Bingham v. Bingham, I Ves. Sr. 126, 78 Eng. Rep. 934 (Ch. 1748) ("there was
a plain mistake"); Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 242, 23 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch. 1691); Gee v.
Spencer, 1 Veto. 32, 23 Eng. Rep. 287 (Ch. 1681) ("a misapprehension in the party"). Henry
Ballow's equity treatise contained this same confusion. Ballow, supra note 241, at 10. Powell's
section on equitable jurisdiction to relieve from contracts likewise appears to group mutual and
unilateral mistake. 2 Powell, supra note 75, at 196-203. Though Powell describes mistake
warranting relief as "mistake in the parties," he describes his examples as those "entered into upon
the (mistaken] presumption by one of the parties of a fact." Id. at 196. Hamburger also notes this
obscurity in early mistake cases. See Hamburger, supra note 61, at 282.
243. Bingham, I Ves. Sr. 126, 27 Eng. Rep. 934 (1748).
244. See id.; I Ves. Supp. 79, 28 Eng. Rep. 462.
245. Bingham, I Ves. Sr. at 126, 27 Eng. Rep at 934.
246. Id. Had the defendant knowingly tricked the plaintiff, the court could have found fraud.
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devise to the plaintiff was valid, and thus that both parties were mistaken.
Bingham has been commonly taken to support the doctrine of mutual mis-
take.247
Chancery has given us a number of other early cases of apparent mutual
mistake, going back at least to Gee v. Spencer (1681), '48 indicating mutual
mistake warrants relief.249 It would be difficult to emphasize enough just how
devoid of reasoning or rationale the English equity cases are. Gee, for instance,
merely states, "This release was set aside, and [a case) cited that a misapprehen-
Jervis v. Duke, I Vein 19,23 Eng. Rep. 274 (1681); Ballow, supra note 241, at 10-1 I; Fonblanque's
Equity, supra note 75, at I I I & n.y.
247. Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle's 325, 331 (Pa. 1817); I Story, supra note 14, § 124
(discussing Bingham). But contra C.J. Slade, The Myth of Mistake in the English Law of Contract
70 L.Q. Rev. 385, 406 (1954) (contending that Bingham should be explained as a "failure of
consideration"). Bingham is better explained as a mistake case than as a failure-of-consideration case
for two reasons. First, while mentioning consideration, the court relied on mistake: "[Tlhere was
a plain mistake, such as the court was warranted to relieve against, and not to suffer the defendant
to run away with the money in consideration of the sale of an estate, to which he had no right."
Bingham, I Ves. Sr. at 126, 27 Eng. Rep. at 934. Second, failure of consideration was a law, not
equity, doctrine. See, e.g., Strickland v. Turner, 7 Ex. 208, 86 R.R. 619, 11 Eng. Rep. 919 (1852);
Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B. 849, 118 Eng. Rep. 975 (K.B. 1853); see also authorities cited supra
note 149.
A case similar to Binghain was taken by Home also to illustrate mutual mistake, and is put on
assent grounds:
I sell to John a horse, understood by both of us to be my property. After all is agreed on,
it is discovered to be his property. The bargain is void even at [Scottish] common law,
as it is incapable of being fulfilled on either side. I cannot convey the property to him.
nor can he receive the property from me. It was not my intention to sell a horse that did
not belong to me; nor was it his intention to pay for his own horse. The case where the
horse belongs to a third person is in effect the same. I did not intend to sell the horse that
belongs not to me; nor did John intend to purchase from me that belongs to a third
person.
Home, supra note 7, at 208. Home advocates that cases of land ought to be dealt with on the same
ground, though he notes that they are not under the common law he reports. Id.
248. 1 Vern. 32, 23 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch. 1681), cited in 2 Powell, supra note 75, at 556.
249. Cocking v. Pratt, I Ves. Sr. 400, 27 Eng. Rep. 1105 (Ch. 1749) (discussed in 1 Story,
supra note 14, 138-39 n.2); Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mosely 364, 25 Eng. Rep. 441 (Ch. 1732); Gee
v. Spencer, I Vern. 32 (1681); Luxford's case, cited in Gee, I Vern. at 32, 18 Vin. Abr. 370. But
see Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vein. 243, 23 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch. 1691). A more questionable case
of mutual mistake is Merrick v. Harvey, Nelson 48, 21 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1649), in which the
defendant gave the plaintiff a bond to pay money due on accounts, and then two days later the parties
"(some Things being forgotten)" executed general releases in favor of each other. The release was
not intended to release the bond, however, so the court ordered that the bond be set aside. Id. The
report leaves uncertain whether the ground for relief was failure to except the bond from the general
release, in which case only a scrivener's error existed, or whether the parties intended a general
release but had entirely forgotten the bond. Stapylton v. Scott, 13 Ves. Jun. 425, 33 Eng. Rep. 353
(1807), describes a doctrine of mutual mistake and applies it in accord with modem application, but
the only case cited for the mutual mistake proposition in Stapylton was Calverly v. Williams, I Ves.
Jr. 210,30 Eng. Rep. 306 (Ch. 1790), a misunderstanding case which mentions "mutual mistake" but
means by that "misunderstanding."
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sion in the party shall avoid his release.""'  The result is that, though in the
equity cases we see mistake covering situations of impossibility or frustration of
purpose, or the undercutting of a bargain, 251 the written reports of these cases
do not recognize these concerns. They simply grant relief and ground it on
mistake or misapprehension. At most a report such as Bingham might say the
court "was warranted... not to suffer the [other party] to run away with the
money in consideration of the sale. . ., to which he had no right.""
2
Related cases give similar hints at the Chancery's reasoning. A case
reported at 37 Hen. VI 13 (1458) shows a mutual mistake but was decided on
other grounds. The defendant assigned debts to the plaintiff in return for which
plaintiff gave a bond. The plaintiff later sought relief in chancery from the bond
on the ground that the debts, being choses in action merely, were not assignable
at law. The chancellor, with the concurrence of the law justices on whom he
called to assist, decided that the bond should be delivered up as given without
a quid pro quo! The defendant refused to give up the bond, so the chancellor
sent him to prison.
In Broderick v. Broderick,'" an heir at law, understanding that a devise in
a recently-executed will had deprived him of his real property inheritance,
released for 100 guineas all rights to the lost property. The deed of release
recited -that the will was valid. The heir later, in exchange for fifty more
guineas, joined the devisee in a lease of the property. The proposed tenant
promised to pay £4,000 for the lease (thus proving the property had great value).
The heir later learned that the will was void.
The Chancery held oddly that the heir's release and lease were void for
misrepresentation because the recitation in the deed was false.25 4 But the heir
is the one who made the misrepresentation in the deed! How could his own
misrepresentation void it? Surely the court felt the heir was innocent and
mistaken (probably the devisee was also mistaken). But a collateral ruling of the
Chancellor in the case suggests another supporting rationale. A witness testified
that he told the heir, before the heir signed the lease, that the will was invalid.
250. Gee, I Veto. at 32, 23 Eng. Rep. at 287.
251. Bingham v. Bingham exemplifies all three, perhaps, if the case is considered one of legal
error. The plaintiff's purchase of an estate he already owned was legally impossible. But because
the defendant did not own the estate, the plaintiff's purpose in purchasing was frustrated. Because
the defendant held no estate, the plaintiff received nothing in the bargain. In Cocking v. Pratt, I Ves.
Sr. 400, Ves. Supp. 176, 27 Eng. Rep. 1105 (Ch. 1749-50), a mother and daughter had relied on an
incorrect accounting of the husband-father's estate in coming to a settlement of their shares. Had
they correctly determined the father's estate, the daughter would have been entitled to possibly £600
more than otherwise. No performance was impossible, but the exchange was grossly undercut.
Cocking, 1 Ves. Sr. at 401, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1106. The court also mentioned, several times, that the
daughter intended to receive her full share of the estate, id. at 400-01, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1105-06, an
intent which was frustrated by the mistake.
252. Bingham, I Ves. Sr. at 126, 78 Eng. Rep. at 934.
253. I P. Wms. 239, 24 Eng. Rep. 369 (Ch. 1713).
254. Id. at 239-40; 24 Eng. Rep. at 369-70.
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But "Lord Chancellor said, it was not to be believed, that if the heir knew that
the will was not duly executed, he would, for so small a consideration, have
parted with his estate." '  Probably this concern for the reasons for promising
lay behind the chancery's more explicit mistake cases also.25
What is the source of mistake law in English chancery? Unfortunately, the
reported cases do not give a source. If Chancery was unwilling to cite a mistake
rationale in 1458 but later found one in the 1500s, we could speculate that in the
meantime an interest in Roman law influenced the chancellors. Many chancel-
lors were trained in the civil law," which was taught at Oxford."s' Surely
the Chancellors studied Grotius and Pufendorf in the seventeenth century and
later." 9 On the other hand, perhaps the Chancery borrowed mistake law from
the common law action for account, convinced that relief was too uncertain or
difficult to obtain at law. English law tended to develop piecemeal, especially
in chancery where the somewhat fluid notion of conscience prompted relief and
decisions were reported sparsely. Moreover, chancellors were well-educated and
moved about in English and European society. 6 Undoubtedly they were
255. Id. at 241; 24 Eng. Rep. at 370. Broderick is almost identical to Evans v. Llewelyn, 2 Bro.
C.C. 150, 29 Eng. Rep. 86 (Ch. 1787), which is founded on mistake, though probably unilateral
mistake, as the devisee-releasee appeared there to harbor doubts as to the validity of his devise.
256. In Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wms. 217, 24 Eng. Rep. 705 (Ch. 1724), Stent had promised to pay
to Bailis a certain sum of money on August 10, 1720, in exchange for stock in the Lustring
Company. On August 20, 1720, an order to show cause why the company's patent should not be
repealed issued and a "proclamation was published to forbid [further] transfers" of the stock. Later,
the proclamation's prohibition was enacted by parliament. Id. at 217-18, 24 Eng. Rep. at 705. Of
course, the stock price plummeted. Bailis sued Stent at law on Stent's promise and won. Stent
brought a bill in equity seeking an injunction against Bailis's collection efforts. Id. at 218, 24 Eng.
Rep. at 705-06. The Master of the Rolls opined:
It is against natural justice, that any one should pay for a bargain which he cannot have;
there ought to be quid pro quo, but in this case, the defendant has sold the plaintiff a
bubble or moonshine.
It is impossible that this bargain should ever be made good to the plaintiff. . ., and the
money cannot be said to be due in conscience, supposing the plaintiff to be incapable of
coming at what he contracted for, and in consideration whereof he was to pay his money.
If I should buy an house, and before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the
same, the house be burnt down by casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay
for the house, and yet the house may be built up again; but I doubt it will be possible to
set up the company again, as in the other case the seller may do the house.
Id. at 219-20, 24 Eng. Rep. at 706. On rehearing, the Chancellor recommended that the parties share
the loss, and they later settled. Id. at 221-22, 24 Eng. Rep. at 707. The opinion proves that someone
in the Chancery court was concerned about reasons for making promises, however.
257. Simpson, supra note 115, at 401 (listing various biographical facts about chancellors from
1432 to 1501); see also I & I1 Lord Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors of England (1874).
258. John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie 115-17 (Chrimes, trans. & ed., 1942) (1468-
71).
259. See supra notes 107-108.
260. Francis Bacon, for example, was chancellor in the early 1600s. See Hastings Lyon &
Herman Block, Edward Coke, Oracle of the Law (Rothman 1992) (Houghton 1929).
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influenced not only by civil and common law but also canon law,26' merchant
law, borough law, and whatever other ideas prevailed in their times.
E. American Development
Thus far this study has outlined law that lawyers in the American colonies
would most likely have studied. Colonial American lawyers had access to
English law and equity reports, commentary (and Powell on Contracts and
Newland on Contracts in particular, which discussed a few cases of mutual
mistake from English Chancery262), and Roman and civilian sources. 63 They
also had equity treatises such as Home and Ballows, both of 'which mentioned
mistake as a ground for equitable relief.2" English law is the primary source
for American common law in the early nineteenth century. However, English
law is at most only indirect evidence of the source of our mutual mistake. Direct
evidence must come from American cases themselves. We would expect
America to inherit England's mistake legacy of the late 1700s, however.
Accordingly, we should find mutual mistake cases dealt with as in the action for
money had and received and in chancery.
1. At Law: Money Had and Received
American courts granted relief for money had and received, paid as the
result of mutual mistake." 5 In the 1820s, some early law courts employed the
261. See Simpson, supra note 115, at 396.405.
262. See 2 Powell, supra note 75, at 196-99 (discussing Cocking v. Pratt, I Ves. Sr. 400(1691),
and Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mosely 364 (1732)); John Newland, A Treatise on Contracts, Within
the Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity 432-34 (Farrand 1808) (discussing cases of mutual mistake in
equity, the same this study discusses supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text, but not referring
to them as such).
263. See, e.g., William Hamilton Bryson, Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia (1978);
Michael H. Hoeflich, Bibliographical Perspectives on Roman and Civil Law, 89 L. Libr. J. 41
(1997). In fact, Roman law books existed in Virginia in colonial times, though probably not in great
numbers. Bryson, supra, at 27-30. Various authors have discussed the English legal education
received by colonial lawyers. See generally Beverly Zseiben, How Blackstone Lost the, Colonies
(1990); W. Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia 1779-1979, at 1-63 (1982).
264. Ballow, supra note 241; Home, supra note 7.
265. Suits for money had and received were brought before the Revolutionary War. See. e.g.,
Newman v. Homans, Quincy 5 (1762); Tyler v. Richards, Quincy 195 (1765) (argued for the
plaintiff, who lost, by Samuel Quincy and John Adams). Another early case, Morris v. Tarin, I Dalil.
147 (Pa. Common Pleas 1785), referred to assumpsit for money had and received, paid by mistake
as if it were available, id. at 148, but refused to grant relief. Id. at 149. Morris cited only English
cases for the point. Id. at 148. Many other early cases granted relief for money had and received
as a result of a mistake, citing English cases. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Taylor v. Seaton, I Minor 75
(Ala. 1822) (counsel for plaintiff citing Morris v. Tarin and Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97
Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760)); Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. Rep. 455 (N.Y. 1807) (opinion of court
delivered by Kent, Ch. J.); Bours v. Watson, 1 Mill Const. 393 (S.C. 1817) (quoting the "ex equo
et bono" language from Moses v. MacFerlan, quoted supra text accompanying note 135, at I Mill
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term "mutual mistake." '66  American courts usually cited English authori-
ties.26 In most ways, early American cases for money had and received are
continuations of the English doctrine. American law imported England's "failure
of consideration" doctrine, for instance.26 1 Moreover, the tendency to equate
failure of consideration with mistake, impossibility, and other doctrines appears
also in American cases.
269
One early money-had-and-received case, Markle v. Hatfield,27 stands
apart. In Markle, the defendant paid the plaintiff with a counterfeit bank note.
The defendant was as mistaken as the plaintiff about the note's false nature.27 '
The court, in an opinion by James Kent, then Chief Justice of New York's
Const. at 394, but not citing to Moses). Some early cases were mutual mistake cases. See, e.g.,
Watson v. Cresap, 40 Ky. (I Monroe) 195 (1841); Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. Rep. 455 (N.Y.
1807).
266. Smith v. Goddard, I Ohio 178, 183 (1823) (tying "mutual mistake" to impossibility).
267. See supra sources cited note 265.
268. See, e.g., Pettibone, 2 Root 258 (Conn. 1795); Spring v. Coffin, 10 Mass. 31 (1813) (dicta:
"If the defendant has paid the note, which was the consideration for the sale [which was later
rescinded], he has his remedy against Salter for the money, as paid for a consideration which has
failed."); Wharton v. O'Hara, 2 Nott & McCord 65 (S.C. 1819) (citing English authorities); Duncan
v. Bell, 2 Nott & McCord 153 (S.C. 1819) (citing English authorities); Lacoste v. J. Flotard & Co.,
I Mill Const. 467 (S.C. 1817) (granting relief for money had and received upon a failed
consideration).
269. See, e.g., Claflin v. Godfrey, 21 Pick. I (Mass. 1838); Spring v. Coffin, 10 Mass. 31 (1813)
(implying in dicta that an action for money had and received for failure of consideration could also
be fraudulent); McGoren v. Avery, 37 Mich. 119 (1877) (ordering judgment entered on an
"[alssumpsit to recover money paid by mistake and without consideration"); Rheel v. Hicks, 25 N.Y.
289 (1862) (a case in which money was paid to the government for the support of an illegitimate
child on the mistaken belief, shared by both parties, that a woman was pregnant with an illegitimate
child; she was not, it was later learned); Briggs v. Vanderbilt 19 Barb. 222, 235-36 (N.Y. 1855)
(stating in dicta that money paid under the mistaken notion that performance by the other party was
possible, when it was not, could be recovered in an action for money had and received; counsel for
defense argued that the contract was the result of a mutual mistake and that money paid under it
could be recovered back for failure of consideration); Murray v. Richards, I Wend. 58 (N.Y. 1828);
Merrit v. Clapp, 2 Cai. R. 117, 120 (N.Y. 1804) (holding a note failed as consideration when its
maker became insolvent); Smith v. Goddard, I Ohio 178, 183 (1823) (tying "mutual mistake" to
impossibility); Champlin v. Laytin, 6 Paige Ch. 189 (N.Y. Ch. 1836); Wharton v. Hudson, 3 Rawle
390 (Pa. 1832); Bellas v. Hays, 5 Serg. & Rawle 427, 440 (Pa. 1819) (Gibson, J.: "Mistake [is]
perhaps not very different from want of consideration."); Keener, supra note 130, at 244; see also
Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 467 (1857) (quantum meruit case); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197,
202 (1859) (quantum meruit); Fenton v. Clark, I I Vt. 557 (1839) (quantum meruit); cf Woodward
v. Cowing, 13 Mass. 215 (1816) (dicta: the case was resolved against the plaintiff on assumption-of-
risks grounds). American counsel argued both mistake and failure of consideration when both
appeared applicable. See, e.g., Mowatt v. Wright, I Wend. 355, 357-59 (1828) (arguments of Troup
and Raymond). The New York courts of appeals opined in 1889: "The action for money had and
received to the use of another is the form in which courts of common law enforce the equitable
obligation. The scope of this remedy has been gradually extended to embrace many cases which
were originally cognizable only in courts of equity." Robers v. Ely, 20 N.E. 606, 607 (N.Y. 1889).




Supreme Court of Judicature, held that the plaintiff could recover. Kent
followed English mistake doctrine generally but declined to cite English sources.
Instead, he cited civil law. Says Kent:
The reasonable doctrine, and one which undoubtedly agrees with the
common sense of mankind, is laid down by Paulus in the Digest; and
has been incorporated into the French law. He says, that if a creditor
receive by mistake any thing in payment, different from what was due,
and upon the supposition that it was the thing actually due, as if he
receive brass instead of gold, the debtor is not discharged, and the
creditor, upon offering to return that which he received, may demand
that which is due by the contract. Se quum aurum tibi premisissem, tibi
ignoranti quasi aurum aes solveim, non liberabor. (Dig. 46. 3. 50.
Pothier, Traite des Obligations, No. 495.)2
Kent noted English authorities placing the risk of a counterfeit note on the person
receiving it, but Kent rejected English risk law in favor of the mistake doctrine
he saw outlined in the civil law. 7 Markle was followed in other cases.274
Markle is more significant as an indicator of Kent's opinion of mistake law,
however, for Kent's role in the development of mutual mistake later became
more significant. 5
2. In Equity
Many early American references to mistake arise in equity. Unfortunately,
early American equity cases are no more clear than those of early English equity.
Perhaps the earliest reference to mistake generally is in Swift v. Hawkins
(1768).276 The reference is cryptic, perhaps because the case holds only that
evidence of "mistake or want of consideration" is admissible; what evidence of
mistake was subsequently admitted in the case is unknown. Swift indicates
272. 2 Johns. Rep. at 459. Kent's quote from the Digest is translated in Mommsen, Krueger,
and Watson as "I promise you gold and .then, you being unaware of the fact, I give you copper as
being gold, I will not be released." 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XL.3.50.
273. Id. at 459-62.
274. See Watson v. Cresap, 40 Ky. (1 Monroe) 195 (1841); Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 181
(1810).
275. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 344-358.
276. 1 Dall. 17 (Pa. 1768). Sw/i is something of an anomaly because it is not an equity case,
Pennsylvania having no equity courts in 1768. Id. The case explicitly incorporated equitable
principles inio the common law, however. Id.
277. Very little about Swift describes mistake. The entire entry in I Dallas can be set forth here:
JOHN SWIFT V. HAWKINS and others
Equitable defense.
In Pennsylvania, on the plea of payment, to debt on bond, the defendant may give in
evidence want of consideration.
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that evidence of mistake had been admissible since 1729.7 s That mistake is
tied to consideration in Swift is significant, however. A Pennsylvania commenta-
tor in 1826 tied the reference in Swift to Mansfield's description of money had
and received in Moses v. McFerlan:279
There can be no doubt of the principle, that in a suit on a bond in
Pennsylvania, the defendant under the plea of payment, may prove
mistake and want of consideration: and that in such case, the jury may
and ought to presume everything to be paid, which ex aequo et bono,
in equity and good conscience ought to be paid. 8
DEBT SUR OBLIGATION. On the plea of payment, Defendants offered to give no
Consideration in Evidence. Objected, that the Consideration of a Bond is not Inquirable
into, the passing the bond being a gift in Law of the money. To this it was answered, and
so ruled BY THE COURT, that there being no Court of Chancery in this province, there is
a necessity in order to prevent a failure of Justice, to let the defendants in, under the plea
of payment to prove mistake or want of consideration: And this, the Chief Justice said,
he had known to be the constant practice of the Courts of Justice in this province, for
thirty-nine years past.
For the plaintiff, the following cases were cited: Plowd. 308.b; Gilb. Rep. 154; Hard.
200; 3 P. Wins. 222.
Lawyers of the twentieth century might question why Chief Justice Allen mentioned mistake. The
defendant offered to prove "no consideration," not mistake. The objection itself did not mention
mistake. None of the cases cited by the plaintiff discuss mistake, though they all discuss
consideration, some with respect to bonds. Sharington v. Strotton, I Plowden 297, 75 Eng. Rep. 454,
470 (K.B. 8 Eliz.) (discussing, however, at 308-09, assent and the care and thoughtfulness the
consideration requirement is supposed to impose on the promisor: "And because Words are
oftentime spoken by Men unadvisedly and without Deliberation, the Law has provided that a Contract
by Words shall not bind without Consideration."); Lardner v. Pashem, Gilb. Rep. 254, 93 Eng. Rep.
321 (12 or 13 Anne) (Gilb. Rep. 254 must be meant; Gilb Rep. 154 is a page in the middle of a quo
warranto case, whereas Lardner actually discusses a condition in.a bond); Turner v. Binion, Hardres
200-01, 145 Eng. Rep. 452 (13 Car. II); Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Wins..210, 24 Eng. Rep. 1033
(1733) (though intent was an issue here, however, see 212-13, 228-29). I suggest a reason for
mentioning mistake in the text: that mistake reflects the same concerns consideration did in 1768.
Perhaps Chief Justice Allen was thinking ofjustice as that term was used in the action for money had
and received. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760) (holding that money had
and received was available in cases of either mistake or failure of consideration), was only eight
years old at the time, and possibly fresh in Allen's mind.
Alternatively, perhaps Chief Justice Allen remembered that equitable arguments are sometimes
allowed in chancery and said "mistake," intending by that to mean "all appropriate equitable
arguments." Later statements by the same court indicate that: "[Swift] may be called the Magna
Carta of this branch of equity, and has been ever since followed; and rules of court universally
established, requiring notice of the special matter, fraud or failure of consideration, intended to be
given in evidence in avoidance of the bond; this notice answering to a bill in equity for relief, on
the ground of fraud, accident or mistake .... (emphasis added). Mackey v. Brownfield, 13 Serg.
& Rawle 239, 240 (Pa. 1825). If Mackey's tribute to Swf is justified, then Swift's mention of
mistake is all the more significant, because it meant that Chief Justice Allen considered "mistake"
to be representative of all categories of equity.
278. 1 DalI. at 17; see Steinhauer v. Witman, I Serg. & Rawle 437, 443 (Pa. 1815).
279. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
280. Anthony Laussat, An Essay on Equity in Pennsylvania 72 (1826).
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Similarly obscure references to mistake appear in several cases around the
beginning of the nineteenth century.2"' A Virginia court of appeals case of that
time period, Quesnel v. Woodlief,'" involved a mistake in acreage, and the
court specifically noticed that "both parties were mistaken in the quantity and
number of acres contracted for., 23  Another decision of about that time,
Alexander v. Muirhead (S.C. 1802),2"" mentions that a mistake must be
material.28 Both Quesnel and Alexander were mutual mistake cases,286 but
neither recites all three elements later courts consider necessary.
QuesnelP7 probably illustrates the development of mutual mistake as well
as any other early authority. In fact, Quesnel may be the true beginning of our
mutual mistake. Quesnel was a native Frenchman relocated to America and did
not speak English well.28 He came to place "great confidence" in Woodlief.
281. E.g., Bundy v. Sabin, 2 Root 209 (Ct. 1795); Matson v. Parkhurst, I Root 404 (1792); Gay
v. Adams, I Root 105 (1789); Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449 (1811) (mentioning mistake of law);
Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483 (1811) (involving an issue similar to that in Warden, 7 Mass. at
449); Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 101, 112 (1813) (dissenting opinion of Yeates, J.); Alexander v.
Muirhead, 2 Desaussure 162 (S.C. Ch. 1802) (reciting the purpose of a bill in equity, "To set aside
the agreement ... upon the principle that it was founded in mistake, viz.-That all the cases on the
policies were similarly circumstanced: Whereas the truth is, that they were materially differ-
ent .... ); Mosby v. Leeds, 7 Va. (3 Call) 439, 445 (1803) (opinion of Lyons, J.).
282. 10 Va. (6 Call) 218 (1796).
283. Quesnel, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 240 (emphasis added).
284. Alexander v. Muirhead, 2 Desaussure 162 (S.C. Ch. 1802).
285. Id. at 164-65 (reciting the purpose of a bill in equity, "To set aside the agreement .. upon
the principle that it was founded in mistake, viz.-That all the cases on the policies were similarly
circumstanccd: Whereas the truth is, that they were materially different .... ).
286. In Alexander, an insurance company insured a ship Juno's voyage to Cuba. After the Juno
sank, its owners sued the company and other insurers who had insured the voyage. The company
thought to defend itself on the ground that the ship owner's agent had materially misstated the Juno's
departure date. Thinking all other insurers could claim the same defense, the company agreed to
stipulate to judgment if any other insurer was liable. Id. at 164. The company wanted to save on
litigation costs. Id. One of the other insurers, Kirke & Lukens, was found liable at a trial. In the
process, however, all parties involved learned that only Kirke & Lukens had been told the correct
departure date. After judgment was entered against the company based on the agreement, the
company filed a bill in equity seeking to have the agreement set aside. Id. at 163-68.
The ship owners actually appear not to have learned that Kirke & Lukens did not suffer under a
misrepresentation until trial. Their answer in chancery stated:
The defendants swear that Messrs. Kirke & Lukens's case was not selected as being more
favorable to the defendants than any other on the policies; that they did not know until
the trial of the cause, that Denoon the broker [who stated the departure date correctly] had
himself called on Kirke & Lukens, and that the clerks' of Denoon [who misstated the
Juno's departure date] called on the other underwriters to have the policies subscribed;
nor did the defendants give any instructions to their attorney who should be sued.
Id. at 166. The Alexander court sent the case to the law courts for trial because the case involved
misrepresentation, id. at 169, so the opinion does not report whether mutual mistake doctrine was
actually applied.
287. Quesnel, 10 Va. (6 Call) 218 (1796).
288. One witness testified that Quesnel needed an interpreter in his commercial transactions.
Id. at 227. Another testified that Quesnel "appeared to understand very little of the English
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In 1788, Woodlief advertised a farm for sale, called Sion Hill. Woodlief said
publicly and privately that Sion Hill contained 800 acres. Woodlief offered to
sell at £4,000, or £5 per acre, but accepted Quesnel's offer to buy at £3,200, or
£4 per acre. Sion Hill had been in Woodlief's family for generations, and
Quesnel thought Woodlief would be correct that it contained 800 acres. So
Quesnel did not have the property surveyed before obtaining a deed. He later
learned that Sion Hill contained about 608 acres. Quesnel sued in equity for
fraud, but the evidence showed that Woodlief's misrepresentation was innocent;
he was as mistaken as Quesnel." 9
The chancery court dismissed Quesnel's suit, and Quesnel appealed.
Wickham for Quesnel argued fraud, innocent misrepresentation, lack of consent,
inadequacy of the bargain, and defect of title.'" Call, for Woodlief, countered
Wickham's arguments and asserted Chandelor v. Lopus29' and assumption of
risk. As to inadequacy, Call claimed:
it was a bargain of hazard, and fair upon both sides. If the land held
out more than 800 acres, the purchaser was to gain; if it fell short of
that quantity, he was to lose. It was what the civilians call ... a
purchase of the contingency as to the excess; which, according to
several authorities, is a good ground of contract; for the hazard is
mutual .. 292
Judge Lyons for the court opined that mistake warrants relief in equity "which
adjusts and equalizes contracts, according to the exigencies of the case."293
The court's order carefully set forth that "both parties were mistaken" as to the
acres.294 The court reformed the contract to reduce the number of acres for
which Quesnel was to pay.295
Quesnel was not published when it was decided, but later in 1825. A brief
recitation of facts and a copy of the order was published in 1808 in Munford's
reports,29 but in the meantime lawyers disputed Quesnel's meaning. In Jollife
v. Hite (1798),97 Judge Roane said that Quesnel allowed the purchasers to
"retain money contracted to be paid, under a mistake, and, .consequently, so far
without a consideration.""29 Judge Lyons' opinion in Jollife gives more detail:
language." Id.
289. Id. at 218-20, 240.
290. Id. at 233-34.
291. Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603), discussed supra notes 120-124 and accompanying
text.
292. Quesnel, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 237.
293. Id. at 238.
294. Id. at 240.
295. id.
296. Nelson v. Mathews, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & Mun.) 164, 173-74 n.(1) (1808).
297. 5 Va. (I Call) 301 (1798).
298. Id. at 311, 312.
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The general rule, as laid down by civilians, is that if there be not
a full knowledge of all the circumstances, it is ground for avoiding the
contract, [Gee v. Spencer,] 1 Vern. 32; [Mildmay v. Hungerford,] 2
Vern. 243; and the reason is, because the buyer proceeds upon the
supposition of a quality, which, if the thing does not contain, the
contract should not oblige the party, who contracts under a misappre-
hension. For, in this case, the party is not conceived to have agreed
absolutely, but upon supposal of the presence of a thing or quality, on
which, as "on a necessary condition, his consent was founded; and,
therefore, the thing or quality not appearing, the consent is. understood
to be null and ineffectual. Grotius, lib. 2, c. 12, [sections] 8, 9;
[Gwynne v. Heaton .. .] 1Bro. C.C. 9; [Heathcote v. Paignon,] 2 Bro.
C. C. 175; Puffendorf, Bk. 1, c.2 [section] 12....
It was upon these grounds, according to my recollection, that
Quesnel v. Woodlief was decided. For in that case,... both parties had
acted under mistake; and therefore, they [the courts? the mistakes?]
relieved the plaintiff.299
Gee and Mildmay were older English equity cases mentioned supra."°  The
substance of Grotius' and Pufendorf's views appear in the margins supra",
None of these authorities mentions "mutual" mistake. The passages cited in
Gwynne °2 and Heathcote0. do not discuss mistake but only the chancery's
concern with fairness in exchange." 4 Perhaps Lyons thought that if consent
299. Id. at 316-17. Judge Lyons uses both parties. This term is a fair translation of ambo, the
Latin term used in the Digest passages that refer to the parties who share a niutual error. Ulpian uses
the word ambo, 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIII.1.14, commonly translated as "two
of a pair or together," "both," or "both parties," Oxford Latin Dictionary ambo (1982). In Julian,
the parties are not referred to together, but their ignorance is handled separately with two descriptive
words, one for each party. 2 Mommsen's Digest, supra note 90, at XVIiI.I.41.1. Though the
grammar does not require it, the context tells us that the parties shared the same mistake. Paul refers
to the parties as ego et uenditor, id. at XVIII.1.57, translatable quite literally as "I and the vendor."
The passage in Gauis is likewise unrevealing. See id. at XLIV.7.1(9)-(l I). It appears, therefore, that
ambo is the source of common or of both parties. The Latin word closest to mutual might have been
mutuo, its ancestor, see, e.g. Oxford Latin Dictionary mutuo (1982), but mutuo does not appear in
the Digest passages relevant to mutual mistake. Nor does it appear in the passage from Pothier
discussing mutual mistake. Pothier uses the word mime, which means "same" or self-same.
Cassell's French-English English-French Dictionary mime (198 1). Thus, Evans translated the phrase
including it as "being in equal error yourself." Pothier, supra note 105, at 11.
300. See supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 107-108.
302. I Bro. C. C. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778).
303. 2 Bro. C.C. 167, 29 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ch. 1787).
304. Gwynne, I Bro. C.C. at 9, 28 Eng. Rep. at 953 ("To set aside a conveyance, there must be
an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest, that it must be impossible to state it to a man of
common sense, without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it."); Heathcote, 2 Bro. C.C.
at 175, 29 Eng. Rep. at 100 ("If there is such inadequacy as to shew that the person did not
understand the bargain he made, or was so oppressed that he was glad to make it, knowing its
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to a contract did not occur when based on a mistaken assumption and both
parties were mistaken, then neither consented and rescission of the contract was
clearly warranted. Lyons and three other Jollife judges found that assumption
of risk precluded relief for mistake on Jollife's facts. 305 They distinguished
Quesnel partly on grounds that Quesnel was a foreigner who knew little English,
was unfamiliar with American conveyancing, and therefore assumed no risk."°
Later courts developed Quesnel's doctrine. In 1813, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in a similar case of "mutually erroneous impressions" implied
that relief would be granted. 07 The Pennsylvania court cited Quesnel in
another part of the opinion.308 In 1819, the Virginia Supreme Court in
Armstrong v. Hickman309 extended the doctrine of mutual error to cases other
than acreage mistakes.1 Chancellor Carr's opinion, affirmed by the court of
appeals without comment, discusses in some detail the elements of mutual
mistake, mentioning mistakes of both parties and asking explicitly of the mistake,
"was it an important one?" 3t ' As authority for this doctrine, Chancellor Carr
cited Powell on Contracts, Newland on Contracts, Pothier, and Jollife.3"2
From Armstrong, it was but' a short leap to a complete, succinct statement
of the doctrine of mutual mistake. The Virginia Supreme Court so stated in
Tucker v. Cocke (1823): ' s
There are cases in which the mutual error of the parties, without
default in either, may be a just ground for rescinding a contract. As, if
the error be in a matter which is the cause of the contract, that is, in the
substance of the thing contracted for, so that the purchaser cannot get
inadequacy, it will shew a command over him which may amount to fraud. If the transaction...
be such a situation, as to shew that it could not have taken place without superior powers on the one
side over the other.").
305. Jollife, 5 Va. (I Call) at 312-29; see especially id. at 326-27 (Pendleton, President: "But,
if [the sale] was meant to change or set aside a real contract for the sale of a tract of land in gross,
at the risk of the purchaser for gain or loss, by a deficiency or excess in the quantity it was supposed
to contain by both parties, ... I do not hesitate to say, that it was carried too far; being an
interference with fair contracts ... .
306. Id.
307. Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 101, Ii (Pa. 1813).
308. Id. at 112.
309. 20 Va. (6 Mun.) 287 (1819).
310. Armstrong involved the sale of notes. The parties learned after the sale that one of the
signers of the notes was bankrupt and that the other was likely to have fallen on bad times with the
first. Id. at 287-90, 297-300.
311. Id. at 296-97.
312. Id. Powell cited English cases discussed above, most notably Cocking v. Pratt, I Ves. Sr.
400, 28 Eng. Rep. 493 (Ch. 1749); Landsdown v. Lansdown, Mosely 364 (1732), discussed supra
note 249 and accompanying text. Newland discussed these and Bingham v. Bingham, I Ves. 126,
78 Eng. Rep. 934 (K.B. 1748); Gee v. Spencer, I Vein. 32 (1681), and Luxford's Case, cited in Gee,
I Vern. at 32, 18 Vin. Abr. 370, all cited supra note 249 and accompanying text.
313. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 51 (1823).
[Vol. 58
VAL D. RICKS
what he bargained for .... In such cases, the contract ought to be
vacated, even if it has been executed ....
By 1823, the Virginia Supreme Court no longer considered the Quesnel note in
Munford's 1808 reports to be fully authoritative, 3 " but by then the Quesnel
principle had become established in the law. After about 1823, mutual error
begins to appear in reported cases regularly.' 16
Remarkably, this development of the doctrine in the Virginia Supreme Court
reveals as grounds for mutual mistake both lack of consent and notions about the
substantive consideration for the promise. Though Lyons' opinion in lollife cited
civilian discussions of consent, Lyons also noted that equity "adjusts and
equalizes contracts."3"7 Judge Roane's opinion in Jollife tied mistake to failure
of consideration." Tucker required that the error be "in a matter which is the
cause of the contract" and equated cause with substance."9 Thus, though the
form of the doctrine became largely Roman, the substance of mistake remained
related to consideration. This development also appears in the writings of
prominent commentators Joseph Story and James Kent.
3. Early American Commentators
Several influential American importers of civil law emerged in the 1820s
and 1830s. Most celebrated of all are James Kent and Joseph Story?2  Each
314. Id. at 66. The court cited as authority Armstrong v. Hickman, 20 Va. (6 Mun.) 287 (1819),
and Chamberlayne v. Marsh, 20 Va. (6 Mun.) 283 (1819), a land case decided with Armstrong and,
without citing any authority, following Quesnel, 20 Va. (6 Mun.) at 286-87.
315. Tucker, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 67 ("[The grounds of [Quesnei] are so uncertain, some of the
Judges who decided it, the Reporter and the counsel on both sides, who argued the cause, differing
so materially in their statements of the reasons upon which the judgment was founded, that it cannot
be considered an obligatory authority to the point now under consideration .... ).
316. See e.g., Harrison & Gibson v. Stowers, 2 Miss. (Walker) 165, 168 (1824) (discussing
"mutual error and mistake" and the seriousness of the error); Hunter v. Goudy, I Ohio 449, 451
(1824) ("A court of equity never interferes to relieve against a contract, made in good faith, where
both parties are mistaken as to the value."); Smith v. Goddard, I Ohio 178, 183 (1823) (tying
"mutual mistake" to impossibility in an action for money had and received). Prior to that time,
mistake was mentioned but often in the vague terms used in older English equity. See, e.g., Perkins
v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle's 325, 331 (Pa. 1817) (dicta) ("[li]t is a principle of equity that the parties
to an agreement must be acquainted with the extent of their rights and the nature of the information
they can call for respecting them, else they will not be bound; The reason is, that they proceed under
an idea that the fact which is the inducement to the agreement is in a particular way, and give their
assent, not absoluteiy, but on conditions that are falsified by the event."); Drew v. Clarke, 3 Tenn.
(Cooke) 373 (1813) ("[I]f a man is clearly under a mistake in point of law, which mistake is
produced by the representation of the other party, he can be relieved as well as if the mistake were
to as to a matter of fact.").
317. 10 Va. (6 Call) 218, 238 (1796).
318. Jollife v. Hite, 5 Va. (I Call) 301, 311-12 (1798).
319. Tucker v. Cocke, 2 Rand. 51, 66 (Va. Ct. App. 1823).
320. Gulian Verplanck wrote on mutual mistake but was not as influential. In 1825 Verplanck
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published influential treatises, Kent on the common law in 1827 and Story on
equity in 1836.321 Kent's chapter on "Contract of Sale" quotes freely from
published Gulian C Verplanck, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts: Being an Inquiry. How
Contracts Are Affected in Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or Inadequate Price (G. & C.
Carvill 1825). Verplanck's essay was written in response to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 178 (1817). In that case a national enemy
blocked America's eastern ports, making trade with Europe impossible. As a result, prices were
depressed. News of peace, when it came, did not reach every trader at the same time. Organ,
hearing the news, promptly bought a large quantity of tobacco, at depressed prices, from Laidlaw,
who had not heard. When news of the peace reached all ears, the price of tobacco jumped fifty
percent. Verplanck, supra, at 2-3. The Supreme Court said in dicta that the buyer had no duty to
share the news of peace before purchasing. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195.
Verplanck was disappointed with the reasoning of the decision and used it as a springboard for
discussing his own ideas concerning nondisclosure and related problems. He ultimately rejected both
civil and common law, and advocated his own principles. In the course of his essay, Verplanck
discussed "mutual mistake" at length. See, e.g., Verplanck, supra, at 46-47, 65, 141-52, 224, 229-30,
232.
Verplanck's statement of the mutual mistake issue reflects his civilian understanding of the
elements:
Another question now presents itself. In a purchase or sale, one party gains, and the other
is a serious loser in consequence of the common mistake of both as to some essential fact,
of which the intentional concealment by either would have been dishonest. How does this
affect the contract?
Id. at 141; see supra text accompanying notes 90-99. From these words, Verplanck shifts to mutual
and uses that word for nearly all the rest of his discussion. Verplanck writes as if he had always
referred to mistake of both parties as "mutual mistake."
Verplanck presents mutual mistake wholly as a civil law doctrine. Verplanck, supra, at 144. He
emphatically claimed that he could find it nowhere in the common law. Id. He thus suggests that
the doctrine was civil in origin and remained civil until the common law explicitly began to adopt
it. Professor Hamburger agrees generally with Verplanck that mutual mistake has a civil source. See
Hamburger, supra note 61, at 283-84. The development outlined in the Quesnel line of cases,
however, shows that the doctrine is as much English and American as civil.
Modem commentators have applauded Vcrplanck's knowledge of the law. Verplanck was "a
notable Federalist politician, practiced law in New York, wrote extensively on politics, religion, and
law, and ... authored a serious of satires which number amongst the best published during the
nineteenth century." M.H. Hoeflich, Laidlaw v. Organ, Gulian C. Verplanck, and the Shaping of
Early Nineteenth Century Contract Law: A Tale of a Case and a Commentary, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev.
55, 59. According to Hoeflich, Verplanck showed a "deep understanding of both the Anglo-
American and the civilian legal traditions." Id. at 60. Verplanck was incorrect about mutual mistake,
however. It was available both at common law in 1825 (at least in Virginia), in indebitatus
assumpsit, and in equity. Perhaps to his credit, Verplanck admitted 'some hesitation and variance"
in the common law's application of caveat emptor to mutual mistakes as to the existence of the item
sold. Id. at 144.
Verplanck opined that mistake should apply in certain hypothetical cases. Verplanck, supra, at
142-52. In some of them mutual mistake would still apply, though in most the Uniform Commercial
Code would force an allocation of the risks of such mistakes. Verplanck's essay was subject to
scathing reviews. See, e.g., I U.S. Law Journal 72-120 (1826) (mentioning mutual mistake only
impliedly in passing at 106-08). At least Verplanck placed "mutual error" language before the legal
public one more time.
321. 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 367-436 (1827); I Story, supra note 14.
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Roman and civil law sources, especially Pothier.'2 2 Story draws heavily on
both Kent and the Digests.
323
a. Story
In his 1837 treatise, Story wrote exhaustively regarding the general equitable
doctrine of mistake; discussion continues for seventy-two pages.2 4 Dividing
his explication into mistakes of law32" ' and mistakes of fact,326 Story exten-
sively examines numerous English cases. His exposition was in 1836 probably
the most exhaustive available. Story was a thorough scholar who pushed
doctrinal discussion of mistake further than ever before, citing his propositions
carefully with detailed analysis of English cases. Story himself decries the
scarcity of English commentary discussing mistake. 27 Story's work stands in
contrast to Fonblanque's, 32 1 whose discussion fills five pages. 329
Story's work specifically on mutual mistake is curt by comparison, taking
only a few paragraphs. In 1820, Story had identified "mutual and innocent
mistake" in connection with English equity.330  In 1837, Story's discussion
looks more civilian. Story explicitly describes "mutual mistake' 33' and
requires that the mutual mistake be "material. 3 2 Story illustrates the principle
by citing Paulus (rather than Gauis) on the burnt house case (thereby avoiding
the mention of a natural law foundation for mutual mistake). Story also
322. Pothier, supra note 105; see 2 Kent, supra note 321, at 468.77.
323. See in particular Story's chapter titled "Mistake" in I Story, supra note 14, at 121-93
(citing to the Digests on the title page).
324. I Story, supra note 14, at 121-93, § 110-83. Contrast Story with Fonblanque, who treated
all forms of mistake as one. See supra note 242. Story noted Fonblanque's failure to discuss the
distinction between mistakes of law and fact. I Story, supra note 14, at 156-57 n.3 ("[Blut
[Fonblanque] has not attempted to expound the true principles, on which [the cases] turn, or the
reason of the differences."). The same could also be said of Maddock, whose equity treatise suffers
from the same deficiency. Henry Maddock, A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of the High
Court of Chancery 47-84 (Hartford 1827). Maddock cites many of the same cases Fonblanque cites.
E.g., id. at 74.
325. I Story, s,,pra note 14, §§ 110-39, at 121-54.
326. Id. §§ 140-83, at 155-93.
327. Id. at 152 n.1 (discussing Maddock, Jeremy, Fonblanque, and Milford).
328. Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75. Fonblanque's second American edition was published
in 1820, but was adapted from his fifth English edition. Id.
329. Id. at 116-22. Fonblanque's unique contribution was to gather the cases from English and
American equity, however. Id.; 1 Story, supra note 14, at 152 n.l ("Mr. Fonblanque has collected
many of the cases in his valuable notes."). Story cited to Fonblanque freely, see Id.
330. Joseph Story, Chancery Jurisdiction, I I North American Rev. 140, 149 (1820).
331. i Story, supra note 14, at 157-58 ("The same principle will apply to all other cases, where
the parties mutually bargain for and upon the supposition of an existing right .... The same
principle will apply to cases of purchases, where the parties have been innocently under a mutual
mistake .... ).
332. Id. at 156-57.
333. Id. at 157-58 (quoting Paulus' resolution of the burnt house case at Digests XVIiI.1.57 as
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cites the case of Hitchcock v. Giddings, discussed supra.14 Story thus connects
the civilian form of mutual mistake to the principles of English equity noted in
Hitchcock."'. The proper application of mutual mistake principles remains
otherwise uncertain in Story's treatise, however.36 Aside from Hitchcock and
another English case, Story cited in support of mutual mistake Kent, the Digests,
Pothier, and Grotius.3" Consistently, Story claims that equity and the civil law
hold the same principle of mutual mistake." t
Story's influence was substantial." 9 General contracts cases routinely cited
Story. 40 Story's equity treatise went through fourteen American and three
British editions from 1836 through 1920. Undoubtedly Story's position as a
United States Supreme Court Justice elevated the status of his treatise. 4' In
fact, Story's position on the United States Supreme Court may have allowed him
to influence mutual mistake doctrine more effectively than he did through his
an example of a mutual mistake, and stating that "The Civil Law holds the same principle [as the
common law].").
334. 4 Price 135, 146 Eng. Rep. 215 (1817), discussed at length supra notes 212-224 and
accompanying text. Story also cites to Calverly v. Williams, I Ves. Jr. 210, 30 Eng. Rep. 306 (Ch.
1790), a misunderstanding case which mentions "mutual mistake" but means by that "misunderstand-
ing."
335. See supra note 216 and accompanying text for a discussion of citation to English equitable
principles in Hitchcock.
336. I Story, supra note 14, at 155-59.
337. See I Story, supra note 14, §§ 141-44 and accompanying notes. Oddly, Story cites not to
Grotius' section on error in promises but his section on promises made under the influence of fear.
Id. at 158 n.1 (citing to Grotius, supra note 107, at II.XI.VII). Possibly this is a misprint, Story
meaning to cite "§ 6" instead of "§ 7" as he does later in the same footnote. Story omits most
American sources. I Story, supra note 14; at §§ 141-42 & nn. I & 103. Story does cite Pearson
v. Lord, 6 Mass. (I Tyng) 81 (1809), and Garland v. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. (I Tyng) 408 (1812), see
I Story, supra note 14, at 155-56 n.I, and Story does cite Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 101 (Pa. 1813);
and Mann v. Pearson, 2 Johns. R. 37 (1806), as examples of specific cases in which mistake
principles were applied, see I Story, supra note 14, at 157 n.2. Story's discussion of fundamental
mutual mistake principles omits several American cases that would have been helpful, including the
Quesnel line of cases, and Harrison & Gibson v. Stowers, 2 Miss. (I Walker) 165 (1824) (discussing
"mutual error or mistake" and the seriousness of the error in this case); Hunter v. Goudy, I Ohio 449
(1824); Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle 325 (Pa. 1817); Drew v. Clarke, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 373
(1813).
338. I Story, supra note 14, § 142. A later commentator, John Bouvier, in John Bouvier,
Institutes ofAmerican Law (Peterson 1851), agreed substantially with Kent and Story, citing Pothier
and giving an example from the Digests. Id. at 226; see also Digest XVIII.I.14.
339. See generally Bernard Schwartz, Main Currents in American Legal Thought 132-43 (1993).
340. E.g., Peters v. Florence, 2 Wright 194, 198 (Pa. 1861); Smith v. Fly, 24 Tex. 345 (1859)
(discussing equitable mistake). As to mutual mistake cases, see, e.g., Ladd v. Chaires, 5 Fla. 395,
400 (1854) (also citing Fonblanque and Hitchcock v. Giddings) Fritzler v. Robinson, 70 Iowa 500,
503 (1886) (also citing to Kent); Martin v. McCormick, 8 N.Y. (4 Seld.) 331 (1853) (stating, "where
there is mutual error as to the existence of the subject-matter of the contract, a rescission may be
had," and citing Story's treatise and Hitchcock v. Giddings).
341. Story was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1811 and remained on it until
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treatise. Story was a member of the Court in 1837 (the year after Story's treatise
was published) when the Court decided its first mutual mistake case, Allen v.
Hammond.42 The opinion was written by Justice M'Lean,343 so we can only
speculate regarding Justice Story's influence. But the case is worth discussion
in its own right (and this study discusses it infra) because it appeared explicitly
to combine mutual mistake with the older consideration doctrine.
b. Kent
Combination of mutual mistake with consideration-related doctrine was
advocated by Kent earlier, in 1827, in Lecture 39 of his Commentaries.3" In
this exceptional lecture, Kent first discourses briefly on the nature of consider-
ation, which he describes as "something given in exchange, something that is
mutual, or something which is the inducement to the contract. 3 45 But, Kent
continues, consideration must be "valuable," and "[a] valuable consideration is
one that is either a benefit to the party promising, or some trouble or prejudice
to the party to whom the promise is made." 3 " In hindsight, lawyers now see
Kent holding to old benefit-detriment law but elevating "exchange" to the
forefront of consideration analysis, a position Powell did not maintain in
1790.3
41
Kent moves from consideration directly to mistake, which he describes
entirely in Roman terms:
If A. sells his horse to B., and it turns out that the horse was dead at the
time, though the fact was unknown to the parties, the contract is
necessarily void. So, if A., at New-York, sells to B. his house and lot
in Albany, and the house should happen to have been destroyed by fire
at the time, and the parties equally ignorant of the fact, the foundation
of the contract fails, provided the house and not the ground on which
it stood, is the essential inducement to the purchase. The civil law
comes to the same conclusion on this point.3 "
Kent's hypotheticals are Gauis' dead slave and burnt house.349 Taking Story
342. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 63 (1837).
343. Id. at 68.
344. 2 Kent, supra note 321.
345. Id. at 364.
346. Id. at 365.
347. See discussion supra notes 177-191 and accompanying text.
348. 2 Kent, supra note 321, at 367.
349. See Dig. XLIV.7.1 & XVIII.1.57. Some argument can be made as to whether these
examples illustrate mutual mistake, impossibility, or a contract contrary to the Law of Nature under
Roman law. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text. Kent cited Roman law deliberately.
He continues:
But if the house was only destroyed in part, then if it was destroyed to the value of only
half or less, the opinion stated in the civil law is, that the sale would remain good, and
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and Kent together, one could conclude that equity, common law, and civil law
all reached the same result in mutual mistake cases.
Kent explains at length how mutual mistake should be applied, however. In
this discussion he ties mistake directly to inducement to promise:
But if the house was only destroyed in part, then if it was destroyed to
the value of only half or less, the opinion stated in the civil law is, that
the sale would remain good, and the seller would be obliged to allow
a ratable diminution of the price. Pothier thinks, however, that in
equity the buyer ought not to be bound to any part or modification of
the contract, when the inducement to the contract has thus failed; and
this ... is certainly the more just and reasonable doctrine. The code
Napoleon has settled the French law in favour of the opinion of Pothier,
by declaring, that if part of the thing sold be destroyed at the time, it
is at the option of the buyer to abandon the sale, or to take the part
preserved, on a reasonable abatement of price; and, I presume, the
principle contained in the English and American cases tend to the same
conclusion, provided the inducement to the purchase be thereby
materially affected."'
With this introduction, Kent begins discussing cases in which a mistake
results in an exchange which is grossly undercut or a performance which is
impossible. Farrer v. Nightinga 52 is a good example. There, defendant
thought he owned an 8.5-year interest in a public-house. Defendant sold that
interest to plaintiff, the parties writing the 8.5-year length of the interest into
the seller would be obliged to allow a rateable diminution of the price. Pothier thinks,
howevcer, that in equity the buyer ought not to be bound to any part of the modification
of the contract, when the inducement to the contract had thus failed.; and this would seem
to be the reasoning of Papinian [citation to Digest XVIII.l.58], from another passage in
the Pandects....
2 Kent, supra note 321, at 367-68. Kent relies on the civil law often. In another place, Kent
explained:
[Ulpon subjects relating to private rights and personal contracts, and the duties which flow
from them, there is no system of law [like the civil] in which principles are investigated
with more good sense, or declared and enforced with more accurate and impartial
justice ..... [For instance,] the rights and duties flowing from personal contracts,
express and implied and under the infinite variety of shapes which they assume in the
business and commerce of life, are defined and illustrated with a clearness and brevity
without example.
I id. at 507.
350. Kent, supra note 321, at 367-68. The Napoleonic Code section, 1601, to which Kent cites
reads as follows:
If at the moment of sale the thing sold has perished intirely, the sale shall be null.
If a part only of the thing has perished, it is at the option of the purchaser to abandon
the sale, or to demand the part preserved, on having the price determined by estimation.
The Code Napoleon § 1601 (Bryant Barrett, trans., Reed, 1811, reprinted by Gryphon 1983).
351. 2 Esp. 639, 170 Eng. Rep. 481 (1798).
[Vol. 58
VAL D. RICKS
their agreement. Plaintiff paid a £5 deposit but then learned that the 8.5-year
term was only a 6-year term. The plaintiff sued for money had and received.
Lord Kenyon ordered it returned and declared that "where a person sells an
interest, and it appears that the interest, which he pretended to sell, was not a
true one .. ., the buyer may consider the contract as at an end." ' 2 Kenyon
explicitly referred to the parties' actions as a "mistake" (though not "mutual
mistake")." 3  The other law cases Kent discusses are similar assumpsits in
which consideration was missing (because products were defective, for instance),
although the parties mistakenly thought it existed when they formed their
contracts.5 4
Kent next discusses chancery cases in which title to the item sold does not
exist. Kent notes English and American precedent coming to opposite
conclusions on whether this defect allows a rescission.3s' Kent then ties these
defective title cases to Farrer and the defective goods cases: Abatement of price
for defective title "is analogous in principle to the case of goods sold as of a
certain quality, and they turn out to be of an inferior quality ... ,,3 6 But
Kent would hold all these cases to be mutual mistake (and, by implication,
failure of consideration):
The good sense and equity of the law on this subject is, that if the
defect of title, whether of lands or chattels, be so great as to render the
thing sold unfit for the use intended, and not within the inducement to
the purchase, the purchaser ought not to be held to the contract, but be
left at liberty to rescind it altogether. This is the principle alluded to by
Pothier, and repeatedly by ... Lord Kenyon .... It is tobe regretted,
that the embarrassment and contradiction which accompany the English
and American cases on this subject, cannot be relieved by the establish-
352. id. at 639-41; 170 Eng. Rep. at 481-82. Precedent for this decision, id. at 641 n.*, 170
Eng. Rep. at 482 n.4, was Berry v. Young, 2 Esp. 640 n.*, 170 Eng. Rep. at 482 n.* (1788). In
Berry, a sale of land was made conditioned on a showing of good title. When the purchaser called
on the vendor to show title, the vendor could show only an abstract, but no deed. The purchaser
sued for the money had and received, and Lord Kenyon granted the action on the ground that "the
seller... has here failed in completing his engagement .. " Id. Thus, in Farrer, breach in Berry
was translated into failure of consideration which resulted from mistake, which warranted relief.
353. Farrer, 2 Esp. at 640, 170 Eng. Rep. at 481.
354. See. e.g., Tye v. Gwynne, 2 Camp. 346, 170 Eng. Rep. 1179 (1810) (discussing whether
defendant could prove mitigation of damages so as to reduce the amount of a note, because the
defendant had received bad cheese for the note and therefore consideration had failed); Morgan v.
Richardson, I Camp. 40 n.*, 170 Eng. Rep. 868 (breach in that the ham ordered was "almost quite
unmarketable"; court reasoned that consideration had failed), reported as a note to Farnsworth v.
Garrard, I Camp. 38, 170 Eng. Rep. 867 (1807); Fleming v. Simpson, 1 Camp. 40 n.0, 170 Eng.
Rep. 868 (c.1806) (breach in that wine ordered was "very bad quality"), reported as a note to
Farnsworth v. Garrard, I Camp. 38, 170 Eng. Rep. 867 (1807); Curtis v. Hannay, 3 Esp. 82, 170
Eng. Rep. 546 (1800) (assumpsit because warranty failed and the horse sold was not sound); Towers
v. Barrett, I T.R. 133, 99 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1786) (money had and received for failed condition).
355. 2 Kent, supra note 321, at 370-73.
356. Id. at 372-73.
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ment of some clear and definite rule, like that declared in France, which
shall be of controlling influence and universal reception."'
Kent's influence was substantial. 5
F. The Climax: Kent's Regret Relieved, or How Consideration Came to
Guide Mutual Mistake's Application
In the period of time in which all of the previous developments took place,
the substantive forms of relief for a litigant at law remained bound in pleading
forms. The common law theories for money had and received were reflected in
the pleading and proof requirements for a writ of indebitatus assumpsit, for
instance. Failure to plead correctly would result in nonsuit 59 Recovery in
contract when the plaintiff had paid no money was generally obtained in an
action pleading an assumpsit, though sometimes a covenant or debt. In equity,
only one form of pleading was required,3" but the ambiguous equitable heads
357. Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added).
358. See generally Schwartz, supra note 339, at 143-51. Kent is cited in, for example, the
mutual mistake cases of Fritzler v. Robinson, 70 Iowa 500, 503 (1886) (also citing to Story); Gibson
v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 379, 381 (1877)(citing also to Pothier); see also, e.g., Smith v. Fly, 24 Tex. 345,
351 (1859). Kent may have taken his cue from the translator of Pothier, William David Evans.
Evans described at length the tie between consideration or cause and mistake:
It may be stated as a general principle, that ... when the only cause of payment is a
mistake ... , the adequacy or inadequacy of such cause is the important point...; and
if no other cause of payment appears, and it is. established that money paid under a
mistake, whether of law or of fact, may... be reclaimed, and it is doubtful whether such
mistake did or did not exist, there can be no injustice in adopting the proposition of
Pothier, that when it is uncertain whether a man has paid what was not due from him
knowingly or erroneously, it ought to be presumed that the payment was made
erroneously, and that he should be allowed to reclaim it ....
William David Evans, in Of Mistakes of Law, 2 Pothier, supra note 105, at 341; see also id. at 345-
53. Readers should recall that cases of defective title with respect to acreage are now handled under
the rubric of mutual mistake, just as Kent recommended. See supra notes 355-358 and accompany-
ing text.
359. In Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb. 222 (N.Y. 1855), the court explained in a mistake case
brought at law that the plaintiff's complaint "contains charges for money lent and advanced, and for
money paid, laid out and expended for the use of the plaintiff, neither of which was sustained by
proof; but it omits the usual claim for money had and received, which, if preferred, would have
sustained a [referee's] report in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 236. This language is dicta, as the
plaintiff did succeed before the referee in getting its money back, id. at 228, and the defendant failed
to appeal and therefore abandoned the argument that the plaintiff had failed to plead the cause of
action on which the plaintiff had won at trial. Id. at 236.
360. Spence described the proceeding in Chancery thus:
[Tihe party who desired relief applied as he would to Parliament, or the Council, by a
petition, which afterwards, as in Parliament, was called a Bill. This Bill commenced the
Suit.
.... The plaintiff in his bill simply detailed the facts; it was not necessary that the bill
should use any particular phraseology, or that it should define or describe the cause of suit
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of jurisdiction, of which mistake was one, were so general they gave little
precedential guidance.
Courts in England and America kept mistake in money had and received and
mistake in equity separate, at least formally."' Chancery traditionally refused
relief to the plaintiff who had an adequate remedy at law. 2 Thus, if money had
and received was available to correct a mistake, chancery would deny jurisdic-
tion. 63 Though this formal distinction largely remained part of the law through
the early 1800s, 36' English law courts were anxious to extend the jurisdiction of
indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, so they construed their
jurisdiction broadly. 365 By 1760 Lord Mansfield could ground the action for
money had and received on "ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money." Fonblanque thought this statement of relief at law preempted
chancery jurisdiction over all cases of money had and received. 67 These and
similar developments in other parts of the law caused Spence to report in 1848 that
the common law courts had developed an "equitable jurisdiction."368
in any set or definite terms, as in a declaration at law: ... it frequently sought relief
against some rule of law. All that the plaintiff had to show was that his was a case which
ought to be entertained under the powers given by the general delegation [of authority to
the Chancery].
The bills almost universally pray a subpoena, sometimes a writ of Habeas Corpus cum
causa, or a writ of Certiorari alone .... The bills always conclude in terms of
supplication, as "for the reverence of God and for work of Charity," the plaintiff
sometimes adding, "and he shall ever pray for you;-"and your petitioner shall ever pray,
&c.," is still appended to every petition to the Chancellor.
I Spence, supra note 140, at 367-68; see also generally John Newland, Practice of the High Court
of Chancery (Backus I 18).
361. See, e.g., Lesslie v. Richardson, 60 Alabama 563, 568 (1877) ("When there is a complete
and adequate remedy at law, the Chancery Court has no jurisdiction .... "); Ramsay v. County of
Clifton, 92 III. 225, 228-29 (1879) (refusing to grant a bill in equity for mistake because "the action
at law for money had and received is ... a full and complete remedy"); Smith v. Fly, 24 Tex. 345
(1859) (discussing the differences between money had and received by mistake and mistake in equity;
treating the various legal and equitable jurisdictions as settled).
362. See, e.g., Bowen v. Waters, 3 F. Cas. 1058, 1061 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1827); 1 Spence, supra
note 140, at 420 ("It was a principle, that if the matter were properly cognizable, and relievable in
any established court of ordinary jurisdiction, and no assistance was required from the court to
effectate a fair trial, the parties should be dismissed from the Court of Chancery .... ); Ballow,
supra note 241, at 3 ("But if the law has determined a matter with all its circumstances, equity cannot
intermeddle.")..
363. See supra cases cited notes 359 and 361; Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 361-66
n.(g) ("if it be true, that an action for money had and received will lie in all cases in which a bill in
equity could be sustained .... it seems to afford this conclusion, that a bill in equity, in such case,
could not have been sustained").
364. See supra cases cited note 361.
365. Holt resisted this. 8 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 90-92 (Little, Brown
1926).
366. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B. 1760).
367. Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 361-66 n.(g).
368. 1 Spence, supra note 140, at 699-700.
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American courts accepted the broad, equitable notion of money had and
received. Pennsylvania's Justice Bradford in 1792 stated typically:
This is an equitable action; the defendant ... may go into all the equity
of the case; and unless it appears, that he cannot in conscience and
equity retain the money, unless, ex aequo et bono, he is bound to refund
it; the verdict must be for him.3
69
This doctrine blurred the line between equity and law. Other facets of American
law made the line harder to distinguish. America's highest courts of appeals,
state and federal, often reviewed both equity and law decisions.7 Most early
Americandecisions explicitly recognizing"mutual mistake" come from chancery-
like trial courts. 7' But if the court of appeals reviewing the decision hears
both law and equity appeals, is it a court of law or a court of equity?37
369. Barr v. Craig, 2 DalI. 151, 154 (Pa. 1792) (Bradford, J., concurring); see Guthrie v. Hyatt,
I Del. (I Harr.] 446, 447 (1834) ("The action of assumpsit has been likened to a bill in equity.");
Dupuy v. Johnson, 4 Ky. 562 (1809) ("According to the modem doctrine, there is no difference at
law or in equity with respect to [the defendant's] liability. The action for money had and received
... is an equitable action, and is held to lie wherever money has been paid to the use of another,
which, ex equo et bono, he ought to refund. The defense allowed to this action is equally liberal,
every thing being permitted to be given in evidence.., which may tend to destroy or diminish the
equity of the plaintiff's claim."); Wiseman v. Lyman, 7 Mass. (I Tyng) 286, 288 (1811); Wright v.
Butler, 6 Wend. 284, 290 (N.Y. 1830) ("These actions on the money counts are resorted to as
substitutes for bills in chancery, and ought to be encouraged whenever the law affords no other
remedy, and where a court of equity would compel the defendant to repay to the plaintiff a sum of
money which the latter had been compelled to pay for his benefit."); Morris v. Tarin, I DalI. 158,
159 (Pa. 1785) ("This is a liberal kind of action, and will lie in all cases where by the ties of natural
justice and equity the defendant ought to refund the money paid to him .... ").
370. E.g., Harrison & Gibson v. Stowers, 2 Miss. (I Walker) 165 (1824) (Mississippi Supreme
Court reviewing the decision of a superior court in chancery); Hunter v. Goudy, I Ohio 449 (1824)
(Ohio Supreme Court reviewing a bill in equity); Drew v. Clarke, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 373 (1813)
(Tennessee Supreme Court reviewing a bill in equity). An early contemporary commentator,
Anthony Laussat, reports that in Connecticut, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama some trial courts had both legal and equitable jurisdiction.
Laussat, supra note 280, at Appendix. In addition, some equity jurisdiction was committed to the
trial-level law courts in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and Missouri. Id. Only Delaware, New
Jersey, South Carolina, and Mississippi kept law and equity entirely separate at the trial level, but
in Mississippi, as in Stowers, appeal was to the Supreme Court, which heard both law and equity
appeals. Id.
371. E.g., Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (I I Pet) 63 (1837); Harrison & Gibson v. Stowers, 2
Miss. (I Walker) 165 (1824) (appeal from a superior court of chancery); Hunter v. Goudy, I Ohio
449 (1824) (reviewing a bill for relief from a judgment in a law court, sitting as "(a] court of
equity"); Drew v. Clarke, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 373 (1813) (reviewing a bill in equity); Alexander v.
Muirhead, I S.C. Eq. (2 Des.) 162 (1802); Tucker v. Cocke, 2 Rand. 51 (Va. Ct. App. 1823)(appeal
from "the Lynchburg Chancery Court").
372. Perhaps this blurring accounts for Wilkins v. Woodfin ex rel. Pearce, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 183
(1816), in which the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the chancery could order the
repayment of money received by the defendant, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had a remedy under
the common law. Id. at 184-85. It must have seemed pointless to the Supreme Court to send the
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Pennsylvania had no chancery, 3" so its mistake decisions, Swift v. Hawkins
(1768)... and Perkins v. Gay (1817),' came from law courts hearing both
law and equity. Undoubtedly this kind of mixing of law and equity influenced
the movement to merge law and equity to succeed in part at a faster pace in the
United States than it did in England.376
This merging eventually contributed to the development of our mutual
mistake, as Kent advocated. By 1819, at least, all the elements of our American
mutual mistake were present in early American equity cases. Yet application of
the equitable doctrine of mutual mistake remained uncertain outside of a few
limited cases, and little could be gained from the English chancery cases but that
some of them concerned the fairness of the contract. In the mistake and related
failure-of-consideration applications of the action for money had and received,
courts had preserved the early notion of consideration as a ground for making a
promise, a promise's basic assumption, as it were. Moreover, countless decisions
regarding money had and received had explicated various situations in which a
mistake could be said to occur. Finally, the older consideration doctrine was
disappearing slowly and being replaced by the new view of consideration as
exchange.
action back down to the chancery court only so that it could arise anew in the law court. Home.
reports that this same blurring of common law and iequity occurred in Scotland, where there existed
a "union of common law with equity in the supreme court." Home, supra note 7, at 24. "That
inferior courts are confined to common law," Home continued, but had developed the custom of
hearing equitable defenses:
Imitation of the supreme court, which judges both of law and equity, and the inconve-
nience of removing to another court a process that has perhaps long depended, paved the
way to this enlargement of power. Another thing already taken notice of, tends to enlarge
the powers of our inferior courts more and more; which is. that many actions, founded
originally on equity, have by long practice obtained an establishment so firm as to be
reckoned branches of the common law.
Id.
373. See Swift v. Hawkins, I DalI. 21 (Pa. 1768), discussed supra notes 276-280 and
accompanying text; Mackey v. Brownfield, 13 Serg. & Rawle 239, 240 (Pa. 1825) ("there being no
court of chancery," citing Swift); Perkins v. Goy, 3 Serg. & Rawle 327, 329 (Pa. 1817) ("[What we
have to do with is the direction of the court in matters of law."); Steinhauer v. Witman, I Serg. &
Rawle 437, 443 (Pa. 1815); Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 101, 110 (Pa. 1813); see generally Laussat,
supra note 280, at 20-26 (relating the story of how Pennsylvania both gained and lost its pre-
revolutionary chancery courts). Laussat reported that Massachusetts also lacked chancery courts, but
its law courts exercised some equitable powers. See id. at Appendix.
374. I DalI. 21 (Pa. 1768).
375. 3 Serg. & Rawle 327 (Pa. 1817).
376. Law and equity merged in the United States generally with the passage of various versions
of the Field Code, in some states prior to the civil war. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law 391-98 (Simon & Schuster 2d ed. 1985). In United States federal courts, however,
law and equity was always administered in the same court, though through different forms. In
England, law and equity did not merge until the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. Id. at 397
("Field's work influenced the English Judicature Act of 1873."); Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C.
Hazard & John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure §§ 1.5-1.6 (4th ed. 1992).
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Equity courts looking to money had and received for guidance in application
of mutual mistake doctrine would combine chancery's mistake and mistake in
money had and received in such a way that the older consideration doctrine
stayed vital. Now, mutual mistake doctrine rather than consideration doctrine
would look to the inducement to the contract. This is more or less the result
Kent had recommended. It is also the result foreshadowed by the Quesnel line
of cases. This development occurred generally after Kent's Commentaries and
Tucker v. Cocke were published, in the late 1820s and 30s, during a period of
civil law renaissance exemplified by the writings of Kent, Story, and others."7
The doctrine of mutual mistake would retain its Roman, consent-based form but
be applied so as to guard the reasons for promising. The result is a combination
of the elements discussed in this study: our mutual mistake. 7 Allen v.
Hammond379 illustrates the point.
G. The Climax Illustrated: Allen v. Hammond
Hammond hired Allen on January 27, 1832 to prosecute against the
Portuguese government a claim arising from the capture and condemnation by
Portugal of Hammond's ship. Unbeknownst to Hammond or Allen, Portugal had
on January 19th, one week before, granted Hammond's claim."'0 Thus,
Hammond and Allen's contract was founded on a mutual mistake of fundamental
fact. The Court granted relief on this ground, using familiar mutual mistake
language: "The contract was entered into through the mistake of both parties;
it imposes great hardship and injustice on [Hammond] .... [This] ground...
is held sufficient for relief in equity . ,, .' The language clearly shows the
Court recognized all of the elements of mutual mistake now common in
American law-a sufficiently serious mistake common to both parties. 2
Allen could have been handled as a mutual mistake case only. 383 (Allen
was a suit "in chancery. 38 4) But Allen was not handled this way. The court
gave an alternate ground: lack of consideration. Obviously the facts show a
377. Courts continue today to allow money had and received to inform equity, and vice versa.
See, e.g., Sarbro IX v. State of New York Office of General Services, 645 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (plaintiffs seeking quasi-contract damages and rescission based on mutual mistake).
378. Both Foulke and Palmer recognized a connection between mutual mistake and unjust
enrichment, a descendant of the action in indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received; neither
explained how such a connection might have arisen. Foulke, supra note 22, at 221-23; Palmer, supra
note 32, at 35-39.
379. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 63 (1837).
380. Id. at 67.
381. Id. at 70.
382. The Court also held that neither party assumed the risk of the mistake. Id.
383. Allen could have followed the numerous American chancery decisions already on the books
dealing with mutual mistake. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 276-319.
384. Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) 63, 67 (1837); see also id. at 64 (reporter's note:
"This was a case in equity ... ").
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bargain, and mutual promises exchanged.3"5 But a bargaining process was
insufficient to show consideration. The Court explained:
That this agreement was without consideration is clear. Services long
and arduous were contemplated as probable, by both parties, at the time
the contract was executed. But the object of pursuit was already
attained. No services were required under the contract .... [N]o one
can for a moment believe that Hammond intended to give to his agent
nearly ten thousand dollars, on the contingency of his claim having been
allowed at the time of the contract. . . . Suppose a life estate in land be
sold, and at the time of the sale, the estate has terminated by the death
of the person in whom the right vested; would not a court of equity
relieve the purchaser? ... If a horse be sold which is dead, though
believed to be living by both parties, can the purchaser be compelled to
pay the consideration? These are cases in which the parties enter into
the contract, under a material mistake as to the subject matter of it....
If in either of these cases, the payment of the purchase money should
be required, it would be a payment without the shadow of consider-
ation .... And so in the case under consideration; if Hammond should
be held liable to pay the demand of [Allen], it would be without
consideration.3"
This holding reflects textbook pre-classical consideration theory: Consider-
ation for the promise is the benefit received, the reason for the performance
promised, not a bargaining process.387 If Allen could have performed as he
had promised, Hammond would have received a benefit. But because Hammond
had already received the benefit contemplated by the contract, Allen's perfor-
mance could not have benefitted Hammond. Without a possible benefit from
Allen's work, Hammond would have no duty, and no reason existed to hold
Hammond to the promise. Allen combined this older consideration analysis with
mutual mistake: "These grounds ... unite in favor of [Hammond]."' 8'
385. Id. at 69 ("[T]he parties entered into a contract, under seal, in which Hammond agreed to
pay Allen ten per centum on all sums which he should recover, up to eight thousand dollars, and
thirty-three per cent. on any sum above that amount, as commissions. And Allen agreed to use his
utmost efforts to recover the claim.").
386. Id. at 70-71 (This quoted material is taken from several paragraphs on page 70, but formal
ellipses for omitted material are omitted in this reproduction so that the reader is not distracted by
them.).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 141-206.
388. Allen, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 71. Earlier American mutual mistake cases contained, and were
sometimes decided, on this same rationale. E.g., Conner v. Henderson, 15 Mass. (15 Tyng) 319, 321
(I8 I8) (counselling the plaintiff to "demand his money as paid without consideration"); Woodward
v. Cowing, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 215, 216 (1816) (dicta) ("Where money has been paid upon a




Allen by its facts also unites frustration with this analysis. Allen is a
frustration case. Had Portugal granted Hammond's claim after Allen promised
to seek it but before he had begun performance, the American doctrine of
frustration would arguably have relieved Hammond from Allen's claim.389
Because the case is one of present frustration rather than a later supervening
event, it can also be handled as a mistake case or as a failure-of-consideration
case.
390
One more thread is sewn into the Allen decision, typified by Allen's cite to
Hitchcock v. Giddings.9' Allen summarizes Hitchcock as follows:
[A] vendor is bound to know that he actually has that which he
professes to sell. And even though the subject matter of the contract be
known to both parties to be liable to a contingency, which may destroy
it immediately; yet if the contingency has already happened, the contract
will be void.392
This terse summary of Hitchcock preserves in American mutual mistake law an
important line of English cases: those holding that the contract is void if its
subject matter has been destroyed before the time of contracting.393 To
illustrate this line of cases, Allen cites the dead horse hypothetical:
If a horse be sold which is dead, though believed to be living by both
parties, can the purchaser be compelled to pay the consideration?
[This is a case] in which the parties enter into the contract, under
a material mistake as to the subject matter of it....
[A] horse was believed to be living, but which was in fact dead.
If... the payment of purchase money should be required, it would be
a payment without the shadow of consideration.394
In this passage, Allen incorporates into both mutual mistake law and failure-of-
consideration law the Roman hypothetical which Gauis resolved by reference to
natural law. 39  In Allen though, the dead horse hypothetical is a mutual
389. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266(2) (1981):
Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially
frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-
existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of that
party to render performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the
contrary.
See also id. at cmL a, illus. 6 (illustration in which government action renders a party's performance
of a contract pointless to that party).
390. Regarding the dual applicability of mistake, frustration, and failure of consideration, see
supra notes 194-206 and 269 and accompanying text.
391. 4 Price 135, Daniell 1, 146 Eng. Rep. 418 (1817); Allen cited only Daniell i.
392. Allen, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) at 71.
393. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 125-127.
394. Allen, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) at 71.
395. See Dig. XLIV.7.1 and authorities cited supra note 100-106 and accompanying text. The
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mistake case.396 Present impossibility had become part of the law of mutual
mistake.
Allen was an influential case in mutual mistake law; undoubtedly it helped
bring about the point this study uses it to illustrate. 97 A discussion of Allen
exemplifying all three strands of mutual mistake's primary contemporary
application-impossibility, frustration, and undercutting of the exchange-was
included in a later edition of Story's equity treatise39 s and later in Story's son's
popular contracts treatise .3" But Allen remains primarily illustration. Hun-
dreds of mutual mistake cases were decided in the nineteenth century and
thousands since without reference to Allen.
Lawyers continue to mix mistake and failure of consideration today."
More importantly, however, lawyers continue to apply mutual mistake, primarily
Court was familiar with civil law sources; it also cited Fonblanque and Pufendorf. Allen, 36 U.S.
(I I Pet.) at 71, citing to Fonblanque's Equity, supra note 75, at 114, and Samuel Pufendorf, supra
note 108, at I.IX.12, at which Fonblanque and Pufendorf, respectively, speak of mistake as a defect
in assent.
396. Allen, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) at 71.
397. Allen was cited often with respect to its substantive holdings well into this century. See,
e.g., Jacksonville, M., P. Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 527, 16 S. Ct. 379, 384
(1896); Galloway v. Finley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 264, 277 (1838); United States v. Garland, 122 F.2d
118, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1941); Ontario Paper Co. v. Neff, 261 F. 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1919); United
States v. Charles, 74 F. 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1896); Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d
571, 573 (10th Cir. 1929); United States v. Golden, 34 F.2d 367, 374 (10th Cir. 1929) (quoting the
dead horse hypothetical); Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 388 F.
Supp. 323, 325-26 (D.V.I. 1974); United States v. D'Olier Eng'g Co., 215 F. 209, 211 (E.D. Pa.
1914); United States v. Gridley, 186 F. 544, 550 (D. Idaho 1911) (quoting the dead horse
hypothetical); John J. Gorman v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 260 (1944); Waples's Case, 16 Ct. Cl.
126 (1880); Woodman's Case, 15 Ct. Cl. 541 (1879); Bumside's Case, 3 Ct. Cl. 367 (1867); Harding
v. Robinson, 166 P. 808, 811 (Cal. 1917); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Skyline Air Parts, Inc., 193
A.2d 72, 75 (D.C. App. 1963); Stem v. Ace Wrecking Co., Inc., 38 A.2d 626, 627 (D.C. 1944);
Ladd v. Cha-res, 5 Fla. 395, 400 (1854) (also citing Story, Fonblanque, and Hitchcock); Fritzler v.
Robinson, 70 Iowa 500, 503 (1886) (also citing to Story and Kent); Edward Rose Co. v. Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 160 N.E. 306, 308 (Mass. 1928); Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 379, 381 (1877)
(citing also to Kent and Pothier); Navarette v. Travis-Ziegler Co., 194 N.Y.S. 832, 836 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1922) (quoting the dead horse hypothetical); Martin v. McCormick, 8 N.Y. (4 Seld.) 331, 335
(1854) (also citing Story's treatise and Hitchcock v. Giddings), and by counsel but not the court in
Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio 300, 301 (1876); Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co., 25 A. 1070, 1073 (Pa.
1893); Cummings v. Williams, 269 S.W. 845, 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Ross v. Harding, 391 P.2d
526, 523-33 (Wash. 1964); Kelsey v. Mackay, 117 P. 714, 715 (Wash. 1911) (citing also to Story
and Kent); Adams v. Washington Brick, Lime & Mfg. Co., 80 P. 446, 449 (Wash. 1905); Enrico v.
Overson, 576 P.2d 75, 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
398. See I Story, supra note 14, §§ 143a & 143b, at 160.61.
399. Story, supra note 34, § 107 & 107 nn. 4 & 5, at 69.
400. Cottonhill Inv. Co. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Cape Girardeau, 887 S.W.2d 742,743 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (counsel's assertion that because of a mutual mistake, "a substantially total failure
of consideration occurred"); Reggio v. Warren, 93 N.E. 805, 807 (Mass. 1911) ("(T]he important
question was ... whether tlhe particular mistake was such as a court of equity will correct, and this
depends upon whether the case falls within the fundamental principle of equity that no one shall be
allowed to enrich himself unjustly .... ); see also generally, e.g., cases cited supra note 205.
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as it was set forth in the Allen decision, to cases of present impossibility and
frustration, and cases in which the consideration otherwise fails without the fault
of either party-in which the exchange of the parties is grossly undercut."'
III. DENOUEMENT: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Mutual Mistake and Consideration
Mutual mistake's genealogy and current use lead to the surprising conclusion
that mutual mistake plays in our law a role played by consideration, particularly
benefit-based consideration, in the older common law. This is again the role
Kent advocated for it and the role foreshadowed by the Quesnel line of cases.
Briefly reviewing some history of consideration, to see its tandem development
away from the role now played by mutual mistake, makes this conclusion clearer.
When contract law first formed in assumpsit actions, consideration doctrine
kept parties from error, as St. Germain said:
But yf hys promyse be so naked that there is no maner of consyde-
racyon why yt sholde be made/ than I thynke hym not bounde to
perfourme it/ for it is to suppose that there was som errour in the
makyng of the promyse .... 402
Under this notion of consideration, what would look like a mistake was actually
void for lack of consideration.4 3 To take an example of the older form of
consideration that has survived, if one party promises a payment of money in
exchange for another's forbearance from suit, consideration exists for the first's
promise only if the second's claim has some actual validity or reasonable
basis.40 If the claim is completely invalid, then no reason exists for the
promise; indeed, the promisor gains no benefit and the promisee no detriment
from the forbearance.S Without a valid claim, the purpose of the promised
401. See supra cases cited notes 26-28.
402. St. Germain, supra note 152, quoted supra text accompanying note 152.
403. Professor Simpson presciently stated in his history of assumpsit:
The requirement of consideration renders the recognition of an independent doctrine of
mistake otiose. The requirement of consideration excludes irrational promise, and granted
that only promises given with a good reason are actionable there is no place for a doctrine
of error.
Simpson, supra note 115, at 535.
404. See, e.g., Duncan v. Black, 324 S.W.2d 483, 486-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (opining that the
disputed claim must be a "discernible mole hill" from which a mountain might be made); see also,
e.g., Rosyer v. Langdale, Style 248 (K.B. 1650); Pecke v. Lovedon, Cro. Eliz. 804 (1602); John W.
Smith, The Law of Contracts 182 n.(a) (Rothman 1992) (1853) ("The forbearance to prosecute an
action is not a valid consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff, unless there
be a good cause of action.").
405. See, e.g., Stone v. Withipoll, I Leon. 113, 74 Eng. Rep. 106, Cro. Eliz. 126, 78 Eng. Rep.
383, Owen 94, 74 Eng. Rep. 924, Latch, 82 Eng. Rep. 254 (1588). Owen reports Coke's winning
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payment would be frustrated. Consideration doctrine keeps the promisor from
error.
40 6
As contract law developed, consideration's function remained the same but
its mechanism changed. This change happened gradually throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.407 Originally a doctrine which made sure
good reason existed for making a promise, consideration came to disregard the
reasons for a promise. Instead, it came to let the parties evaluate the reasons for
themselves and examined only the form in which a promise was made or
contained. The form, later recognized as the "bargain" or "bargained-for
exchange" was supposed to insure that no error occurred, though consideration
had (and probably developed during that time) other functions.408  Thus,
Mansfield and Wilmot could suggest that any writing imported a consider-
ation.4° (Mansfield made this move only five years after establishing in Moses
v. MacFerlan a broad basis of relief for "failure of consideration" and mis-
take.410)
Powell could by 1791 find consideration sufficient in a sealed, formal
writing.4 ' By the end of the eighteenth century, Holmes could argue that
"[c]onsideration is a form as much as a seal," and that mere form was suffi-
cient." 2  Legislation later held that a writing would raise a presumption of
consideration." 3 By 1931, the American Law Institute omitted any reasons for
argument in this case involving a promise to pay a void debt: "The consideration is the ground of
every action on the case, and it ought to be either a charge to the plaintiff or a benefit to the
defendant." Stone, Owen at 94, 74 Eng. Rep. at 924.
406. This situation, too, could easily be handled as a case of mistake, as noted by William David
Evans. William David Evans, 0/fMistakes of Law, at 2 Pothier, supra note 105, at 345-46.
407. See. e.g., Atiyah, supra note 115.
408. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941)
(separating to some extent consideration's evidentiary and "channeling" functions from its cautionary
function).
409. Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
410. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680-81 (K.B. 1760).
411. See discussion supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
412.• Holmes, supra note 53, at 215. Holmes elaborated:
It is said that consideration must not be confounded with motive. It is true that it must
not be confounded with what may be the prevailing or chief motive in actual fact. A man
may promise to paint a picture for five hundred dollars, while his chief motive may be
h desire for fame. A consideration may be given and accepted, in fact, solely for the
purpose of making a promise binding. But, nevertheless, it is the essence of a
consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive
or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as
the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the
whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other,
between consideration and promise.
Id. at 230. Suppose a well-known, up-and-coming painter contracted with the family of the United
States president to paint the chief executive but when the contract was signed the president had died.
Wouldn't mutual mistake let the painter out of this contract? Wouldn't consideration fail?
413. Many states now have statutes specifying that a writing raises a presumption of
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promising from its first Restatement definition of consideration and instead held
a promise actionable merely if the prescribed bargain form of deliberation had
occurred."' Whether the law could ever turn its back that far on its past is
doubtful."' The Restatement (Second) retreated, but not much.416
Consideration as form no longer protected against error, so common law
lawyers found cases of error arising in already-formed contracts. Doctrines of
failure of consideration and mistake arose in the late 1600s and early 1700s to
reach a just result in these cases, at least those in which one party had already
transferred money."17  During the same period, litigants would occasionally
obtain relief in equity. By -the nineteenth century, as consideration doctrine
looked more and more to the form of the promise rather than the reasons for it,
failure of consideration and mistake had already filled in largely where
consideration no longer supplied, at least when they took account of frustration
consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 4, Topic 3, Introductory Note (1981)
(listing 13 states with such statutes).
414. Section 84 of the Restatement of Contracts provides, "Consideration is not insufficient
because of the fact... that obtaining it was not the motive or a material cause inducing the promisor
to make the promise .... Restatement of Contracts § 84(a) (1932). This supposedly meant that
merely following the form was sufficient to create a binding obligation: "the motive or the cause is
immaterial." Id. § 84 cmt. b.
415. Even the example the first Restatement used to illustrate that motive was irrelevant
displayed a clear motive that had historically played a role as consideration:
A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B to convey to B Blackacre, which is
worth $5000. Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A writes to B an
offer to sell Blackacre for $1. B accepts. B's promise to pay $1 is sufficient consider-
ation.
Id. § 84 cmt. b., illus. 1. Could the first Restatement plausibly suggest that $1 would bind A to his
promise were A and B not related? Most lawyers would, or should, be skeptical of such a position,
knowing the hesitancy of courts to hold A to something that clearly appears irrational.
416. The Restatement (Second) abandoned the notion that having a good reason for making a
promise is irrelevant. Still, the Restatement (Second) remains not far from the first Restatement's
position. The comments to new § 81 imply that the promise must be induced by more than "mere
pretense." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81 cmt. b ("Unless both parties know that the
purported consideration is mere pretense, it is immaterial that the promisor's desire for the
consideration is incidental to other objectives and even that the other party knows this to be so.").
The Restatement (Second) also reversed the hypothetical used to illustrate that reasons for promising
were irrelevant:
A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B. Being advised that
a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $1000 a book worth less
than $1. B accepts the offer knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense.
There is no consideration for A's promise to pay $1000.
Id. § 71 cmt. b, illus. 5.
417. Could these doctrines have arisen even earlier in some cases? Sheppard reports that in
order to have an assumpsit action on a promise, the "thing promised ... must be possible to be done
[and] ... must be co-hering, and agree in itself, and with the consideration." Sheppard, supra note
176, at 84 (1663). This requirement sounds remarkably like Holmes' (and Pufendorf's) description
of a mutual mistake. See supra note 60.
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.of contract and undercutting of the parties' exchange. Cases of mistake
multiplied, both in England and America.
In the 1990s mutual mistake protects parties in somewhat the same way the
older doctrine of consideration did (particularly benefit-based consideration), but
from a different procedural posture.""8 This function of mutual mistake
accounts for the various descriptions of the seriousness requirement, the most
telling of which actually requires a showing that the mistake was as to "the
substance of the whole consideration" or the "sine qua non or efficient cause"
of the agreement." 9 Inasmuch as this older consideration doctrine is unclear
to us now (or, additionally, to the extent it was unclear at common law), we will
remain unclear about which mistakes meet the seriousness requirement.
Mutual mistake doctrine can be applied to the actual cases to which
consideration doctrine was once applied. If a benefit or detriment to one of the
parties was a principle reason or purpose for making a promise, then such benefit
or detriment is probably a basic assumption, or material, fundamental, substantial,
essential, or vital fact. If that reason or purpose is frustrated or its fulfillment
is impossible, then mutual mistake doctrine will allow the party whose purpose
it was to rescind. When a perceived mutual benefit provides reasons for a
bilateral contract, a mutual mistake that grossly undercuts the parties' exchange
will frustrate that purpose and remove the benefit, and the injured party may
rescind.42 Originally a good reason for making a promise was both necessary
and sufficient for enforcement; it remains necessary under mutual mistake
doctrine.
418. 1 have not read every older consideration case and every newer mutual mistake case to
determine if there is an exact fit. But the theory and lines of application fit remarkably well.
Moreover, the fit is strongly suggested by the history. Of course, this theory of the origin of mutual
mistake does not account for later-developed lines of cases, such as those dealing with mutual
mistake in plea agreements, which are founded in part on constitutional concerns. See. e.g., United
States v. Lewis, 964 F. Supp. 1513 (D. Kan. 1997); United States v. Barron, 940 F. Supp. 1489 (D.
Alaska 1996).
419. See supra authorities cited notes 11-21.
420. Whereas the judges of the late 1500s might have found a reason to enforce the promise-in-
the-blood relationship, the judges of the 1990s could find a reason not to enforce the promise-in-the-
lack-of-the-blood relationship. Scottish equity also addressed blood relationships. Home gives the
following illustration:
My brother having died in the East Indies, leaving children, a boy is presented to me as
my nephew, with credentials in appearance sufficient. After executing a bond in his
favour for a moderate sum, the cheat is discovered. The moral sense would be little
concordant with the fallibility of our nature, did it leave me bound in this case. And
supposing the cheat not to be discovered till after my death, a court of equity, directed
by the moral sense, will relieve my heir. Here the relief is founded on error solely; for
the boy is not said to have been privy to the cheat, or to have understood what was
transacting for his behoof.
Home, supra note 7, at 201. Probably a blood relationship was more likely to be a basic assumption
of a promisor in the 1500s, when one's home and income often depended on blood. Mutual
mistake's impossibility application would also prevent the enforcement of a promise of an executor
regarding a non-existent asset deliverable to an heir.
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We should not be surprised by the connection between mutual mistake and
the older understanding of consideration."a ' The civil law analogue of consid-
eration is cause, and the civil law contains a doctrine called error in the principal
cause, which means to mistakenly think cause exists when it does not.422 F.H.
421. Gulian Verplanck said, "The incongruities of our law are more a matter of regret than of
surprise. The reason of their existence is to be found in its history." Verplanck, supra note 320, at
59.
422. See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract 125 (Clarendon 1992); Saul
Litvinoff, "Frror'" in the Civil Law, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 222, 235-36, 259-69
(Joseph Dainow, ed., LSU 1969).
Nicholas describes the French doctrine of erreur sur la cause as follows:
In the context of synallagmatic contracts [(those involving mutual exchange)], where
cause has an objective meaning, it is merely another way of expressing absence of cause,
as [where, unknown to the parties the thing sold did not exist when the contract was
made]. The buyer of a thing which does not exist can be said to be mistaken as to the
existence of the cause for his obligation. Where, however, cause bears a subjective
meaning . . ., the term indicates that the cause for the promise, in the sense of its
determining reason or motive, is unfounded. Where, for example, a man undertakes to
maintain a child in the mistaken belief that he the natural father, or to compensate for
damage caused by a fire in the mistaken belief that he is responsible for it, or where a
testator gives his property to charity in the mistaken belief that he has no heirs, the courts,
in declaring the transaction void, commonly speak of "mistake as to the cause" or
"mistake as to the legal validity of the cause" or "mistake as to the determining reason"
(motif diterminant).
Nicholas, supra, at 125-26. French law also retains an erreur sur ia substance, derived from the
Digest passages we have been studying, however. Id. at 83-95. This can also mean mistake as to
that which motivated the promise. Id. at 91.
Professor Litvinoff further explains:
As a matter of tradition, the internal will is that which is regarded as the essential element
in France. However, French doctrine did not remain unconcerned with the serious
problem of the security of transactions which is better accounted for by the theories that
make the declared will prevail upon the internal one. Thus, the question was raised
whether the internal will should be taken into account by the law in all its psychological
complexity, and, as a result, the doctrinal discussions of error were oriented towards a
clearer definition of the measure in which the internal will explains and justifies the
party's obligation. With respect to this, the assertion was made that a contract should be
annulled on grounds of error whenever the error affects the cause of the obligation. In
this view, the precept contained in article 1I10 of the French Civil Code becomes a
particular instance of application of the more general rule contained in [another article]
where the nullity of agreements for absence of cause, or false cause is prescribed. As a
result, the problem of warranty of hidden defects was brought very close to the problem
of error, and both were framed within the concept of absence of cause.
On the basis of this connection between cause and error, the doctrinal developments
have been so profuse and profound that everything has apparently already been said.
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the theory of error, many problems are still unsettled.
Questions come up very often as to whether an error on the simple motives is a ground
for nullity; the relation of error with cause, warranty of defects and lesion is far from
being clearly defined. Above all, the question still exists as to whether psychological
elements and behavior of both parties have to be scrutinized. Indeed, so many are the
problems related to the theory of error that not all of them can be touched upon here.
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Lawson, a British commentator reviewing English mutual mistake cases, opined
that:
the natural and rational explanation of the effect given to error in
substantia is that the law is prepared in certain cases to save a party
from the results of a mistaken motive. The three leading continental
systems have been unable to avoid subjective tests. Once they are
adopted, error in substantia really glides into error in causa, and
whatever causa may have been in the past, it now contains a strong
admixture of motive, and when it is worth considering is almost
indistinguishable from it.
423
Lawson suggested that the requirement that the mistake be mutual acts as a check
to prevent the law of contract from entirely disintegrating into concern for
subjective motives. 24
The relationship of mutual mistake to reasons for promising prompts
questions about the evolution of consideration doctrine. Professor Atiyah has
noted the paternalism that existed under the older consideration law. 2 s The
courts' saying they will enforce only those promises made with good reason
seems paternalistic. Now our consideration doctrine allows parties to make their
own bargains; reason is not considered in contract formation. But if the law will
undo a promise which does not comply roughly with the older notions of
consideration, has the law become less paternalistic? Of course, mutual mistake
never took account of a promise to pay for forbearance to sue when the claim
later turned out to be invalid. In allowing such a promise to bind without a valid
claim, but on a good faith claim only,"2 the law may become less paternalistic.
Moreover, accompanying mistake doctrine has always been a host of corollaries
assigning the risk of some mistakes to the parties. Assumption of risk doctrine
had no place in the substance-based doctrine of consideration. Perhaps free
market assumptions allowing reasonable persons to determine their own fate
show up more in our assumption of risk doctrines than in our newer consider-
ation doctrine. Even more importantly for mutual mistake, when courts allocate
risk that the parties have not expressly or impliedly allocated themselves, as they
Litvinoff, supra, at 235-36. Litvinoff also notes a relationship in certain cases between error in
substance and error in the principle cause. Id. at 239-46.
423. F.H. Lawson, Error in Substantia, 52 L.Q. Rev. 79, 102 (1936).
424. Id. at 103:
To insist that the mistake shall be shared by both parties... almost inevitably leads to
an acceptance of error in causa, which is naturally treated as including assumptions other
than those relating to substantia.
The operation of common error will be far too uncertain and capricious unless
knowledge of the other party's error is treated as equivalent to sharing it.
425. Atiyah, supra note 115, at 64-65, 340-41.
426. Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 732, 734-36 (Iowa 1986); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 74 (1981).
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occasionally do, courts preclude an examination of the substantive reasons for
promising and instead force parties to allocate those risks in the future." 7
Paradoxically, this move more than any other relating to mutual mistake perhaps
indicates judicial promotion of personal autonomy in contract law.
On the other hand, perhaps Americans do not want less paternalism. Or
maybe we want the possibility of paternalism to remain with us. No one has yet
suggested we do away with mutual mistake. Moreover, as noted above,
commentators continue to suggest rationales supporting its existence and (at least
occasional) use."28 We want our courts to protect us not just from other parties
but also from the inherent unpredictability of the world. Perhaps only on this
basis can our trust in our society and each other continue to the degree necessary
to maintain that society.
Mutual mistake's application to cases of present impossibility is perhaps less
related to older consideration doctrine than is present frustration and undercutting
of the parties' exchange . 29  Even so, the rise of impossibility relief as a
replacement for consideration theory has some consistency with this discussion.
What good reason could a promisor have for promising to do something that is
impossible? Such a promise would be contrary to good sense as understood by the
English and natural law as explicated by the Romans. The Roman hypotheticals
comes back again and again in applications of mutual mistake to cases of present
impossibility. At least four courts cite the dead horse case, and many, many more
refer to Kent's and Story's discussions of it. 3 We can no more expect a seller
of a dead horse to provide the horse live than we can expect him to fly (unassist-
ed) to the moon. Perhaps natural law stays with us to some extent.
Undoubtedly other legal developments besides the decline of the older
consideration doctrine spurred on mutual mistake's dealing with impossibility.
One development was the reluctance of the common law to grant relief for
impossibility generally.1 ' The hesitancy of the common law to release a party
427. Farnsworth. supra note 25, § 9.3; Henry St. George Tucker, Commentaries on the Laws
of Virginia 405 (Winchester 1837).
428. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 23 (allowing mutual mistake to be used when
efficient); Schneyer, supra note 49 (recognizing that we need mutual mistake's existence to make
contracting viable as a mechanism for ordering life).
429. 1 have also suggested that mutual mistake law fills in to protect executors from promising
to deliver assets of the deceased that do not exist. To suppose that only this need prompted mutual
mistake law to apply to cases of present impossibility would be ludicrous.
430. Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (I 1 Pet.) 63, 71 (1837); United States'v. Golden, 34 F.2d 367,
374 (10th Cir. 1929); United States v. Gridley, 186 F. 544, 550 (D. Idaho 1911); Navarette v. Travis-
Ziegler Co., Inc., 194 N.Y.S. 832, 836 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1922). The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts also employs the dead horse hypothetical. See supra note 206. For cites to Kent and
Story, see supra notes 339 and 69.
431. See generally G.H. Trietel, Frustration and Force Majeure (Sweet & Maxwell 1994); John
D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of impossibility
of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 Geo. L.J. 1575 (1987) (describing carefully the
piecemeal fashion in which the defense of impossibility or impracticability developed in English
common law and why the history has confused many).
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from a contractual liability on grounds of supervening impossibility or
impracticability is well-documented, if slightly misunderstood."' Yet this
hesitancy explains only why impossibility was not dealt with elsewhere, not why
it comes out in mutual mistake cases.
Of course, I do not suggest mutual mistake could take the place of the older
consideration doctrine. Its different procedural posture makes that impossible.
Also, mistake as a concept can only be stretched so far. It does not cover future
events, generally, nor does it cover events about which the parties have assumed
the risk. Wise parties explicitly allocate risks of which they are aware, making
mutual mistake inapplicable. Surely other limitations exist which prohibit it
from replacing exactly the older doctrine. These limitations do not mean mutual
mistake does not fulfill the same function, however, in this more limited manner.
Other doctrines, namely frustration and impracticability, deal with future
contingencies. I am also not suggesting that replacing the older doctrine of
consideration is mutual mistake's only function, though it appears to function
that way very often.
B. Rationale of Mutual Mistake
That mutual mistake comes to us with part of ancient consideration doctrine
embedded in it should affect any discussion of a proposed rationale for mutual
mistake. Attempts to give a rationale for mutual mistake have thus far focused
on present policy concerns, relationships between mutual mistake and present
doctrines such as unjust enrichment and unconscionability, or present theories of
contract enforcement. These explanations fail to take account of mutual
mistake's history, which has affected and continues to affect its application.
Holmes' explanation (or any assent-based explanation), a product or part of the
rise of classical contract law, is in some ways contrary to this history. Rather
than looking for theoretical explanations for mutual mistake only in classical
contract law or contemporary jurisprudential theory, perhaps a look at the
foundations of consideration would once again be helpful, or other influences on
the writ of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. Perhaps the fact
we lawyers of the twentieth century have forgotten these roots tells why we are
unable to explain mutual mistake. These searches for rationales should not be
confined to mutual mistake. Failure of consideration, impracticability,
frustration, and doubtless other doctrines carry the facial features of mutual
mistake's parents.
Of course, the original rationale for mutual mistake may have changed but
a new, yet undiscovered reason might justify the rule's use. I think this possible
in the case of mutual mistake. The market economy rationales that seem to
underlie much of bargain theory break down in a mutual mistake case. Free
market justifications for contract law presume that people act rationally and have
432. See generally authorities cited supra note 43 1.
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access to perfect information.'33 Neither rational action nor access to perfect
information occurs when parties act under a mutual mistake. That courts'
application of mutual mistake takes place without concern for efficiency 3.
suggests that these ideas do not animate mutual mistake doctrine, however. Even
if they did, any explanation of mutual mistake should account for the decline of
the principles which created the need for mutual mistake in the first place.
Historically, these needs appear to have been the same principles that created the
need for the original doctrine of consideration. Only a look back to them will
resolve conclusively why we keep mutual mistake in service today.
IV. EPILOGUE: THE FAMILY TREE
John Salmond once wrote that, though "forms of action are dead,. . . their
ghosts still haunt the precincts of the law.""' Edwin Patterson said, "The
doctrine of consideration still rules us, and not from the grave."' 36 Consider-
ation lives on in mutual mistake because mutual mistake is haunted by the form
indebitatus assumpsit and its applications. Mutual mistake brings forward other
ghosts from the past, too. Its ancestors include Roman hypotheticals, civil law
as interpreted by Pothier and others, English thinking about which promises
should be enforceable and why natural law, English public conscience manifest
in the decisions of England's chancellor, the English chancery's failure to publish
detailed reasons for its decisions, the books found in law libraries at the time of
America's independence, our federal system which allowed mutual mistake to
develop in many different states concurrently, our early merger of law and
equity, St. Germain, Plowden, Coke, Grotius, Pufendorf, Holt, Mansfield,
Fonblanque, Lyons, Carr, Kent, Story, M'Lean, Holmes, Foulke, Williston,
Corbin, Palmer, Rabin, Braucher, Farnsworth, the American Law Institute,
thousands of lawyers and judges who have argued and decided mutual mistake
cases, the rise of classical contract law, desire on the part of American scholars
to look for substantive principles as opposed to mere patterns of application, et
cetera.
At least with regard to mutual mistake, history connects form to substance
in contract law. Mutual mistake's diverse ancestry explains its doctrine and
applications. Mutual mistake's genesis in older doctrines and legal systems
explains its family resemblance to impracticability, frustration, and failure of
433. Robin P. Malloy, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice
54-55 (1990).
434. Some applications of mutual mistake are efficient, and some are not. Rasmusen & Ayres,
supra note 23, at 339.
435. John W. Salmond, Observations on Trover and Conversion, 21 L.Q. Rev. 43 (1905).
Maitland said about the same time, "The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from
their graves." F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (A.H. Chaytor & WJ.
Whittaker eds., 1936) (1909).
436. Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 930 (1958).
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consideration. Finally, this history explains the unique character of American
mutual mistake. Our mutual mistake is neither Roman, nor civil, nor English.
Like America and most Americans, it is a melting pot of authorities, influences,
and people who have helped shape its life. Surely it will grow and change with
the people it serves.

